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I N S E V E N T E E N T H-century China, the 
name "Donglin" meant three different but partly overlapping things. It 
stood for an ethical revitalization movement; it referred to a national 
Confucian moral fellowship; and it also labeled a Beijing political faction, 
whose activities are the main focus of this book. The name comes from 
die Donglin ("East Forest") academy ofWuxi county, located about fifty 
miles west of Shanghai, in what is now Jiangsu province. The heyday of 
the Donglin in all of its dimensions were the early decades of the seven-
teenth century. 
The Donglin academy, from its refounding in 1604, disseminated 
through its widely attended lecture sessions, open to officials and stu-
dents from all over China, an ethically intense and militant Confucianism, 
according to which, in the words of Heinrich Busch, everyone was 
"urged to form convictions on the basis of truth and adhere to them 
uncompromisingly without regard to the consequences."1 Important 
for our story is the fact that the Donglin leaders also labored to place 
their adherents and sympathizers in key offices of the central government 
and, through them, to achieve nothing less than the remaking of a 
troubled Ming China starved, they believed, of morally right-guided 
leadership. 
In 1620 and 1621, after the death of the Wanli emperor, who had long 
been hostile to the Donglin, it appeared that the movement had tri-
umphed at last. But over the next several years its pretensions were chal-
lenged and its power curtailed, and from 1625 to 1627 the young Tianqi 
emperor and his favorite eunuch, Wei Zhongxian, purged and destroyed 
the Donglin movement in one of the most spectacularly gruesome polit-
ical repressions perpetrated in the history of China to that point. 
It all makes for gripping drama. Normally the story finds its place as 
an episode in the longer history of late Ming partisan struggle and dynas-
tic decline and collapse.2 Long ago, Charles O. Hucker published an ex-
cellent chapter-length study of the Donglin movement, the conclusions 
of which still strike me as valid. But when I first read that paper in the 
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early 1960s, I was left puzzled and bewildered by the affair, and I found 
it inexplicable why so many should have sacrificed even their lives f o r 
what seemed to be no important or useful or even definable purpose.3 
Until 1989, that is. The Tiananmen demonstrations of spring 1989 o f -
fered several compelling clues to a satisfactory rereading of the events o f 
the 1620s, which also had their epicenter in Beijing. Whatever it was that 
kept so many of us who were not in China in 1989 glued to our television 
sets while the demonstrations were under way, it had something to d o 
with loving good and hating evil; with vilifying the corrupt and cheering 
for the selfless and the brave; with the play of hope against despair; and, 
in the end, with the smashing of beautiful, fragile ideals on the ugly rocks 
of entrenched power. And all those things were searing and memorable 
because they were visceral, and it all ended, appropriately enough, awash 
in blood and martyrdom. 
From what happened in 1989 it became evident that, in China, a 
political-moral confrontation was not necessarily aimed at achieving 
practical reforms or concrete results. The point was not to achieve victo-
ry in the usual sense. Rather, the intention was to communicate sincere 
moral feelings to the rulers and to the public at large. The agenda was 
imprecise, symbolic, unrealistic. The protesters did not venture beyond 
spontaneous or ad hoc organization as a matter of principle rather than 
oversight. Their mood became so vehement as to be intolerant of nego-
tiation and compromise. In the end, the protesters (both the Donglin 
and the students in 1989) did achieve something through their elitist 
storm of absolute self-righteousness: glorious commemoration for the 
dead and imprisoned participants, and eternal infamy for those w h o 
unleashed the dogs of repression upon them. Repression and memory; 
blood and history. Hence the title of this book. 
With perhaps very few exceptions, the protesters of 1989 were not 
knowledgeable about China's past or aware of what had taken place in the 
1620s on the same ground now occupied by Tiananmen Square.4 Even so , 
scholarly commentary has called attention to the place of China's nation-
al self-obsession and persistent traditionalism in the story of Tiananmen 
m 1989. It has been said that Tiananmen was "ritual or 'ritualized' polit-
ical theater" in which an educated elite, articulating ideals on behalf o f 
the entire nation, demanded "a greater voice" in the affairs of govern-
ment It has also been said that, like the students and scholar-officials 
(sht) of imperial times, the intellectuals and students who protested in 
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1989 were an "achievement-based elite—or at least an aspiring elite" who 
had proved themselves, or were in the process of proving themselves, 
through academic competition.6 
At center stage, then, ready for suffering and death, converged the na-
tion's brightest and best. By a display of total sincerity, they hoped to 
"move" (pftmdong) the holders of power. Compelling public statements 
were composed. On May 18,1989, a dozen student leaders actually gained 
the opportunity to meet with Premier Li Peng in a moral showdown, a 
meeting of feverish emotional intensity of which excerpts were later tele-
vised. As is usual in such cases, authority proved resistant to the ethical 
reawakening that the protesters demanded of it. 
Meanwhile, confined as always to the sides of the stage, the common 
people enlarged the unfolding drama by offering from the sidelines their 
sympathy and moral support. In 162$, there had been crowds of trades-
men and commoners who wept and offered sacrifices and donated cash 
to the Donglin hero Yang Lian as imperial police escorted him north to 
Beijing. There were shopkeepers and laborers and commoners who 
surged in riot in the rain-soaked streets of Suzhou in 1626 when the police 
came to arrest Zhou Shunchang. There was also an outpouring of public 
support for the Beijing protesters of 1989, when, thanks to television, the 
sideline chorus swelled to include the whole globe. The last act of 1989 
was a crackdown, as authority in the end retaliated against the protesters 
with spectacular cruelty. 
There seems to be something psychologically askew about the idea that 
political authority should somehow yield to collective displays of selfless 
sincerity. Government, Ming and modern, assumes and acts upon the 
assumption that protesters have hidden agendas, that what they are de-
manding is not what they really have in mind. The effort to "move" 
authority fails, and everything ends in bloody retaliation. Given their 
constant talk of blood, the protesters themselves half expect this. One 
suspects it all ends this way because, in part, the more radical of the pro-
testers underestimate the force of their rhetoric and fail to gauge the ef-
fect their unlimited and unconditional claims to moral righteousness may 
have upon those in power whom they are addressing. Grand Secretary Ye 
Xianggao, as a man caught in the middle, noted this phenomenon at 
work in 1624. In 1989, foreign television viewers could see for themselves 
how effectively the protesters managed to transform Deng Xiaoping from 
a hero of liberalization into a vicious, corrupt autocrat, or Li Peng from 
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a faceless party functionary into a personification of evil, a kind of latter-
day Wei Zhongxian. 
Bloody crackdown, evidently, is a requirement of the script. The pro-
testers are the nation's moral and intellectual elite. They cannot be ma-
neuvered or finessed or bought off, and so it all ends in blood and beat-
ings and arrests and torture-murders and machine guns. Blood and his-
tory. As student leader Chai Ling suggested, it is through the periodic re-
enactment of this compelling public drama that China seems to reaffirm 
its moral and spiritual oneness as a civilization and as a nation. 
In the speeches and placards and protest literature of 1989, "blood" and 
"history" are two words that stand out through constant repetition. By 
"history," the protesters sometimes meant history-as-past, and in that 
(for them) negative sense of the word, they construed the current regime 
as a recrudescence of the oppressive imperial dragon of olden times. But, 
more often, the protesters meant by "history" not past but future history, 
because their actions would ensure remembrance by future generations of 
what the protesters were doing now. As exhausted but ecstatic student 
demonstrators returned to their campuses on April 27, "history wept and 
history also smiled."7 "Let the son call you once more, 'Mama!' You will 
not understand your son, but history will," read a big-character poster 
of April 23.8 "History will remember this historic time, these historic 
lives, these historic heroes!" read another, in mid-May.9 "With the spirit 
of the sacrifice of our lives," said student leader Chai Ling in an emo-
tional mid-May interview, "we fight for life. Death is not what we seek 
but we contemplate death knowing that the eternal, broad echoes [of our 
cries] and the cause that we write with our fives will float in the air of the 
Republic."10 
Blood, of course, was the ink of this future history. "Even if ahead lies 
the end of our lives / Our blood and our unconquerable souls, / shall 
forever be in the annals of our nation!" stated a small-character poster of 
the week of April 20.11 "My students, history's heavy burden rests heavy 
on your shoulders.... [And] if there are people who force us to shed 
blood, then let our blood flow!" cried intellectual Ren Wanding in a 
speech of late April.12 In the words of Chai Ling, late in May, "only when 
the government descends to the depths of depravity and decides to deal 
with us by slaughtering us, only when rivers of blood flow in the Square, 
will the eyes of our country's people truly be opened, and only then will 
they unite... ,"13 And when the end came, on June 3, she said: "Every-
body sat there quietly, awaiting with calm expressions the butcher knives 
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of the slaughterers. We were carrying out a war of love and hate, not a 
batde of military force The students just sat there quietly, lying down 
to await [the moment of] sacrifice."14 
Here, one striking difference between die Tiananmen affair and the 
Donglin protests of the 1620s can be noted. The Donglin radicals were 
themselves central government officials, men of mature age, who volun-
tarily surrendered themselves to the very authority whose moral creden-
tials they had challenged, and then suffered martyrdoms of a most cruel 
and gruesome kind. By contrast, the Tiananmen radicals were young stu-
dents who, for all their rhetoric of blood and sacrifice, escaped the 
regime's violent crackdown, the brunt of which fell on workers and 
others.15 
In one essential respect, however, the Donglin hero-martyrs of the 
1620s beg to be understood in the same light as the leaders in Tiananmen 
in 1989—that is, not as insurrectionaries, but as uncompromising cham-
pions of a moral point of view, a national ethical vanguard proposing to 
use its very blood to write that point of view in such a way as to seize the 
attention of present and future generations. 
The available sources for the events of 1620-1627 are many and rich, 
and they have not been much used by modern researchers. There are per-
sonal letters that participants wrote describing their thoughts and feelings 
to friends and family; there are personal diaries and autobiographical 
accounts; there are prison letters of victims, some of them written in 
blood; and there are eyewitness records, like that of the pseudonymous 
"Beijing guest" who worked under cover as an orderly in the Decree 
Prison in Beijing and left a detailed description of the sufferings inflicted 
on six of the Donglin heroes in 1625. There are publications of private 
copies of imperial edicts and rescripts, and of extracts from memorials 
that came out in the so-called "Beijing Gazette" (Dibao). There are orig-
inal memorials to the throne, unedited by official court historians and 
bearing the original dates of submission and rescript. Beginning right 
after the suicide of eunuch Wei Zhongxian in 1628, there began to be 
published compilations of personal accounts and official documents, such 
as the Bixue lu (Jade blood record), as well as topical histories written to 
satisfy an evident public appetite for reading material devoted to recent 
events. Probably no earlier event in China's long history has available for 
modern retelling anything like the archive available for the Donglin affair. 
The seventeenth century in China was in many ways an age that 
licensed the unleashing of romantic passions. It was a time when many 
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people, in literature and in drama as well as in real life, felt somehow com-
pelled to pursue emotional commitments to their often lethal conclu-
sions. The protean term for such passionate commitment was qin£, which 
usually attached itself to sensual impulses, such as love affairs, but could 
as well be harnessed to the pursuit of moral ideals. And suffering and 
death in pursuit of one's moral ideals, far from being invalidated, might 
actually be "authenticated" by the failure of one's efforts to affect and 
move die object of one's moral struggle.16 The Donglin martyrs failed in 
their stated purpose, which was to encourage the Tianqi emperor, inade-
quate figure as he was, to step forward and behave as an ideal Confucian 
ruler should; yet although they failed, they died in the attempt, and so 
won eternal remembrance from an understanding public for their hero-
ism and steadfastness. 
Seventeenth-century China was also a society suffering from chronic 
and worrisome crises, particularly its inability to stop the steady advance-
ment of Nurhaci's Jurchens (after 1635, Manchus) upon what official cir-
cles considered to be Ming ancestral territory in Liaodong, just a few 
hundred miles northeast of Beijing. A catastrophic collapse of Ming 
armies there in 1619 was followed by further major reverses in 1621 and. 
again in 1622.17 Somehow the dynasty had to be rallied to reverse that sit-
uation. Moderates among the Donglin argued that it was time for every-
one to put other concerns aside and work together to solve the crisis. 
However, radicals among the Donglin insisted that the crisis could not be 
solved unless Ming China first undertook national moral rearmament un-
der the personal auspices of its ultimate authority, the Tianqi emperor. 
The radicals relentlessly pushed their agenda. Deceptively trivial issues, 
especially the so-called Three Cases, were elevated by them into center-
pieces of life-and-death political struggle. The radicals lost this battle. 
Donglin opponents rallied behind Palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian and in 
1626 managed, temporarily at least, to impose a first-ever military defeat 
upon Nurhaci's Jurchens. Unfortunately, the Donglin opposition fatally 
degraded the quality of Ming political life with their frightening arrests 
and horrible tortures of the leading Donglin partisans, and their purge of 
the rest, a process that raged through two years, 1625 and 1626, and in-
deed was still going on when the Tianqi emperor died in September 1627 
and the whole effort collapsed. The aftereffects of that partisan violence 
*xre more than the last Ming emperor, Chongzhen, could cope with, 
though he tried. Internal rebellions broke out and soon grew uncon-
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tainable. Seventeen years later, in 1644, the Manchus seized Beijing and 
commenced the conquest of all the rest of China.18 
Many people in the Manchu Qing dynasty looked back with fear and 
horror at the Donglin encounter with "blood and history" because, as 
will be noted in Chapter 6, they believed the Ming collapse to have been 
brought about in some major way by the political provocations of the 
Donglin heroes' moral extremism. The Manchu rulers worked, with bet-
ter success than the Chongzhen emperor was able to achieve, to ensure 
that weak imperial leadership and other conditions favorable to a renew-
al of all-out factional confrontation should never arise again. 
But something of a cultural predilection for political-moral "struggles 
to the death" (sizheng) lived on to resurface in times of crisis in the 
modern era. Tang Tsou has noted a spirit of "final confrontation" and 
"settlement of accounts" in which not just Tiananmen but much of 
twentieth-century politics in China has been enacted.19 It is evident from 
what happened in the 1620s, and again in 1989, that the absolute moral 
certitude the radicals espoused marginalized as corrupt all efforts toward 
negotiation and compromise. And, in both cases, the extreme personal-
ization of the issues of engagement so demonized the opposition that it 
was left with little alternative other than to agree to do battle on the pro-
testers' terms and crush them in the same high spirit of rectitude that they 
themselves had been forced to confront. 
The Donglin affair was no harbinger of some possible future parlia-
mentary democracy.20 Donglin Confucian thought was monarchical and 
authoritarian to the core.21 However, the arrangement of political institu-
tions in Beijing in the 1620s was already in some ways closer to a parlia-
mentary system than the party-driven regime of 1989, at least insofar as 
the Ming state included a corps of some 170 "speaking officials," that is, 
members of the Censorate and Offices of Scrutiny (often jointly referred 
to as the kedao)y whose duties included criticism of mistaken or inappro-
priate imperial acts.22 The Donglin martyrs were mainly, though not 
exclusively, kedao who conducted their protests against the imperial gov-
ernment both as a political duty formally required by their offices and as 
an ethical obligation stemming from their extracurricular understanding 
of Confucian doctrine. 
But that is about as far as parliamentarism went. The whole tragedy and 
pathos of the Donglin protests was a function of the protesters' unshak-
able belief in the ultimate decision-making power of the emperor. Not 
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one of them entertained even for a moment the thought of challenging 
that power. Even as they were unjustly arrested and abused and tortured, 
even when they could have joined the rioters in the streets of their home 
cities of Suzhou, or De'anfu, or Tongcheng, or Jiangyin, or Changzhou, 
and opposed Tianqi's grotesque tyranny with popular force, the Donglin 
martyrs resolutely refused to seize the opportunity. They obeyed the 
imperial orders. They voluntarily delivered themselves into the hands of 
murderers, and their blood made history. 
C H A P T E R I 
The Ming Throne Imperiled 
The Three Cases 
< 
I N T H E S U M M E R of 1620, Ming gov-
ernment at its highest level came close to a point of meltdown. Many 
opinion makers of the time asserted that the ultimate blame for that lay 
with Zhu Yijun, better known as the Wanli emperor (r. 1573-1620). 
For decades, Wanli liked to do things, or not to do things, in his own 
way. He hated being pressured. Ming house law, the Ancestral Instruc-
tions (Zu xun)y clearly required that oldest sons be designated as succes-
sors to the throne. Wanli had an oldest son, Zhu Changluo. Formally 
installing him as heir apparent should have been a routine matter. Some-
how it was not. For fifteen years Wanli made excuses about it, and his 
delay became the focal point of dark speculations and fervent protests 
among Beijing officialdom. Sequestered inside the Forbidden City as he 
kept himself, no one knew for certain what Wanli's procrastination 
meant. A protracted standoff, indeed a national crisis, resulted and earned 
its own rubric: the "struggle over the root of the state" (zhengguoben). 
In October 1601, the emperor angrily gave in to the pressure and had the 
nineteen-year-old Zhu Changluo formally designated heir to the throne 
of Ming China.1 
But the struggle over the root of the state, far from quieting down, 
soon intensified. Rumors about family matters inside the Forbidden City 
caused many officials to suspect that the emperor did not care for Zhu 
Changluo and was maneuvering to replace him with Zhu Changxun, a 
younger son by his favorite concubine, the notorious Zheng Guifei. 
In 1614, after many years of official protest, Wanli again yielded to pres-
sure and sent Zhu Changxun (Prince of Fu) away from the Forbidden 
City and out to a lavish residence built especially for him in Henan 
province. 
Zhu Changluo's position as heir apparent, once again, seemed secure. 
But, once again, it was not. The first of the sensational Three Cases hap-
pened in the very next year, 1615. It involved an alleged attempt to mur-
9 
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der Zhu Changluo. It is known as the Stick Case (tingji zhi an). Over-
night, it became a major issue of dispute between the Donglin party and 
its opponents in late Ming China's steadily intensifying intrabureaucratic 
struggle. 
< 
A few facts about the convoluted Stick Case everyone agreed upon. There 
was no doubt that in the early evening of May 30, 1615, a lone assailant 
armed with a stick somehow managed to enter the Forbidden City and 
proceeded to the lightiy guarded Ciqing palace, where Zhu Changluo 
lived as heir-designate to the Ming throne. The assailant struck an elderly 
eunuch by the name of Liu Jian to the ground. Then he went up the steps 
of the palace. Eunuch Han Benyang cried for help. Six or seven other 
eunuchs came running. They seized, disarmed, and tied up the intruder. 
Then they took him to the office of the security guards at the Donghua 
gate. Meanwhile, Han Benyang told Zhu Changluo what had happened, 
and Zhu Changluo sent him to tell Wanli. 
At the Donghua gate, squad leader Zhao Guozhong interrogated the 
suspect. His superior, Commander Zhu Xiong, wrote up a report that, on 
the following day, May 31, was incorporated into a formal memorial by 
Censor Liu Tingyuan, on duty as imperial city patrolling inspector. Ac-
cording to Censor Liu's memorial, the assailant's name was Zhang Chai; 
he was a commoner, thirty-five years (sui) old; his home village was Jing-
eryu in Jizhou prefecture (some fifty miles east of Beijing); and he was a 
religious sectarian of some sort. Little else of his testimony made sense, 
however. It appeared he might be mentally deranged (fenjjmo), but his 
demeanor also suggested some possible deceit. Censor Liu recommend-
ed that Zhang Chai be interrogated further, and then be severely pun-
ished for his violent intrusion upon the imperial security.2 
However, the Stick Case exploded within a matter of days into an irre-
solvable national political dispute. Was Zhang Chai merely a deranged 
loner> Or was he part of some sinister plot to kill Zhu Changluo? Those 
in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy who believed that Zhang Chai 
was unquestionably involved in an assassination plot were the so-called 
Donglin faction of moral absolutists. 
Prisoner Zhang Chai was moved from the guardhouse at the Donghua 
gate to the custody of the Ministry of Justice. On June 5, Acting Vice 
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Minister Zhang Wenda ordered Bureau Director Hu Shixiang, Vice Di-
rectors Yue Junsheng and Zhao Huizhen, and Secretary Lao Yongjia to 
reexamine the prisoner under torture about the motive for what he had 
done. The four interrogators were from Zhejiang province, Hu and Liu 
Tingyuan were related by marriage, and the Donglin people considered 
them all to be members of a nefarious regional clique. 
Under torture, Zhang Chai stated that back in Jizhou two men named 
Li Ziqiang and Li Wencang had set fire to his fuel pile. In anger, he had 
come to Beijing. He wanted redress from the imperial court for the 
wrong done him. He was unfamiliar with the gates and streets of Beijing. 
Outside Beijing he met two men who told him he could not enter the 
city unless he equipped himself with a stick to show his intent to raise a 
formal complaint. He followed their advice. He got a jujube stick and en-
tered the Donghua gate and beat at a guard who tried to bar his way. It 
was at this point that he was arrested.3 
Wang Zhicai, secretary in charge of the ministry's prison office, did not 
believe Zhang Chai's testimony. He decided to reinterrogate the prisoner. 
On June 6, he placed a meal in viewing range of the prisoner, who must 
not have eaten for some time. Two guards hauled Zhang Chai to his feet, 
and Wang threatened to let him starve unless he talked. With the meal 
before him but beyond his reach, Zhang gave a story completely at odds 
with the one he had given the day before. He now said that two men, Ma 
Sanjiu and Liu Waifu, had introduced him to a certain eunuch, who in 
turn recruited him for a mysterious mission. On May 30, Zhang Chai fol-
lowed this eunuch to Beijing. They came to a residence, where another 
eunuch gave Zhang Chai a meal and told him to go strike and kill any-
one he might encounter, that he would be rescued if he did that. 
"Strike whom?" asked Secretary Wang. "I was to hit anyone I saw," 
answered Zhang. "The eunuchs gave me a jujube stick and had me go 
through the Houzai gate to the palace gate. The gate guard [Liu Jian] 
struck me with his hand, so I knocked him over with the stick. Once 
inside I waved the stick around but a bunch of eunuchs overpowered 
me. That was lucky for the young master [i.e., Zhu Changluo, the heir 
apparent]."4 
Zhang Chai further alleged that there were other assailants involved, 
armed with cedar and other kinds of sticks, but he refused to name their 
names. All this was copied down in the local dialect that Zhang spoke. 
So there was a plot! Wang Zhicai reported by memorial to the emperor 
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this sensational new testimony. He demanded that Wanli authorize a full-
dress reinterrogation of Zhang Chai in open court. It was Wanli's long-
standing habit not to respond to contentious matters sent up from the 
bureaucracy, and he was silent now. 
Wang Zhicai could not prevail unaided with his new testimony, and so 
other Ministry of Justice officials rallied to help him. A low-ranking offi-
cial by the name of Fu Mei rushed to the home of Vice Director Lu 
Menglong and urged him to convene a larger group to reinterrogate the 
prisoner. Lu called together a group of seven, including himself, Fu Mei, 
and Wang Zhicai, plus the four who had already questioned Zhang Chai 
on June 5 and had agreed that he was mentally disturbed. The four were 
averse to a new grilling, but they agreed to it provided that the ques-
tioning would be limited and no torture used. 
On June 11, the reinterrogation was held. To everyone's surprise, Lu 
pounded the table and demanded that torture appliances be placed at 
hand. Prisoner Zhang Chai no longer appeared deranged, but stood erect 
and spoke confidently. Lu gave him a pen and a sheet of paper and asked 
him to sketch his route into the Forbidden City. "Are you mad? How 
can a madman draw a map?" laughed one of the doubters. But Zhang 
went ahead and made the map. "How did you know the way?" asked 
Fu Mei. "I'm from Jizhou," the prisoner replied, "and I couldn't have 
gotten in without guides." "Who were the guides?" asked Lu. Zhang 
said they were two eunuchs named Pang and Liu, and he added that they 
had given him gifts and that he'd known them for three years. Lu de-
manded to know the eunuchs' personal names. But Hu Shixiang and the 
others, determined to limit the investigation, objected to the question on 
the ground that Zhang Chai could not be expected to know the eunuchs' 
personal names. Lu then went on to ask Zhang what the eunuchs want-
ed him to do. "Strike the young master," said Zhang. "Who do you mean 
by 'young master?'" asked Lu. At this point, Bureau Director Hu Shi-
xiang rose from his seat and objected to the question as out of bounds, 
and the interrogation came to an end.5 
However, Acting Vice Minister Zhang Wenda was persuaded that there 
was more to be learned of this new testimony, and so on June 15 he or-
dered yet another interrogation before a plenary session of eighteen Min-
istry of Justice officials. The prisoner now identified the eunuch who had 
recruited him as old, tall, pale-faced, and named Pang Bao. He could not 
identify or locate the house in Beijing he was taken to, except to note that 
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it had a black gate. But he now identified as Liu Cheng the thirty-five- or 
thirty-six-year-old, thin, dark-complexioned eunuch who fed him the 
meal at the house with the black gate and gave him the stick made of 
jujube wood. Ma Sanjiu and Liu Waifu were Jizhou charcoal makers. 
They were supplying charcoal to the eunuch Pang Bao (Pang Bao was in 
charge of building the Tiewadian, or "Iron-tile Palace," a Jizhou Bud-
dhist temple, for Wanli's favorite concubine, Zheng Guifei).6 Prisoner 
Zhang Chai then stated that there took place a meeting at a local temple, 
at which Ma, Liu, and the two eunuchs promised him food and clothing 
if he would "fight his way into the palace, hitting anyone he met, until he 
hit the young master." The prisoner also stated that Ma Sanjiu brought 
him a "red enfeoffment ticket," which conferred upon him the title "per-
fect man" (.zhenren), understood to be a position in a sectarian group of 
some sort. 
This confession added sensational new details to the story first coaxed 
out of Zhang Chai by Wang Zhicai. Some of the sixteen officials who 
heard this version for the first time refused to endorse it. However, all 
agreed to fetch Ma Sanjiu and Liu Waifu from Jizhou to Beijing for inter-
rogation, and to ask the emperor's permission to arrest the two eunuchs 
Pang Bao and Liu Cheng.7 
The case riveted the attention of Beijing officialdom and further polar-
ized the existing factions. Everyone sought out more information to 
corroborate his preferred story. Censor Guo Tingxun (from Zhejiang) 
contacted Qi Yanling, prefect at Jizhou, and asked him to investigate. 
Prefect Qi's detailed report stated that Zhang Chai was a woodcutter and 
occasional hired laborer who had been driven to frenzy by business asso-
ciates and others who repeatedly cheated him, and that it was in such a 
fit of depression and rage that, according to informants, Zhang Chai de-
parted Jizhou on April 29 with two catties of beans and an axe-handle, 
not telling anyone where he was going.8 
By now, many days had passed since the arrest. Wanli maintained his 
silence. Urgent memorials from the grand secretaries, supervising secre-
taries, and censors begged the emperor to act to allay all the suspicions 
and resolve the case once and for all. Zhang Chai had confessed in open 
court to an attempt on the life of the crown prince! Who was behind this? 
He Zongyan (acting vice minister of the Ministry of Bites) directly ac-
cused Wanli of a lack of concern for his son. "The realm suspects you of 
having long mistreated the heir designate. His position is not secure. 
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Only two [eunuchs] were on guard on the day of Zhang Chai's attack, 
and one of them was over seventy, and the other over sixty," he asserted.9 
There were further suspicions. Lu Dashou, bureau director in the Min-
istry of Revenue, all but direcdy accused Zheng Guotai (Zheng Guifei's 
brother) of having masterminded a plot to assassinate Zhu Changluo. 
Zheng Guotai at once issued a statement denying the imputation. He 
Shijin, supervising secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Works, then 
weighed in with a scathing reply to Zheng Guotai, impugning his verac-
ity and linking him, not just to this recent incident, but to a number of 
other unexplained events in the long history of the "root of the state" 
struggle. The only way to get to the bottom of the matter, insisted He 
Shijin, was to turn the two named eunuchs over to the Ministry of Justice 
for interrogation under torture.10 
Emperor Wanli had not seen or spoken with anyone in the outer bu-
reaucracy since the year 1602.11 In the mid-morning of June 23, 1615, he 
surprised everyone by sending eunuchs out to invite all the civil and mil-
itary officials to a general meeting in the Cining palace, residence of his 
recendy deceased mother. One after another, the officials rushed in. They 
found Wanli seated on a platform, a table in front of him, Zhu Changluo, 
the heir apparent, stood at his right. Three imperial grandsons stood at 
his left, below the platform. "Come up, come up!" ordered the emperor 
to the officials as they arrived. They all inched forward on their knees 
until the closest of them were only a few paces away. "I've been in deep 
mourning since my mother died [on March 18, 1614]," explained the 
emperor. "Since spring I've had no strength in my legs. Even so, on the 
first and fifteenth of every month and on her death anniversary I've 
unfailingly come to the Cining palace to do the rites. I've never dared 
neglect that." 
Then Wanli scolded the kneeling mass of officials for using rumors 
about the crazy intruder Zhang Chai to divide him from his own son, 
Zhu Changluo. "You all have fathers and sons, so why are you trying to 
split me from mine?" He grasped the hand of the thirty-two-year-old heir 
apparent, and said: "This boy is completely filial. I love him very much." 
After a commotion in the rear ranks of the assembled officials, the em-
peror continued his extraordinary public performance. He patted Zhu 
Changluo on the head. "He's been taken care of since his mother died, 
and now he's an adult. Wouldn't I have deposed him long ago, if I 'd 
wanted to? Why are you so suspicious, seeing that he's grown up? The 
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Prince of Fu [Zhu Changxun] is at his fief, thousands of li away, and do 
you think he has wings and can fly here?" 
The emperor then called for his three grandsons to come up to the 
platform where everyone could see them. In a sharp voice he insisted that 
the heir apparent was kindly, and that all those officials who were reckless-
ly manufacturing rumors about die imperial family were evil. Evil! 
Wanli turned to Zhu Changluo. "Is there anything you want to say?" 
he asked. For the first time, the target of the alleged assassination attempt 
spoke up. "It appears that fellow [Zhang Chai] was crazy, that's all there 
is to it. No wide-scale investigation will be allowed." He went on to echo 
his father's scolding. " I and my father are very close and affectionate. 
There is all that talk in the outer court. You're all subjects who recognize 
no ruler. You make me out to be an unfilial son. That is deeply hateful." 
"Did you all hear that?" Wanli asked the kneeling officials. He urged 
the latecomers to come up and have a closer look. "Has everyone had a 
look?" he asked. 
Wanli then authorized three prosecutions only: of Zhang Chai and of 
the two eunuchs Pang Bao and Liu Cheng. With that, one of the most 
unusual meetings in the imperial history of China was concluded.12 
The hapless Zhang Chai, his inconsistent testimony unresolved, was 
executed on the next day, June 24. Wanli did not hand over the two eu-
nuchs to the Ministry of Justice. Rather, on the day after Zhang Chai's 
execution, they were interrogated on neutral ground, in front of the 
Wenhua gate, with the palace eunuch office retaining custody of them. 
The ministry officials could question the two eunuchs but could not ap-
ply torture to them. Repeatedly, the two eunuchs denied any involvement 
with Zhang Chai. While these proceedings were in progress, a message 
arrived from Zhu Changluo, stating to the officials that the deranged 
Zhang Chai had acted alone and that the two eunuchs had at worst cheat-
ed him in transacting for fuel, so causing his derangement.13 
The Ministry of Justice still demanded full custody of the eunuchs, but 
Wanli refused. Then, on June 27, the emperor announced that he had 
ordered the palace eunuch office to conduct its own interrogation under 
torture of the two eunuchs; that five times the eunuchs denied knowing 
Zhang Chai, or giving him a meal, or a stick; and that the two were 
now dead—of the effects of the torture and the extreme heat of the June 
climate.14 
And so the case was laid to rest, for the time being. Officials, mainly 
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those in the Donglin camp, who had been certain that Zhang Chai was 
in fact a hired assassin, were removed from their positions. But beginning 
in 1620, when Wanli died, those officials were recalled to duty, and the 
whole case was reopened and reargued in the cause of partisan struggle.15 
It was now linked to two later incidents, which the Donglin officials in-
terpreted as conclusive evidence of a conspiracy of long standing against 
the throne of Ming China. 
< 
In the troubled summer and fall of 1620, three emperors ruled Ming Chi-
na, one after the other. Wanli, seriously ill for months, died on August 18, 
a few months short of his fifty-seventh birthday. Zhu Changluo succeed-
ed him as the Taichang emperor, but he died unexpectedly under per-
plexing circumstances on September 26, at the age of thirty-eight. The 
third emperor was Tianqi, Taichang's oldest son, who assumed the 
throne on October 1, at the age of fourteen. 
The second of the Three Cases was the so-called Red Pill Case, which 
stemmed from the medications Taichang was given just before he died. 
Did the pills cause his death? And if they did, was Taichang poisoned by 
accident or deliberately? 
For years, Zhu Changluo had been a model heir apparent. Stories fil-
tering from behind the walls of the Forbidden City described how, de-
spite his father's neglect and the insecurity of his position, he comported 
himself as a paragon of unwavering filial respect and stoic dedication to 
his studies. When Zhu Changluo became the Taichang emperor, he re-
versed many of his father's policies and endorsed the recall of many 
central-level officials whom Wanli had dismissed for defying him. Many 
of those recalled were Donglin men. They included some of the bright-
est and most famous lights of the realm. 
The new emperor was in the prime of his life. Everyone comfortably 
assumed that he had a long reign ahead of him. There was wide rejoicing 
at his enthronement. Then, barely a month later, he was dead. People 
were thunderstruck! There was shock and grief. Had he been assassinat-
ed? Had dark forces finally accomplished what Zhang Chai had failed 'to 
accomplish five years earlier? 
On August 28, the day of his formal enthronement, Taichang had 
looked perfectly healthy. Three days later it was reported that he was 
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slightly ill. On September 5, he failed to attend court. On the day fol-
lowing, imperial physician Chen Xi was called in to read his pulse. The 
emperor attended court on September 8 and 9, but Yang Lian (then 
supervising secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for War) thought that he 
did not look well. Censor Zhang Po thought he looked exhausted. On 
September 12, a delegation of officials visited the ailing emperor, who 
complained of dizziness and weakness and an inability to walk. "We were 
shocked," stated Yang Lian, "and we could not understand what had 
caused this."16 
The next day, physician Chen Xi and a small group of officials visited 
the emperor, who now complained of insomnia and lack of appetite. " I 
don't know what to do," he wailed. The officials were alarmed. Word 
leaked from the palace that eunuch Cui Wensheng, superintendent of the 
palace clinic, had administered a purgative to the emperor when what he 
actually needed was a tonic. On September 16, Yang Lian impeached Cui 
Wensheng for incompetence. The emperor refused to endorse the im-
peachment, but he stopped taking any more medicine.17 
Days passed. On September 25, a delegation of thirteen high-level offi-
cials visited the emperor's bedside in the Qianqing palace. The mood was 
somber but intimate. Yang Lian wrote that it was like a family of sons 
gathered around their dying father. It was during this visit that the first 
of the infamous red pills entered the picture. Somehow the emperor had 
been told that a certain Li Keshao, an assistant director in the Court of 
State Ceremonial, had in his possession a red pill that was certain to ef-
fect a cure. In the presence of the thirteen officials, Taichang demanded 
the pill. 
While under arrest two years later, Li Keshao wrote a detailed state-
ment of his side of the whole matter. Li presented himself as a simple, 
good-hearted citizen, distressed as everyone else was by reports of the 
emperor's failing health. "So I thought," wrote Li, "that I have this 'elixir 
of the three primary vitalities' (sanyuan dan) which always works." On 
September 21, Li told chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe that he had 
this medicine and was willing to give some of it to the emperor. But it ap-
pears that the emperor had somehow already heard of the pill. "On [Sep-
tember 25]," continued Li, " I was in my office when several eunuchs and 
guardsmen came in and said that the emperor wanted my medicine. In 
alarm I fetched it." Li was then rushed off with his pill to the Qianqing 
palace and the emperor's bedside. "The emperor was thin and looked 
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lifeless," Li reported. "His breathing was rapid and he couldn't talk intel-
ligibly. A eunuch had to interpret for him. 'Save me, save me!' he said. 
He extended a hand and I took his pulse. 'What is your medicine?' he 
asked. I said: 'It's called sanyuan dan. It's compounded of lead, autumn 
mineral, human milk, and cinnabar.' The emperor said: 'Those are all 
tonic medicines. I want it now. If I get better, I'll give you a big reward 
and promotion.' I said, 'Please just don't punish me for my daring.' He 
said, 'Just bring it, I won't hurt you.' So I had no choice." 
Li Keshao and the thirteen officials then left the emperor's bedside, 
while eunuchs hunted up a palace wet nurse to provide the human milk. 
Li mixed the ingredients himself, to achieve an exact balance between the 
yin and yang components. Soon the pill was ready. Li gave it to the em-
peror. Then he left to join the officials who were keeping vigil just out-
side the palace. Presendy word came that the emperor was feeling better. 
Warmth was returning to his hands. He was resting comfortably. 
Li and the thirteen officials were called back to the ruler's bedside. 
"That's magic medicine, magic medicine," said Taichang. "I feel much 
better. My heart has stopped throbbing. My sore throat has gone. My 
body feels warm. Maybe my color is better too." Everyone agreed that 
the emperor looked better. "What makes that medicine so effective?" he 
asked. Li Keshao replied: "Your primary qi (yuanqi) was depleted. The 
red lead is a young girl's yuanqi. The autumn mineral is a young boy's 
yuanqi. The milk is a woman's yuanqi. Only the true yuanqi from the 
human body can repair a [sick] person's true qi. When the upright qi 
grows, it dispels the deviant heat. That's why it's effective." "Why didn't 
you come see me before this?" asked the emperor. "I'm just a small offi-
cial, and I didn't dare," replied Li. The emperor told Li he was a "true 
loyal official." Then he turned to the officials and said to them: "You're 
all true loyal officials. For seven days I couldn't sleep, so now I'll take a 
nap." He wanted another pill, but Li cautioned him that one pill a day 
was enough. 
Again, Li and the officials left the emperor's bedside. After a while 
word came that the emperor was hungry. Li said: "Don't feed him! H e 
should only take human milk." Then word came that the emperor was 
weakening. With the thirteen officials present as witnesses, Li relented 
and prepared another pill. He also directed that the emperor could have 
plain rice without meat. By now it was early evening on September 25, 
and Li was sent home and asked to come back the next morning. 
Very early in the morning of September 26, palace eunuchs called an 
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emergency meeting of the officials. When they arrived at the palace, they 
were given shocking news. The emperor was dead.18 
< 
Now, among the thirteen high officials whom Li Keshao cited as eyewit-
nesses to the Pill Case were three who were, or soon became, prominent 
in the "pure-current" Donglin faction. They were Grand Secretaries Liu 
Yijing and Han Kuang, and Supervising Secretary Yang Lian. Because 
they were right there on the scene, they could not become the whole-
hearted partisans of the conspiracy theory that other adherents of the 
Donglin, who were not there, rapidly became. Yang Lian's detailed state-
ments defending his own behavior omit all mention of Li Keshao and his 
red pills. But Grand Secretary Han Kuang issued a long statement in 1622 
that corroborated Li Keshao's account but admitted his own guilt in fail-
ing to stand in the way of the emperor's demand for Li's medicine. Thus, 
while Han Kuang endorsed the Donglin belief that the red pills had 
caused, or helped to cause, Taichang's death, he did not venture to sug-
gest that the emperor had been deliberately poisoned.19 
Minister of Rites Sun Shenxing was the spear carrier for the "pure-
current" view that the emperor had in fact been assassinated, and that the 
immediate engineers of his death were pill maker Li Keshao and chief 
Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe, the senior official among the group at 
the emperor's bedside. 
"I was living at home," wrote Sun in a memorial of May 25, 1622, 
"when the two imperial deaths occurred in quick succession. I later read 
in the Capital Gazette how Li Keshao, an official in the Court of Imperial 
Entertainment, had prepared two pills, the giving of which was allowed 
by former Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe. Li was not a medical official, 
and it is not known whether the medicine in the pills was really meant to 
cure the sickness at hand. Yet someone allowed that medicine to be ad-
ministered [to the emperor]! [Nor was the medicine pretasted], and that 
the classics, the Chunqiu and Shangshu, call regicide!"20 
Wei Dazhong (supervising secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for 
Works) went even further than Minister Sun. He asserted that the failed 
Stick Case of 1615 had made every loyal and righteous person in the realm 
fear for Zhu Changluo's life, and plots to harm him continued! Li 
Keshao's pills were preceded by Cui Wensheng's purgative, and Cui's 
purgative followed a deliberate attempt to weaken the emperor by having 
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palace maids exhaust him sexually! Thus it was not Li's pills alone that 
had killed the emperor; it was their part in a deliberate sequence of sexu-
al and medical abuse!21 
It is not known for sure whether Zhu Changluo ever had an exhaust-
ing session with palace maids, or, if he did, whether the maids were part 
of a planned assault on his health. A few days before his death, Taichang 
had denied outfight Yang Lian's assertion that something of the sort had 
occurred.22 Even so, later that same year, Yang Lian raised the same alle-
gation. He wrote that "it was reported in Chang'an [street] that on a 
certain day Lady Zheng presented eight singing girls to him, but the em-
peror was ill, so she visited him, and then she ordered the eunuch physi-
cian Cui Wensheng to give him medicine, but it wasn't effective, as the 
emperor got up thirty or forty times [with diarrhea]."23 
Censor Zhang Po's long statement in support of Yang Lian has it that 
on September 3, Lady Zheng had Cui Wensheng give the emperor a pur-
gative. Yang Lian alleged that on September 10, the imperial in-laws Guo 
Jiazhen and Wang Tianrui had come weeping to the outer offices of gov-
ernment, stating that the situation in the palace was dangerous, diat Lady 
Zheng and Lady Li were in charge of things, and that Taichang's young 
heir (the soon-to-be Tianqi emperor) could not understand why "daddy" 
(diedie) was sick, what "those slaves" were doing to him, and wondered 
how we could stop this> "My innards cracked when I heard this," wrote 
Yang. 
Censor Zhang Po wrote that on that same day, September 10, Director 
of Studies Li Tengfang told Yang Lian that those two in-laws had said to 
him that Lady Zheng had sent maids to Zhu Changluo, and that it was 
through them that Cui Wensheng's purgative was administered, and that 
this was no accident, but all by plan.24 Thus imperial in-laws hostile to 
Lady Zheng were the source of the story of the maids, for which there is 
no other confirming testimony. 
-<1 
The third of the Three Cases was the Moving out of the Palace Case, 
which unfolded in tandem with the Pill Case and cannot be disentangled 
from it. As in the Stick and Pill cases, so here again an assemblage of am-
biguous, incomplete, and conflicting testimony was read as evidence of 
conspiracy by the Donglin, and in a perfectly innocent way by those who 
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opposed the Donglin (including especially the so-called Zhejiang or Zhe 
faction). 
The Donglin belief was that, as the Taichang emperor's health deteri-
orated during the month of September 1620, the Ming dynasty fell under 
the effective control of two women: Wanli's favorite concubine, Zheng 
Guifei, and her ally, Taichang's own favorite concubine, Lady Li (known 
as "Western Li"). 
Wanli's dying request was that Zheng Guifei be promoted to the rank 
of empress. In an act of filial respect for his father's wishes, on Septem-
ber 2 Taichang directed the Grand Secretariat to confer the title of em-
press on Zheng Guifei. A court conference gathered to discuss the mat-
ter. Chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe (of the Zhe faction) asked Vice 
Minister of Rites Sun Ruyou to draft the formal request. But Donglin 
partisan Yang Lian had acting charge of the seal of the Office of Scrutiny 
for Rites, and he refused to let the memorial go forward.25 
On September 12, following an urgent suggestion from Censor Zuo 
Guangdou, a general court conference was held to discuss the issue of a 
new title for Zheng Guifei. Lady Zheng's oldest surviving male relative, 
her nephew Zheng Yangxing, was also in attendance. Minister of Person-
nel Zhou Jiamo confronted Zheng Yangxing in the presence of everyone 
and gave him a stern warning. "The former court failed to settle the 'root 
of the state' matter early on, and the blame for that fell on your aunt 
Everyone thought the succession would be changed, until your aunt 
agreed to forgo promotion to empress. So why does she stay on in the 
Qianqing palace, giving jewels and girls to the emperor, thinking strange 
thoughts, and making inordinate demands? This is a serious matter, and 
all you Zhengs could end up exterminated!"26 Zheng Yangxing blanched 
with fright. "Your aunt probably just wants to keep her present status," 
continued Minister Zhou. "If you cooperate with us, we'll help you, and 
if not, you'll be in trouble. Lady Zheng is smart; she knows she must 
move to the Cining palace." 
Ladies Li and Zheng and Taichang's young heir (the soon-to-be Tianqi 
emperor) were all living together in the various apartments of the emper-
or's palace, the Qianqing. At some point over the next several days, Lady 
Zheng indeed moved out. Debate among the officials continued over the 
ritual-political question of whether or not the dying emperor's young heir 
should move from his father's palace and into the Ciqing, the regular 
palace of the heir apparent. Because the emperor himself was too sick to 
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manage these things, Yang Lian argued that it was therefore the duty of 
the Grand Secretariat and the officials of the outer court to intervene. 
The Grand Secretariat, long abused and neglected by Wanli, had con-
sisted of the sole grand secretary, Fang Congzhe. Taichang aimed to 
revive it. He had made six new appointments, two of whom were already 
in Beijing. They were Liu Yijing and Han Kuang, both identified with the 
Donglin faction. They had introduced themselves to the new emperor at 
his sickbed on September 18. The emperor let it be known that he want-
ed his son to stay in the palace with him. He also wanted Lady Li to be 
given a tide. "She's served me a long time," he said. He gestured toward 
his son. "I'm worried that she won't get a title, except through me." 
A week later, on September 25, came the dramatic incident that set the 
Palace Case in motion. The delegation of high-level officials were all eye-
witnesses to what happened. The emperor sensed that he had litde time 
left to live. "I 'm at the end," he said. "Take care of the dynasty, help my 
son be a good ruler. My tomb must be prepared." The officials protested. 
"You'll live," one of them said. "Why do you speak of that?" All sobbed. 
At that moment, a young eunuch emerged from behind the curtains 
and whispered something into the ear of Taichang's young son. The boy 
nodded. Then entered the "woman dressed in red"—Lady Li. She took 
the young heir up to his father's bedside. There was some whispered con-
versation between her and the dying emperor. The officials could not 
make out what was being said. Then Lady Li forcibly brought the boy up 
closer to his father. The young heir appeared flushed and angry. Then the 
officials heard him say, "Imperial daddy wants to give her the title of em-
press." Censor Zhang Po thought his voice sounded strained. 
Vice Minister of Rites Sun Ruyou replied on behalf of the gathered 
officials. "If the emperor wants to give Lady Li the [lesser] title hunng 
guifei, we will obey." He had the regulations for such a conferment with 
him. "Bring the regulations here," said the emperor. Then he gestured 
toward the rest of the officials standing by. "It's essential that you help 
him." He meant his young son. 
As the officials withdrew from this awkward and disturbing meeting, 
Censor Gu Zao said: "The emperor is very sick, and his cleaving to us 
shows that he's unwilling to die in the arms of a woman, and he hopes 
for the security of the dynasty. He is a great ruler. But there was some-
thing shocking and brazen about what Lady Li did." Grand Secretary Liu 
Yijing made some similar remarks. 
Early in the morning of the next day, September 26, the emperor died. 
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The officials, hastily summoned to the Qianqing palace to hear the an-
nouncement, began a worried discussion of the succession and the secu-
rity of the Ming throne. 
Several years earlier, Lady Li had prevailed upon Lady Zheng to have 
Wanli authorize the placing under her care of Zhu Changluo's two sons 
(the future Tianqi and Chongzhen emperors), plus her own daughter by 
Zhu Changluo, together with three wet nurses.27 This made Lady Li, in 
effect, Tianqi's guardian and stepmother, because his birth mother had 
died. Ming house law did not provide for regencies for child emperors. 
The heir to the throne was no longer exacdy a child, yet not an adult 
either. Born on December 23, 1605, he was not quite fifteen years old in 
September 1620. Could he serve in his own right as ruler of Ming China, 
effective immediately? 
Some of the officials thought that Lady Li should act as regent for him. 
There is unanimous testimony that Supervising Secretary Yang Lian, des-
pite his low rank, objected violently and took charge of matters from that 
point on by the sheer force of his personality. "That cannot be allowed to 
happen," he shouted. "There are no grounds for entrusting an emperor 
to a woman." Everyone had seen Lady Li push Tianqi around on the pre-
vious day. "What sort of scene was that?" asked Yang. "The former em-
peror was forty years of age (sui). The present emperor [is too young to] 
stand up to that." 
Yang Lian continued his argument, to the effect that Ladies Li and 
Zheng were conspiring with each other to capture and sequester the em-
peror and rule China in his name, and that it was now up to the officials 
led by the three grand secretaries present to fetch the boy from his fa-
ther's palace and personally escort him from there to the Ciqing palace 
(the palace of the heir apparent). 
After some discussion, the officials agreed and walked up to the Qian-
qing palace. Eunuch guards wielding sticks barred the entrance. The offi-
cials milled about. Yang Lian urged the three grand secretaries to enter. 
The guards stopped them. Yang waved his arms and yelled at the guards. 
The guards stood aside. All the officials filed in. They made weeping 
sounds in honor of the dead emperor. They called out three or four times 
for the imperial son. At length he appeared. ccWansui!v shouted the offi-
cials. The boy made the appropriate reply: "I dare not accept," he repeat-
ed three times. The officials asked that the formal enthronement take 
place on October 1, and that Lady Li be given her title on that same day. 
The boy was slow to respond to these proposals, but he agreed. 
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At this point the officials demanded that the future emperor accompa-
ny them to the Wenhua palace to show himself to all the other officials 
and accept their acclamation. Palace eunuch Wang An brought the boy 
forward and delivered him bodily. Grand Secretary Liu Yijing took him 
by the left arm, and a hereditary duke, representing the military, took him 
by the right. The other officials gathered around. Just as the entourage 
was about to exit the palace, eunuchs came running from one of the inte-
rior apartments, shouting and wanting to know what was going on. 
"Where are you dragging the young master? Give him right back! He's 
afraid!" Some of the eunuchs grasped the boy's robe. Yang Lian yelled at 
them: "You're talking nonsense! He's our ruler! We're his officials! The 
realm is his! What should he be afraid of? You survivors of castration, who 
are you to order him back to the palace?" The eunuchs backed away. 
The procession marched out the gate of the Qianqing palace. The 
soon-to-be emperor was placed in a sedan chair. At the Wenhua palace, 
an assembly of lower-ranking officials bowed five times and kowtowed 
three times and shouted in acclamation. Then the procession left the 
Wenhua palace and made its way to the Ciqing palace, where Grand Sec-
retary Liu Yijing asked the ruler-to-be to stay while the main palace was 
"cleaned up" and Lady Li moved out. Minister of Personnel Zhou Jiamo 
warned Tianqi not to go back to the Qianqing palace alone. Tianqi nod-
ded his agreement and went inside. 
The officials then began arguing about the enthronement date. Some 
urged that the date be moved up to September 28, or even to noon that 
very day, the twenty-sixth. Yang Lian told Censor Gu Zao that there was 
no need to hurry things; others echoed Gu Zao's point, that matters were 
perilous and the ceremony had to be completed quickly. Reports came in 
from outside the Forbidden City that the people were worried about the 
succession. Officials on the spot thought the security of the state mat-
tered more than strict ritual observance. A eunuch was sent to convey 
these concerns to Tianqi. Presendy the eunuch returned and reported, 
"The young master didn't say much—any day would do, but the sixth 
[October 1] has already been agreed on, so we shouldn't change it." 
Meanwhile there was confusion among the officials who had gathered 
at the Wenhua palace. Many had rushed to dress in formal ceremonial 
costume only to discover that they had gathered at the wrong place at the 
wrong time. They milled about the Wenhua palace, looking angry and 
upset. Yang Lian came by and tried to explain. Xu Yangliang (vice min-
ister of the Court of die Imperial Stud) and Censor Zuo Guangdou 
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sprayed saliva in Yang Lian's face as they screamed at him that delaying 
the enthronement was a stupid mistake. Matters were too uncertain! 
Yang Lian deserved to die for that! " I felt," recalled Yang Lian, "tiiat a 
knife had been stabbed in my back. There was no hole for me to hide in. 
I was ashamed for what I had said." 
The enthronement date could not be changed now, but police protec-
tion had to be enhanced. Yang Lian at once directed the Embroidered-
uniform Guard to form a special detail of mounted police to control traf-
fic in and out of the Forbidden City. Li Ruogui, supervising secretary in 
charge of inspecting the military training divisions of the capital, placed 
additional armed guards at all the main city gates. Yang and Zuo visited 
Minister of Personnel Zhou Jiamo and got him to write a memorial that 
the others could cosign demanding that Lady Li not be allowed to share 
the same palace as Tianqi. Zuo also wrote a memorial of his own, insist-
ing that, since Lady Li was not Tianqi's mother, she had no right to stay 
in the Qianqing palace and act as though she were empress of the realm, 
like Empress Wu of the Tang.28 
After the hectic events of September 26, the next two days were tense, 
but quiet. At some point, Tianqi slipped unobtrusively back into the 
Qianqing palace. On the twenty-ninth, as the officials gathered at the 
Qianqing palace to wait for Tianqi to appear, one of Lady Li's eunuchs 
came out. Yang Lian accosted him and demanded to know if Lady Li had 
moved out yet. "Don't talk about moving out," replied the eunuch. 
"Mother and son are getting along very well, so why should they live in 
two separate places? Lady Li is very upset. Today she got the young mas-
ter to agree they should live together. And she wants to know what Cen-
sor Zuo means by his talk of Empress Wu." Yang swore at the eunuch, 
who then went back inside. 
On September 30, the day before the scheduled enthronement, word 
came from the Palace that Lady Li had backed down. She now agreed to 
vacate the Qianqing palace on October 7. 
This was unacceptable to Yang Lian. At a meeting of officials and pal-
ace eunuchs, he demanded that chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe 
inform the Palace that Lady Li had to move out immediately. No com-
promise was possible. There were rumors that one or more of Lady Li's 
eunuchs were stealing palace valuables. The officials argued. The eunuchs 
argued back. Yang Lian put the issue ,in terms that anyone in China could 
easily grasp. "In the families of common people, a maid serves her mas-
ter, but when he sickens and dies, his son moves into his quarters, and the 
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maid must of course move out. That's because roles and statuses can't be 
mixed. You eunuchs eat the food of the Zheng and L i families, and you 11 
have to kill us to get your way!" Voices were loud. Faces reddened. Inside 
the palace, the young ruler heard the commotion. H e ordered Lady Li to 
move quarters immediately. Three of her eunuchs were arrested for theft. 
The officials were so notified. Yang Lian had won. 
On October i, the young heir, Zhu Youjiao, two months short of his 
fifteenth birthday, took up formal residence in the Qianqing palace under 
the reign-tide Tianqi, as emperor of Ming China. Overnight there had 
been a rainstorm. As the dawn broke, the skies were clear and blue, all 
except for a purple vapor encircling the newly risen sun. It was a felicitous 
sign. Everywhere, officials and people rejoiced that the succession had 
been properly secured. Unfortunately, Lady Li was almost immediately to 
become the center of a white-hot controversy. 
As he lay dying, Taichang had, in the presence of some dozen officials, 
indicated that he wanted Lady Li to be given the title "empress"—or at 
least that of "imperial honored consort" (huang guifei). Surely he also 
wanted her to be well cared for. However, during the night of September 
So-October i, she had been hurriedly evicted from the Qianqing palace. 
Censor Jia Jichun noted that in all the turmoil of ensuring Tianqi's 
succession, the welfare of Lady Li had been forgotten. In a letter of Oc-
tober 19 to chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe, made public immedi-
ately, Censor Jia asserted that Taichang had for thirty years exhibited his 
filial respect for Wanli by showing care and concern for Lady Zheng; but 
now Tianqi's own filial respect for his father had been damaged! The new 
ruler had been forced to abuse Lady Li, in defiance of his father's wish 
that she be well cared for! (It was irrelevant to the core of the issue that 
neither Lady Zheng nor Lady Li was a woman of good character.) J ia 
asked Fang Congzhe to intervene to ensure that Lady Li and her littie 
daughter be secure and comfortable.29 
Censor Jiâ s letter prompted the issuance of a sensational public edict 
from the Palace. The language seemed to be that of Tianqi himself. T h e 
document divulged intimate revelations of a troubled family life inside 
the Forbidden City. Tianqi openly accused Lady Li of having slapped his 
mother » anger, causing her illness and death (in 1619)! Then she humil-
iated 1 unqi when, in the infamous scene at Taichang's deathbed, she had 
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made him beg the officials for the tide of empress. Then, when his father 
died, and Tianqi was moved to die Ciqing palace to avoid her, official 
memorials were sent, not to him, but to the Qianqing palace, where her 
eunuchs vetted them before relaying them to him. So Lady Li was indeed 
intending to "lower the curtain and listen to government" (chuilian 
tinpfzheng) in die style of Empress Wu, just as Censor Zuo Guangdou had 
charged! The young ruler also stated tiiat he hated Lady Li for the above 
reasons and so forced her to vacate the Qianqing palace. But now he 
wished to reassure the world that Lady Li was being well looked after; she 
was living in the Huiluan palace with the full subsidy that Taichang had 
earlier authorized. Tianqi ordered "Lady Li's clique" in the outer court 
henceforth to cease their agitations in her behalf.30 
Chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe read the draft of this edict, 
which had been written somewhere in the palace, in shock, and tried to 
stop it from being issued. It was good to inform the world that Lady Li 
was being well treated, he argued, but the emperor should not divulge 
such details about her. Fang was sternly rebuked by die Palace, so let the 
edict go through. Tianqi followed with another edict reassuring everyone 
that Lady Li's littie charges had been reassigned: the eighth younger sis-
ter to the Xuqin palace and a different consort Li; the fifth younger 
brother (the future Chongzhen emperor) to the Zhaojian palace, in the 
care of consort Fu.31 
These edicts, however, did not still the controversy. In November and 
December the case rekindled. Supervising Secretary Zhou Chaorui ac-
cused Jia Jichun of deliberately creating trouble with his letter of Octo-
ber 19 to Grand Secretary Fang. Why did he care more for Lady Li than 
for the security of the dynastic succession? Jia denied that he cared more 
for Lady Li, arguing that the succession was secure, the dynasty was safe, 
and there was no need to force the poor woman out of the palace in the 
middle of the night. She had been denied a tide; her father was under 
arrest; and, think of it, if her littie daughter fell into a well, would anyone 
care? If the poor widow, Lady Li, committed suicide, would anyone air 
her grievance? Don't we officials have human feeling enough to help even 
one concubine and one daughter of the dead emperor? The whole world 
weeps in anguish over this matter!32 
This was a compelling argument. Officials weighed in on either side of 
it. Donglin adherents like Zhou Zongjian and Fang Zhenru emphasized 
the danger that had been dispelled by the resolute action taken by Yang 
Lian and die others on September 30. It was better to have offended Lady 
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Li, they argued, than to have delayed her removal and allowed her to rule 
"from behind the screen" on Tianqi's behalf.33 
On December 29, Supervising Secretary Yang Lian made public his de-
tailed account of his own role in the Palace Case, in the vain hope that 
hill disclosure would put the controversy to rest.34 The Palace replied with 
a fervent endorsement of Yang Lian's every word. It then issued, on Jan-
uary 1,1621, another sensational edict. This one purported to give Tian-
qi's own eyewitness testimony in much greater detail than had the Octo-
ber 22 edict. It aimed to justify Lady Li's abrupt nocturnal eviction. The 
emperor described how, on September 26, Lady Li had tried to confine 
him to his apartment and prevent his meeting with the officials; and how, 
on September 27, she had tried to intercept him as he was returning to 
the Ciqing palace from the Renzhi palace, where his father's coffin lay. 
"All the officials witnessed that," stated Tianqi. "Clearly she was manipu-
lating me, hoping to rule from behind the curtain." The edict went on to 
make further revelations about how Lady Li had struck his mother, caus-
ing her death; about how Taichang realized that it had been a mistake to 
put Tianqi under Lady Li's care; about how Lady Li forbade Tianqi any 
contact with his dead mother's eunuchs; about how she had her own eu-
nuchs spy on him; and about how, at one point, Tianqi had cried night 
and day for a whole week because of her abuse of him! The edict con-
cluded by announcing that, out of filial respect for his dead mother, the 
emperor would not grant Lady Li any title, but that, out of filial respect 
for his dead father, he was treating her liberally. "The officials must un-
derstand this and stop being partial to Lady Li," he ordered. "Everyone 
must work together and not create factions."35 
The young emperor (or the Palace, who could be sure?) was furious 
with Jia Jichun for suggesting that he was unconcerned for Lady Li ' s wel-
fare and for raising the rumor that Lady Li had committed suicide, or 
might be driven to it. The emperor did not believe lia's explanations or 
accept his apology. He suspected that Jia had ulterior motives for his be-
havior and dismissed him from the civil service.36 
Meanwhile, Yang Lian had entered the spotlight of controversy him-
self. Donglin partisans held him up as a major hero for his leadership in 
forcing Lady Li from the Qianqing palace and eliminating the threat 
to the Ming dynastic order that she seemed to have posed. But some 
voices accused him of taking sole credit for what had been a major effort 
involving others in key roles: Li Ruogui, Liu Yijing, Zhang Wenda, Zuo 
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Guangdou, Zhang Po, and several more. Censor Ma Fenggao criticized 
Tianqi for overpraising Yang Lian's detailed account of his actions, caus-
ing suspicion and uneasiness in the outer court.37 Yet others defended Jia 
Jichun, agreeing that there had been no need to force Lady Li out in the 
middle of the night and doubting that she had any intention of ruling 
from behind the screen . 
All this prompted Supervising Secretary Yang Lian to resign his posi-
tion. He was uneasy that his role had been blown out of proportion, and 
that others were accusing him of ignoring the well-being of Lady Li. He 
thought it best to leave.38 In January 1621, die Palace reluctantiy agreed 
to let him go home on the ground of illness. 
Thus the infamous Three Cases and the profoundly politicized disagree-
ments surrounding their meaning. Donglin officials and intellectuals read 
the Stick Case as an attempted assassination, the masterminds of which 
(Lady Zheng and her family) were never exposed and punished. The Pill 
Case they read as, at best, negligent homicide, with the many culpable 
parties (Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe, eunuch Cui Wensheng, pill 
maker Li Keshao, and, again, Lady Zheng) also unexposed and unpun-
ished. The Palace Case they read as an attempted usurpation of monar-
chical authority. Evil forces had for many years threatened the Ming 
throne, and through it the very political security and moral order of 
China. 
Donglin opponents read the Three Cases very differentiy. The Stick 
Case, they argued, was simply a case of a lone assailant who was mental-
ly deranged. The Pill Case was just a well-meaning but unfortunately un-
availing attempt to effect a last-minute miracle cure of a dying emperor. 
The Palace Case was a chimera, based upon nothing but groundless sus-
picions about Lady Li.39 The Donglin partisans who made "cases" of 
these events, placing filial relations among the members of the imperial 
family in jeopardy, surely harbored dark ulterior motives of their own. 
Over the next several years, the Three Cases, singly and together, were 
argued and counterargued with ever greater ferocity. Partisan lines were 
drawn tighter and tighter, as new officials, upon arriving in Beijing, were 
questioned as to which side they supported.40 In 1621, Tianqi fully sup-
ported the Donglin, as had his father, who had only just begun recalling 
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them to office when he died. But Tianqi—and/or the Palace, acting in 
his name—soon began to undergo a change of heart. The Donglin parti-
sans found their newly won dominance at court gradually eroding. In 
1625-1627, the Donglin were thoroughly purged, and their leaders, in 
unspeakable acts of cruelty, were put to death after slow torture in prison. 
C H A P T E R 2 
Beijing, 1620-1624 
The Storm Clouds Gather 
< 
T H E D E A T H O F their patron Taichang in 
September 1620, after a reign of just one month, gave a severe jolt to the 
Donglin partisans' hopes for political and moral dominance over die 
affairs of Ming China. However, Yang Lian and the other Donglin men 
had played so forceful a role in guarding the succession of his young son, 
the Tianqi emperor, through the "removal from the palace" crisis that 
diey seem to have assumed that the unsteady new ruler would favor and 
rely on them as much as his father had. They acted as tiiough they 
thought it possible to educate the new ruler and, under his auspices, 
reverse the waning fortunes of Ming China. The Donglin were disap-
pointed in this expectation, as the years 1620-1624 showed. 
For all his undisguised physical and psychological handicaps, Tianqi 
managed to win battie after battle in the face of violent Donglin chal-
lenge. He retained the companionship of his wet nurse, Madame Ke, 
despite the sociomoral objections and the contemptuous insults the 
Donglin hurled at him. From the outset of his reign, he shifted the 
rescript-drafting function from the Grand Secretariat to the eunuchs of 
the inner palace, and he seized personal control over all new appoint-
ments to the Grand Secretariat. He secured a personally congenial palace 
eunuch staff headed by the controversial Wei Zhongxian, and he pro-
tected Wei Zhongxian against a series of withering Donglin assaults 
launched from the outer court. 
Up until the summer of 1624, the Palace cooperated with chief Grand 
Secretary Ye Xianggao in a strategy of compromise with die Donglin in 
the outer court. But as the rift in the outer court between the Donglin 
partisans and their opponents grew increasingly unmanageable, the Pal-
ace by degrees gave its support to the anti-Donglin forces. 
The Donglin program for Ming China consisted of three main ele-
ments. First was their insistence upon scrutinizing all high-level official 
appointments with a view to supporting the "good species" and rejecting 
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the morally unfit. Second was their nationwide effort at Confucian moral 
rearmament, revolving around the organization of lecture meetings and 
academies, with the Shoushan academy, which they set up in Beijing in 
1622, as the center. And third was their claim to a right on moral grounds 
to interfere in the affairs of the Ming imperial family and its inner palace 
staff. The opponents of the Donglin readily accepted the Palace and the 
imperial family as they were, rejected Donglin assertions of absolute 
moral and judgmental certitude, and accused them of using moral argu-
ments as a cloak for partisan mobilization. 
The worrisome external event of Tianqi's first four years of rule was 
military defeat and the loss of yet more Manchurian territory in 1622 
to Nurhaci and his emerging Manchu state. Given the already heated 
political climate in Beijing, it proved impossible for either the Palace or 
the outer court to prevent the personal disagreements between the two 
commanders responsible for that loss from becoming engulfed in the par-
tisan battles. The Donglin—with some reluctance—rallied behind Xiong 
Tingbi, while their opponents energetically vilified him and protected 
(also with some reluctance) Xiong's enemy Wang Huazhen. 
Then, in the summer of 1624, the Donglin camp itself began to unravel 
over the issue of official appointments. Secret decision making by Minis-
ter of Personnel Zhao Nanxing and his agent, the controversial broker of 
recommendations Wang Wenyan, created disappointment, suspicion, and 
anger among men who had hitherto been friendly to the Donglin and 
drove them into the arms of Tianqi's surrogate, the palace eunuch Wei 
Zhongxian. That set the stage for Yang Lian's sensational but desperate 
"Twenty-four Crimes" memorial against Wei Zhongxian in July 1624, 
and for the retaliatory political murders that so darkened the later years 
of Tianqi's rule, 1625-1627. 
The Palace, 1620-1624 
One of the Taichang emperor's key aides in identifying and recalling 
Donglin officials was the palace eunuch Wang An. He had been for many 
years a tutor (bandu) and personal aide to Taichang (i.e., Zhu Changluo) 
when he was heir apparent. Wang An suffered from various infirmities 
and spent much of his time after around 1601 in his private home in 
Beijing, where he lived well off the proceeds of house and shop rents. 
. There he practiced longevity techniques, played chess, studied, and, most 
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important, welcomed visits from "upright men" and inscribed fans for his 
friends in officialdom.1 It was through the unofficial personal contacts 
that Wang An had long cultivated that Taichang, as emperor, was able to 
identify and restore to office so many Donglin men. 
Confined as he was to home, Wang An himself needed help in build-
ing a network among the officials in disfavor. Here his principal operative 
was a man named Wang Wenyan, whose arrest in 1625 would initiate the 
repression of the Donglin that so damaged the political and moral climate 
of the late Ming. 
Wang Wenyan was a fixer and a network builder, a fringe member of 
officialdom who had a talent for bringing people together. He was affa-
ble and sincere in manner, a perceptive observer of character, and a keen 
political strategist. He lived modestiy, as befitted a camp follower of the 
Donglin. He knew personally many of the principal Donglin men.2 He 
came from Xiuning county, Huizhou prefecture, home of some of 
China's richest merchants. Through his patron, mentor, and county com-
patriot Huang Zhengbin, a secretariat drafter witii a purchased degree, he 
was introduced to eunuch Wang An. This was in 1613-1614. 
It was said of Wang Wenyan that he loved to put his fingers together 
and discuss high political strategy. The capital evaluations of 1617 had 
been ruinous for the Donglin men. Wang Wenyan correcdy saw that the 
winners of 1617 were a loose coalition of provincial factions led by Zhe-
jiang. Wang Wenyan made contacts among some of the coalition partners 
and succeeded in detaching the Huguang provincial faction and bringing 
it over to the Donglin side. In the "palace" crisis of 1620, Wang Wenyan 
played a role behind the scenes as a contact maker for Wang An.3 
When Taichang died after his short reign, the recall of the Donglin 
men to office had scarcely begun. Although it was Ming political tradi-
tion that any new enthronement should entail major policy revisions and 
personnel changes, eunuch Wang An aimed to have Tianqi continue his 
father's legacy and not preside over any major changes in it. 
During the hectic days of September 26-October 1, 1620, Wang An 
appears to have done much to support Yang Lian and the others who 
were clamoring for Lady Li to vacate the Qianqing palace. Wang An 
personally hated Lady Li, and he did not treat her with courtesy.4 There i 
is testimony that, as Tianqi cowered in Lady Li's clutches in a private 
apartment in the Qianqing palace on September 26 while the officials 
outside demanded that he show himself, it was Wang An who extricated 
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him. "Good tutor has come to save me!" cried Tianqi in his palace baby 
talk.5 
But after Tianqi's enthronement, Wang An spent less time with Tianqi 
than some thoughti he should. According to palace eunuch Liu Ruoyu's 
insider's account, from September 1620 until die summer of 1621 Wang 
An set up an office in the southwestern arcade inside the Qianqing gate, 
about 100 meters south of the palace. Then he moved to a small office 
near the Longdao pavilion, about 100 meters west of his old office. He 
was in bad health and needed assistance walking. He spoke in hoarse 
whispers, which few besides his own personal eunuchs could understand. 
Often he communicated by wordless gestures. His eunuchs ran docu-
ments back and forth between himself and Tianqi. On one occasion, 
Tianqi inscribed a fan with the words "Helping Me to Become a Benev-
olent and Enlightened Ruler" and sent it over to Wang An. In summer 
1621, Tianqi offered Wang An the top eunuch post, that of Director of 
Ceremonial. Wang An politely declined. He wanted a more fervent ex-
pression of support from the boy emperor before accepting.6 
There would be no such expression. As Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao 
later explained, Wang An wanted restraints placed upon Tianqi's private 
life, and he was conducting a purge of those in the palace eunuch corps 
who seemed to be leading the young ruler astray. Aggrieved eunuchs 
pleaded with Tianqi. "The emperor was willful and wanted things his 
own way," wrote Ye. "He detested Wang An's hard sternness and chafed 
under his restraints. He wasn't free to act. So when Wang An asked to 
retire, the emperor exiled him to the eunuch army at Nanhaizi and re-
hired all [the eunuchs] he had squeezed out."7 
What actually happened was a bit more complex than that. Huo Wei-
hua, supervising secretary for the Office of Scrutiny for War, was in-
formed by his brother-in-law, who was himself a palace eunuch, of the 
eunuchs' opposition to Wang An. Huo Weihua, an opponent of the 
Donglin faction, then sent up a memorial opposing the appointment of 
Wang An, on the grounds that he was too eager for the position and was 
not trustworthy.8 So the position was denied Wang An and given instead 
to another senior eunuch, Wang Tiqian. Wang An was then demoted and 
exiled to Nanhaizi, where he was imprisoned and abused, and, at Wang 
Tiqian's urging, killed on November 27,1621.9 The loss of Wang An was 
a major blow to the political fortunes of the Donglin men, because he 
had been their main channel to the throne. 
The political future of Ming China indeed hung on the question of 
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who had personal access to young Tianqi. Tianqi, orphaned and isolated 
in a position of awesome responsibility, clung tenaciously to people he be-
lieved loved and cared for him. The Donglin partisans never fully under-
stood this fact. It is clear that Tianqi hated Lady Li. But he did cling to 
his wet nurse, the formidable Madame Ke, a widow about forty years old. 
A later Palace source described her as having been "alluring, slightly rud-
dy in complexion, and bodily well endowed."10 It is not known precisely 
when Madame Ke became a widow, or exactly when she entered palace 
service, but to the end of her life she preserved in a tiny box Tianqi's baby 
teeth, baby hair, nail parings, and scabs, and so may have nursed Tianqi 
from the time of his birth in 1605.11 
Any male of the upper class owed certain filial obligations to his wet 
nurse, and so Tianqi was obliged to Madame Ke, a woman whose milk 
had nurtured him; still, the expectation was that she should be sent from 
the Forbidden City with a modest pension now that her charge had no 
further need of her services. But Tianqi loved her and was exceptionally 
generous to her. He gave her a tide in October 1620 and some months 
later assigned her the Xian'an palace, about 250 meters west of his own. 
(She could no longer live witii Tianqi in the Qianqing palace now that 
Tianqi was emperor and steps were being taken to select for him a young 
girl as his empress).12 
Madame Ke loved Tianqi and protected him, and so she was in a posi-
tion to determine the choice of which palace eunuchs would have access 
to his person. That of course made her central to the whole question of 
what direction the Ming government would take in the Tianqi era, 
1620-1627. Of this the Donglin faction were fully aware. This is where the 
infamous palace eunuch Wei Zongxian enters the picture. 
Who was Wei Zhongxian? An illiterate and a street rowdy, his early life is 
the stuff of fiction. The presumed facts are that he was born in 1568 in 
Suning county, about 100 miles south of Beijing; he was married at some 
point to a girl of the Feng surname and had one daughter by that mar-
riage. Then he had himself castrated. He entered palace service in 1589, at 
the age of twenty-one.13 
Why would a grown man have himself castrated? The Ming dynastic 
history simply says it was because he was "angered" when pressed to pay 
gambling debts. But another source has it that it was because he had con-
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tracted a skin disease that affected his private parts.14 Stories vie with each 
other in depicting Wei Zhongxian's raffish youth. Was he a poor boy who 
found excitement in gambling, sport, drunkenness, and riotous debauch-
ery? Had he and Madame Ke been lovers from the streets long ago, 
and did he cheat on her, and did she then have herself selected as a palace 
wet nurse out of anger at his philandering, and did he then repent and 
have himself castrated so that he could be with her again inside the For-
bidden City, and did she love him all the more for that?15 The story con-
flicts with "known" dates and other evidence, but litde of it rests on sure 
foundations. 
If Wei Zhongxian entered palace service in 1589, then he subsequently 
spent thirty-one years very quietly as a menial of low rank, which in light 
of his later behavior is hard to believe. But palace eunuch Liu Ruoyu in 
his memoirs asserts that Wei involved himself in several risky misadven-
tures during those years.16 Popular chronicler Zhu Changzuo, whose 
book was published right after Wei Zhongxian's death, has it that as a 
eunuch Wei turned over a new leaf, or showed a new side, and won every-
one's favor and good opinion by his outgoing friendliness, self-denying 
generosity, and engaging litde acts of honesty and loyalty.17 
When Tianqi was an infant, Wei somehow got a job serving meals to 
the baby and his mother, Lady Wang. In that capacity, he got to meet the 
baby's wet nurse, Madame Ke—perhaps for the first time, perhaps not. As 
a waiter, Wei sought to please, and knew where to find out-of-season 
fruits and other delicacies. 
It appears that by 1620, Wei Zhongxian had become an adept player of 
the palace power game. Wanli was dying. Zhu Changluo was heir appar-
ent. Wang An was Zhu Changluo's closest adviser. So Wei established a 
connection to Wang An. He did so by inviting one of Wang An's favorite 
j eunuchs, Wei Zhao, to help him in serving young Tianqi. It seems that 
he chose Wei Zhao also because Wei Zhao and Madame Ke were already 
friendly with each other. Wei Zhao was flattered by Wei Zhongxian's pro-
fessions of friendship, and he convinced his patron, Wang An, of the ex-
cellence and trustworthiness of Wei and Madame Ke. 
I After Tianqi's mother died in 1619, Wei Zhongxian and wet nurse 
Madame Ke were placed under the supervision of Lady Li, whom Tianqi 
hated. Tianqi dearly loved Wei Zhongxian and Madame Ke. So thanks in 
good part to Wang An's firm relationship via Wei Zhao with Wei Zhong-
xian and Madame Ke, the "palace" crisis of 1620 ended in defeat for Lady 
Li and triumph for Wang An—as well as for Yang Lian and Zuo Guang-
44 B E I J I N G 
dou and the whole Donglin faction in the outer court. Almost to the end 
of his life, Wang An drought that Wei Zhongxian and Madame Ke were 
on his side. 
They were not on his side. According to Liu Ruoyu, Madame Ke felt 
constrained by Wang An. She also came to find Wei Zhao ungenerous 
and timid. Clearly Wei Zhao was acting in Wang An's behalf. She told 
Tianqi of her dislike of Wei Zhao and made him promise her to get rid 
of him. 
Madame Ke's coolness distressed Wei Zhao. He became increasingly 
jealous of Wei Zhongxian. One night the two eunuchs got into a scream-
ing fight in one of the apartments of the Qianqing palace. The emperor, 
Wang An, Wang Tiqian, and other eunuchs were star tied from tiieir sleep. 
Wang An was unaware of the reason for the fight and his fury fell on Wei 
Zhao. He slapped him and ordered him to leave the imperial presence. It 
was a fatal political blunder for Wang An and a crucial move up the power 
ladder for Wei Zhongxian. 
Wei Zhongxian could neither read nor write, but he was a skilled ma-
nipulator of personal relationships. To the end he remained in Madame 
Ke's good graces. She loved him for his "childlike demeanor," his "good 
looks," and his "martial ferocity." They at times acted as though they 
were husband and wife. Aside from their palace quarters, both main- * 
tained private residences near each other just west of the Imperial City. It 
was a stable and affectionate arrangement. To the end of his short life, 
Tianqi clung to the two of diem; tiiey indulged his needs and desires, and 
extended a parent-like protection to him.18 
Tianqi appeared to suffer from some sort of learning disability. Though 
he liked some of his tutors, he was a slow pupil. Occasionally he made ef-
forts to learn. His tutors tried to figure out how best to engage him. His 
eunuch tutor Gao Shiming had taught him parts of the Great Learning. 
Tianqi delighted in some of its phrases. But when he became emperor in 
1620 and began formal schooling under court officials, he seemed whol-
ly lost. Court official Sun Chengzong conferred with Wang An and Gao 
Shiming. "In family schools among the people, the pupils all sit together 
and help each other, which is how they learn," explained Sun. "But the 
emperor comes to the teaching sessions and just sits there and doesn't ask 
any questions How can he learn that way?" The three agreed that 
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they should develop a discussion format in which the young ruler would 
be encouraged to ask questions about what he failed to grasp. Then the 
teachers could explain things to him in detail in the spoken language.19 
Tianqi liked Sun Chengzong. Sun reports that when he explained to 
him the "Canon of Yao" chapter from the Book of Documents, Tianqi paid 
close attention. "When I explained how rulers preside over the realm, 
[Tianqi] sat up and listened... and his expression changed and he became 
grave, like a true sage ruler," stated Sun.20 That class was held on Novem-
ber ii, 1620, and was the first of many "discussion and reading" (jiang-
du) sessions Tianqi attended with some regularity at the Wenhua palace 
until his final illness in 1627. 
But Tianqi never quite seemed to make the expected progress with his 
studies. Liu Ruoyu says, "he could understand the main idea" but did not 
like to sit still and concentrate. He learned to write standard characters 
but was never able to master the cursive script.21 He fished for praise for 
his calligraphy. In February 1621, he sent an example of his calligraphy via 
a eunuch messenger to Grand Secretary Liu Yijing. The characters were 
"upright." How admirable of Tianqi to have done this, at a time when he 
had canceled his classes because of cold weather! (Tianqi had practiced his 
writing in his heated apartment in the Qianqing palace, using as models 
the draft rescripts prepared in the Grand Secretariat.) Liu Yijing showed 
Tianqi's handiwork to the other grand secretaries, who were amazed at 
the improvement it showed. Tianqi promised to send more in the spring, 
when the weather was warmer.22 Grand Secretary Zhu Guozuo preserved 
at home three rescripts dealing with routine ceremonial matters that were 
written in Tianqi's own "inept" hand.23 
But Tianqi's tolerance for study remained limited. According to chief 
Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao, who arrived in Beijing and took up his du-
ties in December 1621, the young ruler "stubbornly refiised to study, was 
petulant, and willfiil."24 In September 1622, Ye Xianggao proposed some-
thing easier for Tianqi to read: the Dijian tushuo, an illustrated children's 
book about the good and bad rulers of China's past that Zhang Juzheng 
had put together for Tianqi's grandfather Wanli when he was a child. 
That seemed to work. Five months later, Tianqi was still being tutored in 
it, and he rejected a suggestion to begin reading Sima Guang's Zizhi 
tongrjwn (Comprehensive mirror for aid in government), a standard his-
tory of China for adults, because he wanted to finish the picture book 
first.25 r 
What was wrong with Tianqi? The outer court was exasperated by his 
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extreme passivity. Wen Zhenmeng decided it was up to him to let the out-
er court's feelings about this be known. On November 20, 1622, he sent 
up a scathing memorial tiiat created a brief sensation in the capital. Wen 
was already a national celebrity; he had just achieved the number-one 
ranking in the Palace examinations, was appointed senior compiler in the 
Hanlin Academy, and was informal leader of all die other new degree 
winners. Why, asked Wen in his memorial, was the emperor not standing 
forth to lead the realm in the face of a national crisis and military threat? 
Why, when the emperor attended court, did he just sit there in lifeless 
silence while the officials trooped up and down "like puppets on stage" 
to introduce the day's business to him? Why were the lessons given at his 
tutorials pitched at a level fit only for children? 
The memorial was long and impassioned.26 Days went by. The Palace 
made no response. Rumor had it that Wei Zhongxian had Wen's ugly line 
about puppets acted out, with puppets, so that Tianqi would get the 
point and get angry.27 Wen Zhenmeng later remarked, probably on the 
basis of some friendly palace source, that a puppet show indeed did take 
place on November 27, in celebration of the birth of Tianqi's first child, 
a girl. After the show, Wei Zhongxian told Tianqi that in his memorial 
Wen had likened the emperor himself to a puppet! "Why did he do such 
a hateful thing?" Tianqi reportedly asked. "He saw how tiny you are, and 
how the palace servants have to help you get up and down the gold plat-
form," replied Wei. "You must kill him, to show the realm [you can't be 
trifled with]!" 
After an imperial tutorial on November 30, a eunuch conveyed Tianqi's 
oral directive that Wen Zhenmeng was to be flogged eighty times for ex-
ceeding his station and demeaning the ruler personally. One of the tutors, 
Grand Secretary Han Kuang, argued with Wei Zhongxian over the mean-
ing of Wen's reference to puppets. Other imperial tutors protested the di-
rective: Wen Zhenmeng was a descendant of the Song martyr Wen Tian-
xiang, a god! Others threatened to plead Wen's case directiy to Tianqi. 
"If you do that," threatened Wei, "I'll order the Embroidered-uniform 
Guard to arrest you!" That frightened everyone. When Tianqi next ap-
peared, no one dared say anything about the matter to him. No official 
rescript was issued until the celebration of Tianqi's daughter's birth was 
completed.28 
After twelve days had passed, a colleague of Wen Zhenmeng sent up 
a memorial sharply protesting the delay. It is said that Wei Zhongxian 
then stormed into the Grand Secretariat, waving his arms and cursing, 
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and demanding that both offenders be flogged. But, in the end, the Pal-
ace softened its position and directed that the two be demoted and sent 
home pending reassignment elsewhere. Ye Xianggao protested even that 
as too harsh. He reminded the Palace of the stature of Wen as the nation's 
highest-ranking degree holder and argued that, although Wen's memori-
al was severe and impassioned, it was not wholly wrong. Grand Secretary 
Han Kuang also defended Wen. But the Palace stood fast. The demotions 
and transfers home prevailed.29 
< 
Although eunuch Wei Zhongxian had become the power behind the 
throne, the Forbidden City never fell completely under the control of 
himself and Madame Ke. The ultimate authority was always Tianqi's. 
There always loomed the threat that Tianqi's affections might be won 
away by any of several palace women, including especially his new bride, 
the thirteen-year-old Zhang Ma (1608-1644), or Empress Zhang. 
If the Qing litterateur Ji Yun is to be believed, Zhang Ma was a found-
ling, abandoned as an infant along a roadside, where she was picked up 
and adopted by Zhang Guoji, an impoverished government Confucian 
student (shengyuan) from Henan province. She may well have grown up 
to be as demure and graceful as Ji Yun claims, because she won what 
might be described as a national beauty contest. 
Tianqi came of marriageable age in December 1620, and eunuch Liu 
Kejing of die Palace Directorate of Ceremonial, in conjunction with the 
outer court Ministry of Bites, launched a national search for an imperial 
mate. A pool of five thousand girls came to Beijing for inspection and vet-
ting. A thousand passed muster and were admitted into the Forbidden 
City for intimate poking and prodding by older palace women. Three 
hundred were kept for a month's furtiier observation, and of these a final 
fifty were accepted as palace maids and concubines. Eunuch Liu Kejing 
was especially impressed by candidate Zhang Ma. She and two other 
beauties, Duan and Wang, were given a final review by a concubine of the 
late Wanli emperor, and she agreed with Liu that Zhang Ma was the best 
choice. 
The marriage rites were conducted during May and June of 1621. Many 
people caught a glimpse of the newlyweds when they went together to 
pay their respects at the imperial ancestral temple just south of the Imper-
ial City. Observers were struck by the contrast between the graceful and 
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elegant Empress Zhang and, beside her, the tiny (,duanxiao) emperor 
Tianqi, who looked to them to be three or four years younger than his 
real age.30 
For some unknown reason, Wei Zhongxian and Madame Ke had not 
had any part in selecting the empress. An immediate hostility developed 
between the beautiful new empress and Madame Ke. Empress Zhang was 
surely capable of alienating Tianqi's affections, perhaps even turning him 
against her and Wei Zhongxian. Something had to be done. 
In late luly 1621, the empress's father (or stepfather), Zhang Guoji, in-
formed the Palace that an impostor in Beijing was falsely claiming to be 
the real father of the empress. He urgently demanded that the man be ar-
rested and punished. To what extent Wei and Ke were involved in this 
plot to depose the empress by questioning her paternity is not clear. Per-
haps others acted without their knowledge. The impostor was one Sun 
Er, already in prison for crime. The Palace reaction to Zhang Guoji's me-
morial reflected the empress's anger. Sun Er and his co-plotters, includ-
ing three palace eunuchs, were seized and interrogated. Confessions were 
obtained. The case was sent to the outer court for adjudication. Sun Er 
was executed. The Palace protected the three eunuchs.31 
Many in Beijing officialdom suspected that Madame Ke was somehow 
behind the plot to unseat Empress Zhang and demanded that she be ban-
ished from the Forbidden City. Grand Secretary Liu Yijing supported that 
demand. A Palace rescript explained that Madame Ke was staying tem-
porarily because Empress Zhang was so very young, but that soon a day 
would be chosen for her departure.32 
The day turned out to be a day in late October 1621. Madame Ke 
moved from her palace in the Forbidden City to her private residence not 
far away. Every day at noon, however, she returned to the Forbidden City 
and stayed with Tianqi until dark. Then, early in November, she brazenly 
moved back into the Forbidden City. A Palace edict explained that Tianqi 
missed her terribly and needed her to stay close by him at night, and it 
cautioned the outer court not to start trouble by protesting her return.33 
Immediately, the outer court protested Ke's return. Officials could not 
abide the publicly acknowledged infantilism of the emperor. Censor 
Zhou Zongjian's memorial was particularly scathing. He reminded Tian-
qi that Madame Ke was a servant, not a high dignitary. Had she whined, 
cajoled, flattered, or used her sexual allure to ensnare the emperor? But 
such favors were cheap! Any palace woman could supply them. Everyone 
in Beijing, from high officials at court to common people in the streets, 
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had rejoiced at Madame Ke's departure and felt dismay at her return. The 
emperor's decision maldng was that of a child! Even common people 
could recognize the problem: here was an aggressive servant threatening 
the family order. Yet now the emperor had shown that he could not con-
trol his own servants!34 
There was no response from the Palace. Some days later, Supervising 
Secretary Hou Zhenyang sent a follow-up memorial. Surely the edict au-
thorizing Madame Ke's return had been forged! Tianqi was not an infant! 
What need had he for Madame Ke, a common woman from the streets? 
It was the moral duty of the outer court to help Tianqi be an ideal ruler 
like Yao or Shun by protesting Madame Ke's presence in the Forbidden 
City in the strongest terms. The Palace condemned Hou's memorial as 
"disruptive." It accused Hou of reputation seeking.35 
Two more supervising secretaries replied in Hou's behalf. One of 
them, Zhu Qinxiang, raised a cosmic argument. Madame Ke, he said, 
personified the negative cosmic force (yinqi). So did the "slave miasma" 
(nufen), by which he meant the war in Manchuria being waged by 
Nurhaci and the future Manchus. "China" and the "gentieman" (junzi) 
manifest the positive cosmic force (yang), while women and barbarians 
are yin. Dark and evil things attract each other. Eventually the yinqi will 
bring on a "killing cycle" (shayun). To Zhu's memorial, the Palace re-
sponse was punitive. Zhu was demoted and sent home pending reassign-
ment elsewhere.36 
It took a long time for Supervising Secretary Jiang Xikong's memorial 
to arrive from the auxiliary capital at Nanjing, but he protested from a 
systemic perspective the demotions of his Beijing colleagues. He said that 
they had spoken out justiy; punishing them had created paranoia (cai-
cun); silencing the mouths of the world now would just ensure a greater 
outburst in the future. Not many officials were brave enough to "enter 
the abyss"; most would prefer henceforth to be "cold crickets," the "ave-
nue of speech" would close, and China's family state (pfuojia) would then 
surely face its ruin.37 
Although no one in the outer court ventured to defend her, the attacks 
on Madame Ke were of course the work of the Donglin faction. Zou 
Yuanbiao, recently appointed vice minister of justice, and a celebrated 
philosopher who was aligned with the Donglin faction, sought to calm 
things by reminding Tianqi that, despite his great appointive and penal 
powers, the world was likely to oppose his decision in the Madame Ke 
matter and honor those whom he had punished in connection with it. 
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The Palace acknowledged receipt of Zou's remarks but did nothing about 
them.38 
The storm over Madame Ke was not yet quite over. A major figure, 
philosopher Liu Zongzhou, arrived in Beijing on November 28, 1621, to 
take up an appointment as a bureau secretary in the Ministry of Rites. On 
December 7, he sent up a memorial criticizing Tianqi for protecting 
Madame Ke. But he aimed his heavy verbal artillery at eunuch Wei 
Zhongxian as the villain ultimately responsible for ruining the govern-
ment. Eunuch Wei was distracting Tianqi from his duties by staging dra-
matic performances and military parades for his amusement! And he had 
seized the initiative of drafting palace rescripts (piaoni) from the grand 
secretaries! 
Ye Xianggao arrived in Beijing on December 3, and on December 7 he 
took up his appointment as chief grand secretary. Advising the Palace 
about how to respond to Liu Zongzhou's troubling memorial was his 
first piece of business. The Palace demanded at least a demotion. Ye ob-
jected. In a memorial of December 8, he advised that indeed Liu was 
seeking a reputation for himself; but because he was loyal in intent and 
orthodox in his views, to punish him harshly would simply enhance his 
reputation. So the Palace backed down and settled for a scolding and a 
fine of half a year's salary. 
"Liu was from Zhejiang," noted Ye in his memoirs, "and strictly pure 
and fond of disputation. He was pro-Donglin, and his coprovincials hated 
him. When I passed through Zhejiang [en route to Beijing], he spoke 
to me gravely about the current situation and advised me that it would 
be disastrous if [as chief grand secretary] I tried to negotiate com-
promises (tiftoting). He was impolite to me. I laughed and didn't argue 
with him."39 
Thus Tianqi won an important victory in defending the continued res-
idence in the Forbidden City of his wet nurse. The outer court did not 
protest her presence again. This victory no doubt encouraged Tianqi in 
his later defense of Wei Zhongxian. 
A 
From at least late in 1621, Beijing officialdom was aware of the extraordi-
nary power inside the Forbidden City of the one-time street ruffian Wei 
Zhongxian. His illiteracy was only a minor handicap. There is no ques-
tion that he possessed imaginative daring as well as exceptional energy. 
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It was as a procurer and caterer that he first made his mark in palace 
service. He soon became an impresario. At Wei's direction, flowers ap-
peared in abundance inside the Forbidden City. In the summer, Wei 
would festoon himself with jasmine and gardenias. In winter and spring, 
peonies put forth a spectacular display.40 Madame Ke favored morning 
glories, with which she decorated herself and her maids. Empress Zhang 
forbade her own maids to wear them.41 There were palace theatricals, 
including puppet shows, as noted. There were imperial meals to super-
vise; these now were major productions requiring the efforts of several 
hundred eunuch cooks and waiters working both inside and outside the 
Forbidden City.42 
Tianqi loved watching horse races, so in 1622 Wei had trees removed 
near the imperial stables (west of the Ciqing palace) to make an open 
space for racing.43 The emperor was also fond of Western firearms and 
military ceremony. In the wake of the panic occasioned by the rout of the 
Ming armies in Manchuria in 1619, eunuch Liu Chao had organized a 
Palace Army (Neicao) of some three thousand soldiers, garrisoned at 
Nanhaizi south of Beijing but regularly assembled for ceremonies and 
exercises inside the Forbidden City. Tianqi enjoyed the displays of horse-
manship, swordsmanship, and the mesmerizing military drum dances. 
There were frequent firings of guns and cannon. In 1621, a eunuch fired 
a gun while standing right in front of Tianqi; the gun exploded and blew 
off the eunuch's left hand, and nearly wounded Tianqi as well.44 
Deafening reverberations from cannon and guns could often be heard 
well beyond the Forbidden City. Officials complained vehemendy, but to 
little avail. 
< 
But not all was fun and games in the Forbidden City. Like it or not, the 
emperor was China's ultimate decision maker, and as such he was posi-
tioned in the very center of a brewing national political storm. The obvi-
ous and unfortunate fact was that Tianqi was in no way equipped to 
handle a job that would have taxed the powers of even a capable and 
experienced politician. There is no question that the Palace had to shield 
Tianqi and assume many of his political responsibilities as emperor. 
Yet the encroachments of Wang An, Wei Zhongxian, and others upon 
the formulation and issuance of imperial rescripts and edicts were under-
standably viewed with deep suspicion in the outer court. The Ming "con-
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stitution" as bequeathed by the dynasty's founder required the monarch's 
open and personal involvement in government. Tianqi's personal needs 
and his personal limitations did not cancel that requirement. 
From the very beginning of Tianqi's reign, Beijing officialdom com-
plained that it did not know exactiy how Tianqi's edicts and rescripts 
were arrived at. As early as October 1620, Censor Zheng Zongzhou pro-
tested that Palace edicts were being issued in the middle of the night 
witiiout giving the Grand Secretariat an opportunity either to draft or to 
vet them.45 
In November 1620, chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe devised a sys-
tem designed to solve everything. He would gradually ease the new em-
peror into the business of government. Imperial tutorials would begin on 
November 11. Six senior officials were designated to serve as tutors. They 
would all meet with the emperor at the Wenhua palace, where they would 
study the Great Learning and the Book of Documents for a time. Then 
there would be a rest break. Tianqi would retire to a private apartment, 
where the eunuch Director of Ceremonial would give him the most im-
portant of the day's memorials to read. Meanwhile the grand secretaries 
would wait in a side room, on call in case the emperor needed their help. 
"We'll then go in and explain matters carefully, so that gradually the ruler 
will become adept," suggested Fang. Then, when it came time for the 
ruler to write rescripts, the grand secretaries would all troop in and stand 
by to help. The tutorial would resume. A Palace rescript approved this 
procedure.46 Tilings looked promising. 
On November 12, Lii Bangyao (a minor official in the Office of 
Transmission) advised the ruler that he should discuss whatever the 
eunuchs told him with the grand secretaries, to obtain their broader view; 
and he urged that, because the emperor could not hope to read all of 
the daily deluge of memorials, nor could the eunuchs explain each of 
them line by line, he should therefore have his tutors scan them and 
underline the important parts for him. Again, a Palace rescript approved 
the suggestion.47 
These procedures seem to have worked for about a week. Between 
November 11 and November 20, Tianqi attended four tutorials. Then he 
gave notice that he was suspending them due to the chilly weather. The 
Wenhua palace was in bad repair; the classroom let in cold drafts of air. 
Chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe protested, to no avail. The direc-
tive stood.48 
The outer court continued the protest. Officials argued that memori-
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als needed to be referred to the appropriate ministries for discussion be-
fore the emperor rescripted them. The authority to draft rescripts must 
be restored to the Grand Secretariat, where by established procedure it 
lay. Why were eunuchs delivering peremptory "inside directives" (zhong 
zhi) ? Who knew whose hand had actually written them and affixed the 
imperial seal? Why couldn't the emperor meet face-to-face with the grand 
secretaries and make the important decisions with them at hand?49 
A Palace rescript of December 18 informed the outer court that its fears 
and suspicions about procedures were groundless. The emperor was 
receiving effective help from the eunuchs of the Directorate of Ceremo-
nial, and he was doing business with them in his own private apartment 
in the Qianqing palace.50 
The outer court was unconvinced. Censor Fang Zhenru doubted the 
reliability of the palace eunuchs. Censor Zhang Jie reminded Tianqi that 
eunuchs were menials who, by Ming house law, should not be taking part 
in government. Supervising Secretary Chen Yincong insisted that the 
ruler consult his officials and not run government through oral instruc-
tions delivered by the eunuchs.51 The Palace was unmoved by these pro-
tests, but on February 2,1621, Tianqi resumed his tutorials in the Wenhua 
palace.52 
A power struggle between the Palace and the bureaucracy began over the 
question of appointing new grand secretaries. Could the Palace pack the 
Grand Secretariat with appointees of its own choosing, ignoring the cus-
tomary ranked listing of nominees as presented by the outer court? 
A Palace edict of November 12,1620, announced the elevation of Min-
ister of Rites Sun Ruyou to the Grand Secretariat in recognition of his 
role in siding with Yang Lian and the others in the "palace" case. Four 
censors and supervising secretaries who were anti-Donglin partisans ex-
pressed shock that this appointment should have come by way of Palace 
fiat. They urged Tianqi to rescind the appointment. The Palace refused 
to do so. A rescript of November 15 informed the court that "the appoint-
ment was decided by me personally; the speaking officials may not ques-
tion die directive."53 
Sun Ruyou asked to be allowed to decline the appointment. His 
request was denied. On November 29, he entered the Grand Secretariat. 
Protests continued. Pro-Donglin officials joined in. Supervising Secretary 
He Tugao pointed out that "the emperor's personal decision" (qincai) 
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lacked valid historical precedent. Tianqi's grandfather Wanli had begun 
its use "as a habit in his late years, when he became lazy and remiss." It 
was bad procedure. "If you make the wrong decision, the disaster will be 
beyond imagining. Even if you make the right decision, you [in effect] 
usurp the function of the high officials . . . and you may as well close down 
the Grand Secretariat! The Palace is a closed-off place. Your eunuchs can 
take advantage of that without the knowledge of you or the outer 
court."54 
On December 28, Supervising Secretary Cheng Zhu (pro-Donglin) at-
tacked both Sun Ruyou and chief Grand Secretary Fang Congzhe. The 
Palace replied with a rescript of reprimand.55 On January 19,1621, an edict 
came down in which the emperor demanded to know why he could not 
reward Sun Ruyou with promotion to grand secretary; there were prece-
dents for doing that; the obstreperous protests of the officials violated 
decorum; drey were taking advantage of the ruler's youth to defy his 
commands; they were using specious arguments to imperil and befoul 
government and disturb people's minds. "I cannot just sit by and listen 
while this contumely wrecks government," concluded the edict. "I here-
by state again diat promotions and demotions of high officials are decid-
ed by the emperor. Those of lesser officials will be decided on the basis 
of outer court discussion." The edict threatened retaliatory punishment 
if die protests continued.56 
The protests did continue. On February 3, the Palace "noted" the re-
ceipt of a memorial from Censor Yi Yingchang arguing that the emperor 
should not compose his own rescripts and issue them as "inside direc-
tives." Censor Yi argued tiiat the device was opaque; no one could be 
sure who had really authored them, and, as a result, a sense of doubt and 
insecurity was spreading through the realm and national affairs were 
being put in danger. Everyone would feel safer when the Palace restored 
the rescript-drafting prerogative to the Grand Secretariat.57 
On the same day, the Palace scolded pro-Donglin Censor Zuo Guang-
dou for his impeachment of Sun Ruyou and his denunciation of the use 
of an "inside directive" to appoint him. "For the past several months," 
Zuo asserted, "there have been many protests against the use of inside 
directives; as their use began when Sun Ruyou was appointed, their use 
will end when he is dismissed."58 Later in the month, Sun Ruyou defend-
ed himself by noting a long list of grand secretaries who, ever since the 
Jiajing reign (1521-1566), had been personal selections of the Ming emper-
ors. He concluded that it was just because Tianqi was very young that the 
4 8 B E I J I N G 
officials were challenging his judgment.59 But Supervising Secretary Wang 
Zhidao found earlier precedents that he believed overrode the later 
ones.60 
Sun Ruyou did not desire to continue the fight. In May 1621, his four-
teenth request to resign was granted, and he went home to Yuyao in 
Zhejiang province, where he died four years later. Contrary to Zuo 
Guangdou's prediction, the Palace's use of "internal directives" had only 
just begun. 
< 
The fight over the Grand Secretariat shifted ground, however. For the 
moment, the procedural question of appointment making faded, because 
the new men had already been appointed by Wanli and Taichang and 
were only now arriving in Beijing to take up their duties. The Donglin 
had the upper hand in these personality-centered struggles, and it suc-
ceeded in forcing the Palace to agree to the removal of several grand sec-
retarial appointees who were unacceptable to them.61 
Among the new grand secretaries was Ye Xianggao. Some Donglin ad-
herents, like Liu Zongzhou, had misgivings about him, but most Beijing 
officials found him acceptable. He was an experienced statesman. He had 
served Wanli as a grand secretary in 1607-1614 and was chief grand secre-
tary during the last two of those years. His arrival in Beijing and his as-
sumption of duties as chief grand secretary in December 1621 were wide-
ly welcomed.62 Ye Xianggao hoped to do what probably no one else 
could—develop an effective working relationship with the Palace, harmo-
nize the struggle between pro- and anti-Donglin officials in the bureau-
cracy, and ameliorate somehow the chronic security crisis in Manchuria. 
More than many of his colleagues, Ye had a sense of the big picture. 
He could speak clearly and effectively about matters of high policy. But 
he was confessedly a conciliator, not a domineering figure in the style of 
Zhang luzheng, the grand secretary who had been virtual dictator of 
China during Wanli's youth. Indeed, Ye insisted that the Grand Secre-
tariat, for all its eminence, occupied a modest place in the Ming power 
structure. It could not force or compel. Its purpose was simply to help 
the Palace draft rescripts (piaoni). Real leverage (quan)y he said, lay with 
the Six Ministries. Enforcement of rescripts through the power of im-
peachment belonged to the supervising secretaries of the Offices of Scru-
tiny attached to each ministry. The Grand Secretariat could not order or 
compel anything.63 
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By the time Ye Xianggao arrived in Beijing after a five-month's journey 
from his native Fujian, pro-Donglin eunuch Wang An had already been 
purged and destroyed, and it was Wei Zhongxian whom Ye found "very 
much in charge" in the palace. Ye hoped to develop a good working rela-
tionship with Tianqi through Wei. An opportunity to do that arose in 
June 1622. 
Censor Zhou Zongjian had earlier been one of those who tried, but 
failed, to force Madame Ke's removal from the Forbidden City. Now, on 
June 7, 1622, Censor Zhou impeached Wei Zhongxian. He accused him 
of moral and political ignorance, usurpation of power, and illiteracy. He 
implored Tianqi to get rid of him.64 
Zhou's attack upset Wei Zhongxian. "I really am illiterate," he wailed 
to Ye. "What's to become of me?" Ye soothed him. He reminded Wei 
that on an earlier occasion Wei himself had said, "Doing what is good for 
the people is how to do good for the dynasty." Admirable! " I praised 
[Wei] highly for saying that," recalled Ye in his memoirs. "I said, 'What 
you said couldn't have been said better even by someone with a stomach 
full of Odes and Documents. Why be ashamed of your illiteracy?' Wei was 
very pleased and we chatted for a while, and Tianqi was in a pavilion close 
by, and he heard everything we said." Ye went on to explain to Wei 
Zhongxian that he preferred not to deal with Tianqi directiy. "If we 
grand secretaries speak face-to-face with the emperor, then he has to heed 
us; and if he disagrees, then we have to argue with him. That puts high 
and low in contention, and the appropriate decorum (timian) between 
ruler and subject disappears. But you eunuchs serve the emperor daily, 
you can plead and cajole until he changes his mind, whereas it would not 1/ 
do if we grand secretaries were to try that."65 
Wei Zhongxian was happy with such an approach and, until 1624, he 
and Ye Xianggao managed to cooperate fairly well. Ye was often able to 
make his views prevail by contesting edicts and rescripts that had been 
shown to the Grand Secretariat after having been first drafted in the 
palace. 
Defeat in Manchuria 
Many thought that what Ming China needed was a strong hand. The 
realm was in crisis on several fronts in the 1620s. There were revolts in 
Sichuan and Guizhou, far in the southwest, and a major upheaval closer 
to home—the sectarian revolt of Xu Hongru in 1622, which affected 
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northeast China and was prompted in part by an influx of refugees from 
what everyone recognized as the major theater of crisis, Manchuria. 
There had been a collapse of the Ming armies in Manchuria in 1619, fol-
lowed by the loss of yet more Ming territory east of the Liao River in 
1621. These losses sparked the national territory (fengqitmg) controversy, 
which achieved a prominence at least equal to diat of the Three Cases in 
the increasingly violent partisan struggle that was developing in Beijing. 
It was essential to rally and strengdien the Ming military defenses west of 
the Liao River. This task the Tianqi government placed in the hands of 
two men, both of them civil officials, who held conflicting strategic views 
and hated each other personally. They were Wang Huazhen and Xiong 
Tingbi. 
A forward position was established at Guangning, some three hundred 
miles east-northeast of Beijing. Wang Huazhen was posted there as gov-
ernor (xunfu). Wang's aim was to carry out a swift reconquest of the ter-
ritory east of the Liao River with die help of Mongol mercenaries. Simul-
taneously, Xiong Tingbi was posted as military commissioner (jinjjlue) 
rearward of Wang, at Shanhaiguan, a hundred miles southwest of 
Guangning and two hundred miles east of Beijing. Xiong's strategy was 
longer-range and defensive, with emphasis on making common cause 
with the ethnic Chinese inhabitants of Manchuria. 
Wang and Xiong jealously worked at cross-purposes. While some offi-
cials ardendy championed Wang Huazhen, others, including especially 
those in the Donglin faction, supported Xiong Tingbi. Court conferences 
deadlocked over Manchurian strategy. The Palace ordered the two com-
manders to cooperate, to no avail. Then, in March 1622, Wang's forces 
were routed in a skirmish east of the Liao. Guangning was inadequately 
defended; the future Manchus advanced and seized it. Wang Huazhen 
and a large mob of civilians and defeated soldiers fled west in disarray and 
overwhelmed Xiong Tingbi's position at Shanhaiguan. Appearing mag-
nanimous in his personal victory over his failed rival, Xiong Tingbi escort-
ed Wang and the mob accompanying him westward to safety through the 
narrow Shanhaiguan gateway.66 
Panic developed in Beijing as the refugees reached the suburbs. There 
was fear of their starting a rebellion. The Beijing bureaucracy struggled 
to reorganize the defenses outside Shanhaiguan and to determine appro-
priate punishments for both Wang and Xiong. At first it was decided to 
arrest Wang Huazhen and to order Xiong Tingbi to stand down pending 
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further investigation.67 Some inhabitants of Beijing reacted angrily to this 
decision. Crowds wept at the sight of Wang under arrest. They flung 
stones and tiles at Xiong Tingbi, striking his head and causing blood to 
flow. Supervising Secretary Zhou Hongmo thought the people's rage was 
genuine, but Censor Huang Zunsu surmised that die stone throwers had 
been paid by Wang Huazhen's partisans.68 
In May 1622, two months after the disaster, a joint public meeting of 
the fast (the Censorate, Ministry of Justice, and Court of Judicial Review) 
was held to recommend just punishments for both failed commanders. 
Minister of Justice Wang Ji, Censor-in-chief Zou Yuanbiao (botii Dong-
lin men), and Zhou Yingqiu (chief minister of the Court of Judicial Re-
view, and anti-Donglin) met and agreed that both Wang and Xiong 
should be executed—Wang for incompetence, Xiong for obstructionism 
and arrogance. Their verdict was severe, but at least it was bipartisan. The 
Palace endorsed it.69 
This, however, did not end the matter. The loss of territory (feng-
qiang) issue was too complex; there were too many unresolved questions 
as well as suspicions and charges of espionage and treachery. Liao natives 
in Ming service were accused of pro-Manchu activity. There were charges 
of gross peculations of military funds and that Donglin partisans had 
abetted Xiong Tingbi in his obstructionism and must also be prosecuted. 
Countercharges were brought against those officials who had champi-
oned Wang Huazhen. And the heat of the summer of 1622 was further 
raised by intense partisan debates over the Three Cases. 
The temperature rose further still. While Wang and Xiong awaited their 
fates in the prison of the Ministry of Justice, an ugly confrontation took 
place between Minister of Justice Wang Ji (pro-Donglin) and Grand Sec-
retary Shen Que (anti-Donglin). 
Shen Que had recruited several hundred troops from his home prov-
ince of Zhejiang to assist, he argued, in the Ming defense of Manchuria. 
In April 1622 these troops arrived in Beijing. Shen grandly presented 
them to Tianqi. But rumor had it that Shen Que was in secret collusion 
with palace eunuch Liu Chao to use those troops, plus ten thousand 
more he had promised, in support of the controversial palace army that 
Liu Chao was then organizing. Supervising Secretary Hui Shiyang 
detailed those rumors in an impeachment of Shen Que. Shen protested 
the impeachment as wholly unfounded, insisting that he had recruited 
the troops out of the devotion of his "red heart" to the Ming cause! 
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Yet his detractors were calling him a villain and a bandit, and sought his 
death, so he must resign. The Palace consoled him and kept him on 
duty.70 
The "speaking officials" (censors and supervising secretaries) then in-
creased the pressure. They now accused Shen Que of bribing Madame Ke 
and Wei Zhongxian! By accepted custom, Shen Que should have seclud-
ed himself at home while the Palace considered this latest impeachment 
charge. But he did not. He continued to appear at court. Minister of Jus-
tice Wang Ji was angered. He told Ye Xianggao that he was going to curse 
Shen Que publicly if he attended another court assembly. Ye tried to calm 
him down. Wang Ji sent up two impeachments of Shen Que. These the 
Palace rejected; it warned that high officials should act to preserve the 
"national body" Qjuoti) and not assault each other.71 
Shen Que did not take these impeachments quietly. He accused Wang 
Ji of deliberately delaying an investigation of the role of double agents in 
the fall of Guangning. Moreover, he accused Wang Ji of protecting the 
archvillain, Xiong Tingbi. Again, the Palace asked that high officials cease 
making such accusations.72 
Then, suddenly and shockingly, on August 17, 1622, the Palace dis-
missed Wang Ji from his post as minister of justice and removed him from 
civil service altogether. Several days later, Shen Que was granted retire-
ment with full honors. No one protested Shen's departure, but the inex-
plicably harsh treatment of Wang Ji was challenged by the grand secre-
taries jointly and individually, by joint memorial from the top officials of 
the ministries, and by various speaking officials. It was all to no avail; the 
Palace declined to change its mind about Wang Ji. Its tilt against the 
Donglin partisans was evident.73 
The agreed-upon executions of Wang Huazhen and Xiong Tingbi were 
placed on indefinite hold, pending a more thorough investigation of the 
role played by the accused double agents. Then, in November 1622, 
Censor Yang Weiyuan laid the groundwork for the 1625 torture-murders 
of Donglin partisans by making the charge that Gu Dazhang, a top assis-
tant to former Minister of Justice Wang Ji, had, early after the fall of 
Guangning, argued that Xiong Tingbi's guilt was less than that of Wang 
Huazhen, and that whereas Wang should be executed, Xiong should be 
given a lighter penalty and a chance to redeem himself. Yang Weiyuan fur-
ther charged that Gu had accepted 40,000 taels of silver from Xiong as a 
bribe to help him win acquittal. 
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Gu denied the charge. He had been but one of twenty-eight officials at 
the fast meeting in May and had agreed with the execution verdict pro-
posed on that occasion, so how, he asked, could he be a protector of 
Xiong Tingbi? Gu's protest was unconvincing. What of the alleged bribe? 
Besides, Gu had argued that the accused double agents were innocent. 
Clearly he was protecting Xiong.74 
Thus the question of blame for the loss of Guangning became hope-
lessly entangled in partisan infighting. The original bipartisan solution— 
to execute both Wang and Xiong—could not be sustained. Ye Xianggao 
rather favored Wang. Anti-Donglin partisans protected Wang Huazhen 
by ignoring him while they vented their wrath on Xiong Tingbi, making 
it necessary for the Donglin to defend Xiong. No one was allowed to 
remain impartial in the dispute. All this would come to a head in 1625. 
The Shoushan Academy 
The year 1622 featured yet another matter of partisan controversy, this 
one of a very different kind. It centered on the foundation by Donglin 
sympathizers of the Shoushan academy in Beijing. The trouble with this 
academy was that it was not so much a school as a headquarters and gath-
ering place for intellectual exchange, spiritual renewal, and making con-
tacts for officials and students in Beijing. 
The leaders in this risky venture were Feng Congwu and Zou Yuan-
biao, two senior officials and eminent Confucian philosophers who had 
spent decades in political exile and were recalled to service after the death 
of Wanli in 1620. Feng was a northerner, from Shaanxi. In 1622 he was 
sixty-five years old. Zou was a southerner, from Jiangxi, seventy-one years 
old. Zou was appointed censor-in-chief. Feng was vice censor-in-chief 
and the main organizer of the Shoushan academy. 
Feng Congwu might best be described as a Confucian evangelist. By 
his own confession, he "lived, ate, and breathed" the activity called jiang-
xue (literally, "discussing study"). This meant the gathering together of 
listeners and truth seekers in informal question-and-answer sessions for 
the purpose of provoking an ethical awakening—the refocusing of minds 
on the moral foundations of the inherited Confucian tradition. 
Although it appeared to be a benign form of extracurricular activity, 
there is no question that jiangxue contributed to the toxicity of political 
54 
B E I J I N G 
conflict in Beijing. At discussion meetings Feng would hang up a chart 
showing a fork in a road and explain to his audience how one fork led 
"good people" and "gentlemen" along a path to humanness and sage-
hood, while the other fork led fools away to bestiality and evil. "One 
instant of thought" at the base of the fork made all the difference. There 
was no middle path, "no road between the two." Literary cultivation and 
administrative acumen were irrelevant, he maintained. Either they en-
hanced one's villainy, or they embellished one's goodness.75 
Like his colleagues from the Donglin academy in Wuxi, Feng Congwu 
placed the common Confucian division of the world into "gentlemen" 
(junzi) and "small men" (xiaoren) at the very forefront of his concerns. 
A listener asked Feng how gendemen should treat small men who follow 
the path of self-interested advantage. Feng said it depended upon the sit-
uation. You could not befriend such people, but you could welcome 
them to jianjfxue meetings, because there was always the hope that they 
might be morally awakened by the experience. In official life, small men 
might be tolerated, no more.76 
Feng agreed with the Donglin academy's revision of Wang Yangming's 
dictum with regard to good and evil: Wang's error was in trying to tran-
scend the distinction and bring about moral change in the world in non-
confrontational ways. That was wrong, argued Feng: we must love good 
and hate evil. But hypostasizing good and evil in this way justified on 
moral-theoretical grounds a posture of uninhibited ad hominem denun-
ciation in bureaucratic life and injected a lethal dose of moral absolutism 
into the endemic regional and personal rivalries of central-level politics in 
Ming China. 
Thus the founding of the Shoushan academy in Beijing was politically 
no small matter. Upon their return to official life in 1620-1621, Feng and 
Zou at first convened jiangxue meetings thrice monthly at the city god 
temple, near Beijing's southwest edge; but the site was too small and far 
away, so Censor Zhou Zongjian and several of his colleagues found some-
thing better inside the Xuanwu gate, about 2,000 meters west of the main 
complcx of offices housing the Ming central bureaucracy. A collection of 
some several hundred taels of silver was taken up, enough to buy a small 
building and remodel it so that it housed some ten rooms, including a 
lecture hall, a library, and a shrine containing an icon of Confixcius. Chief 
Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao composed a dedicatory inscription for the 
academy. The great artist Dong Qichang calligraphized it and the inscrip-
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tion was cut into stone. A gazetteer was compiled, and notes of what was 
said at the meetings were regularly recorded. Some were later published. 
The academy was called the Shoushan. As Feng Congwu explained, the 
meaning of "Shoushan" was moral-geographical: Beijing was the model 
for the four quarters of the realm, the "place at the forefront of good-
ness" (shoushan zhi di), so the new "Forefront of Goodness" academy 
should rightfully stand nationally in the vanguard of the half-dozen pro-
vincial academies, like the Donglin academy in Wuxi, which had been 
conducting jiangxue for many years. Meetings at the Shoushan were held 
six times a month.77 
Participants debated the question of whether current political matters 
should be discussed at the meetings. Lu Shanji, for one, argued that "in 
these times of crisis, we who are high officials cannot be said to be en-
gaged in 'study' if we don't talk about current government."78 Feng over-
ruled him. "We don't discuss government, or private matters, or reli-
gion," he insisted. "All we talk about is things like father-son, ruler-sub-
ject relations, the five virtues, and the Six Injunctions of Ming Taizu."79 
The aim was to revitalize China. Jiangxue defined what Ming China was 
all about. "Today we do jiangxue, and to be sure what we're doing is elu-
cidating principles, but really we're sustaining the dynastic fate (guoyun). 
The fate of all of us lies here. It's not idle chat!"80 
Feng preached that there was no more pressing time than now for "dis-
cussions of study." China's officials, burdened by crises in Sichuan and 
Manchuria, rushing about to mobilize troops and find new sources of 
supply for them, needed to stop fighting and blaming each other, and re-
discover the moral grounds upon which alone they could unite their 
minds (tongxin). The ultimate strategy for resisting the enemy in Man-
churia and elsewhere was jiangxue.81 The Ming armies were defeated in 
Manchuria and the inherited territory (fengqianjj) was lost there because 
the nation's understanding of Confucian principles (lixue) had not been 
made clear.82 
The Shoushan meetings were heavily attended. Feng's exhortations 
had the ability to reduce sympathizers to tears, and scoffers to shame. 
However, there were some among the Donglin who doubted the wisdom 
of holding jianpfxue meetings in the heated political atmosphere of Bei-
jing. Hanlin academician Yao Ximeng recalled that he had attended a pre-
liminary meeting at the city god's temple late in 1621 and accepted Feng's 
invitation to one of the first full meetings there. "Some thirty people 
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came," wrote Yao. "They were looking for common ground in their 
ideas, but there were a few who disagreed, and the differences were left 
unresolved." 
"That night lying in bed," continued Yao, "I thought about how the 
people of the world have always looked askance at worthy men. [It 
seemed to me that] to open a venue for discussion right here in the cap-
ital would only invite denunciation. At dawn, Zou [Yuanbiao] knocked at 
my gate and I told him I wasn't going, and I said that, by not going, my 
hope was to discourage him and Feng.... Then a few days later Feng 
came by, and I warned him that the state was in trouble, there was a lot 
of work for the officials to do, and that jiangxue was not a priority right 
now. But Feng said: 'It's exactly because the state is in trouble, and the 
officials don't realize they must die for it, that they cover their heads and 
flee like one rat after another. We must resurrect the mind of cleaving to 
the ruler, and risk our lives for our superiors. How can we lay ji&ngxue 
aside?' I was silenced, and didn't dare reply."83 
But Yao Ximeng's misgivings were on target. Some officials viewed the 
Shoushan as a sinister threat to political order. In October 1622, Super-
vising Secretary Zhu Tongmeng attacked the institution. He said that 
there was nothing wrong with "clarifying the Sage's ideas and teaching 
them to juniors," as the Donglin academy had long ago begun to do, but 
their lecture meetings had also attracted a modey gathering of deviant 
men who exploited the Donglin tb build a faction, advance friends, and 
attack rivals. They set up a "camp" (menhu), strengthened the walls, and 
fought bloody skirmishes with their foes. Those Donglin partisans were 
eventually defeated (in 1617), but now Feng and Zou had erected a new 
academy right here in Beijing and were building another camp just like 
the old one! Zhu Tongmeng urged the emperor to close down the 
Shoushan. The Palace replied by rescript that it did not believe Feng and 
Zou were intentionally building a faction, but it asked both men to 
"reflect" on what they were doing.84 Feng and Zou at once sent up me-
morials explaining and defending the meetings. They then offered their 
resignations, which the Palace did not accept.85 
Attacks on Feng and Zou intensified. Violent debates about the Three 
Cases were in progress in which Zou and Feng weighed in with strong 
briefs on behalf of those who perceived conspiracy in the "stick" and 
"pill" affairs.86 In November 1622, Supervising Secretary Guo Yunhou 
again impeached Zou Yuanbiao for his role in the jiangxue meetings, on 
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the ground that those meetings were attended by ambitious elements 
hoping to obtain official appointments. "The good species are being 
squeezed out, and disaster threatens the state," he warned.87 
Inside the palace, the notion had somehow taken hold tiiat jiangxue 
had caused the fall of the Southern Song dynasty some three centuries 
before. Wei Zhongxian told chief Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao that this 
was what Tianqi understood. Ye endeavored to refute the idea. The Pal-
ace refused to change its mind, but it directed Zou and Feng to stay on 
the job.88 
The attacks continued. Supervising Secretary Guo Xingzhi stated in a 
memorial that Zou Yuanbiao had told one of his subordinates that "right 
and wrong needn't be made too clear." What on earth sort of statement 
was that? Did Zou want to close the mouths of the censors and supervis-
ing secretaries? Did he want to forbid judging the character and quality 
of others? Did he want to muddle merit and blame? Yet this is what jiang-
xue had come to! What we need, concluded Guo, is the real study of 
Confucius and Mencius, not this irresponsible stuff.89 
In reply, Zou protested that Guo had taken his words out of context. 
Of course right and wrong are never unclear. It's just that there may be 
good reasons to soften one's assaults on targeted figures. The Palace's 
response was to support Zou and scold Guo.90 
Guo took no heed. Immediately he assailed Zou Yuanbiao as a crypto-
Buddhist and not an exponent of "upright learning" at all. Such a person 
should not be censor-in-chief. He also attacked Ye Xianggao for support-
ing Zou. Ye asked to resign. The Palace chided Guo Yunhou. "The good 
species are the primary qi of the state," said the Palace. "Why is Guo try-
ing to triumph over the good species?"91 
Both Zou Yuanbiao and Feng Congwu offered repeatedly to resign in 
response to these attacks. On November 25, the Palace finally allowed 
Zou to do so, and it accepted Feng's resignation on December 3. Feng 
pleaded that the emperor not use the departures of himself and Zou as an 
excuse to close down the Shoushan academy and prohibit jiangxue.92 In-
deed, both continued to function until suppressed in 1625. 
Ye Xianggao remarked in his memoirs that, according to his own obser-
vation, jiangxue was "ninety percent empty discussion," and therefore he 
never engaged in it himself but harbored no hostile feelings toward those 
who did. "I always told people that while there was no need to 'discuss 
study,' there was no need to forbid it either, and that it was no enlight-
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ened policy for the court to prohibit it. Zhu Tongmeng and the other 
[critics] had an ulterior motive, which is why I spoke out so sharply. 
Thanks to me, the [Shoushan] academy wasn't destroyed... until after I 
retired."93 
Packing the Grand Secretariat 
A fear existed that the sexennial official evaluations of 1623 might be 
exploited for partisan purposes again, as they had been in 1617, when op-
ponents used them to force Donglin adherents out of their positions. (In 
1617, it was enough for a person to interpret the Stick Case of 1615 as evi-
dence of a conspiracy to assassinate the heir apparent, Zhu Changluo, to 
count as "Donglin".) But die 1623 evaluations, conducted in February 
and March, were not much politicized, as things turned out. Officials 
were rated on tiieir merits rather than on their political leanings.94 
It was otherwise with a new set of appointments to the Grand Secre-
tariat. In February 1623, the Palace appointed four new grand secretaries 
—Zhu Guozhen, Gu Bingqian, Zhu Yanxi, and Wei Guangwei—to join 
the five already on duty. The disturbing feature of these appointments 
was not that Tianqi had "personally selected" them out of the blue (as he 
had done with Sun Ruyou in 1620-1621). In accordance with established 
procedure, an outer-court conference had met and agreed on a ranked list 
of nine nominees for grand secretary. The expectation was that the Palace 
would follow the outer court's rank order. The Palace did not. It reject-
ed the court's top two nominees, Sun Shenxing and Sheng Yihong, 
selected the third and fourth nominees (Zhu Guozhen and Gu Bing-
qian), and then went to the bottom of the list and picked the eighth and 
ninth (Zhu Yanxi and Wei Guangwei). 
The Beijing bureaucracy was astounded. Chief Grand Secretary Ye 
Xianggao remarked that, although he personally saw nothing wrong witii 
the Palace's choices, it was incumbent upon him to make a formal protest 
in the hope of dampening controversy and paranoia in the outer court. 
Ye asked the Palace to explain why it had rejected the top two nominees. 
The Palace replied that Sun Shenxing had discredited himself by his con-
tinuing charges of regicide in the Pill Case, while Sheng Yihong was unac-
ceptable because of his thick Shaanxi accent.95 
That ended the matter. Grand Secretaries Gu Bingqian and Wei 
Guangwei would soon become major anti-Donglin players. The display 
of Palace willfulness in appointing the new grand secretaries troubled 
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many, in that it eroded the integrity and prestige of the outer-court 
bureaucracy and sent a strong signal of support to the opponents of the 
Donglin. 
The Partisan Struggle Escalates 
A sense that the Donglin position was being undermined surely inspired 
the ugly public dispute between Censor Zhou Zongjian and Supervising 
Secretary Guo Gong that erupted shordy afterward, in March 1623. At 
the center of the dispute was the imprisoned ex-commander of Ming 
forces at Shanhaiguan, Xiong Tingbi. When the arrogant and widely hat-
ed Xiong Tingbi was appointed commander at Shanhaiguan in 1621, the 
Palace had acted to reassure him of its backing by demoting his loudest 
detractor, Supervising Secretary Guo Gong.96 Then, after Xiong's arrest 
in 1622, Guo Gong was reinstated. In early 1623, ignoring the pleading of 
Ye Xianggao and others, who urged him not to, Guo Gong went ahead 
and sent up an impeachment of Xiong Tingbi's former supporters.97 
In February 1623, a Nanjing censor by the name of Tu Shiye sent up a 
memorial accusing Censor Zhou Zongjian of having once referred to 
Xiong Tingbi as the "savior of Liao." Censor Zhou sent up a rebuttal in 
which he denied ever having backed Xiong's appointment. Then, gratu-
itously, he added the allegation that Tu Shiye really had an ulterior mo-
tive: he was in league with Supervising Secretary Guo Gong and palace 
eunuch Wei Zhongxian and was angling to advance his own promotion 
prospects. 
The Palace sent Zhou's rebuttal down to the outer court for its com-
ment. Supervising Secretary Guo Gong exploded in anger at Zhou's alle-
gation. In retaliation, he further linked Zhou to Yang Lian (the main 
actor in the "palace" case ), to the now deceased palace eunuch Wang An, 
and to the "bandit thicket" of the Shoushan academy. These, he alleged, 
were all components of one and the same "deviant clique."98 
Zhou replied to Guo Gong on March 11 with a stinging statement that 
accused Guo of turning all the facts upside down in "extremely ugly lan-
guage." "What is Guo's motive, since his reinstatement?" asked Zhou 
rhetorically. "Why is he alone of all those recalled being so obnoxious? I 
won't speculate. He is a year-mate of mine. But the emperor should order 
Guo Gong to rectify himself, to discuss one case at a time, and not con-
coct conspiracies." To this the Palace's reaction was calm. It said Xiong 
Tingbi's case was already decided and reminded both disputants that they 
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should state right and wrong according to principle, and refrain from rais-
ing implications." 
But on March 28,1623, Censor Zhou Zongjian sent up a long and sen-
sational bill of new charges, alleging that Guo Gong was the linchpin in 
a plot hatched by palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian to create a new political 
order for China—at the expense of the "good species"! Zhou wanted the 
emperor to know all the vile details of this plot. He wanted Tianqi to 
know that when Guo Gong was demoted in 1621 he actually stayed in 
Beijing and secredy contacted Wei Zhongxian. Wei, deeply stung by 
Zhou's powerful assault on him in June 1622, wanted revenge. Having 
already allied himself with Madame Ke, and with eunuch Liu Chao and 
his palace army, Wei now extended a tentacle into the outer court 
through Supervising Secretary Guo Gong, since reinstated. Guo Gong 
then compiled for Wei Zhongxian an enemies list consisting of some fifty 
names of Beijing officials. Over the past several months, eleven good men 
from that list had already been cashiered: Wang Ji, Zou Yuanbiao, Feng 
Congwu, Wen Zhenmeng, Sun Shenxing, and six others. Zhou further 
claimed: Guo Gong openly flaunts this enemies list! Right now, I have a 
copy of it in my hands. Most people are too fearful to say anything about 
it, but Guo Gong cannot be allowed to pursue his evil plan and "gather 
more ants and flies" for Wei Zhongxian. Does the ruler know how Wei 
killed Wang An? He cut off his head and fed his flesh to crows and his 
bones to yellow dogs! The cruelest thing in history! Zhou demanded that 
Guo answer these charges. He vowed he would not serve in the same 
court with "a sucker of boils and licker of hemorrhoids like Guo Gong!" 
To this the Palace replied, again calmly, on March 31. It stated that the 
eleven dismissals had all been decided by the emperor personally, and had 
been endorsed by the Grand Secretariat. It also demanded that Zhou 
Zongjian supply facts to substantiate his other allegations.100 Zhou replied 
immediately by restating his case in further detail, but he explained that 
he lacked the powers of arrest and interrogation, and could not substan-
tiate everything. It was simply his duty as a "speaking official" to report 
what he heard. To that, the Palace drafted a rescript ordering that Zhou 
be flogged eighty times. The Grand Secretariat objected, and argued suc-
cessfully for reducing the penalty to a fine of three months' salary.101 
Zhou Zongjian's charges were explosive. By making them, he was vis-
ibly placing himself in a position of leadership on the Donglin battiefront. 
It appears, however, that others were not prepared to follow him. Perhaps 
he was too recent a convert to the Donglin side.102 Friends reportedly ad-
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vised him that his "righteous demeanor" was evident, and that if he now 
just kept quiet for a few months, he would not risk being considered a 
"cold cricket," that is, someone too intimidated to speak out. "I'm ready 
to be flogged to death here and now," replied Zhou. "How can you sug-
gest such a thing? The emperor gives me life, and I dare not but offer my 
own life in return."103 
Supervising Secretary Shen Weibing (pro-Donglin) memorialized that 
the "tongue battle" between Guo Gong and Zhou was, at bottom, about 
Xiong Tingbi. He begged the emperor to proceed with Xiong's execu-
tion. Delaying it was giving Guo Gong and all the others the opportuni-
ty to accuse Yang Lian and others of serving as his protectors! The Palace 
was unimpressed by Shen's long argument and declined to act on it.104 
It came to the attention of Supervising Secretary Liu Honghua that his 
name appeared at the top of Guo Gong's enemies list, and early in April 
1623 he complained bitterly about this in a memorial. Did his name appear 
there because Xiong Tingbi, Yang Lian, and Liu himself were all copro-
vincials from Huguang? "The talk on the street is that [imprisoned for-
mer commander] Wang Huazhen has given out generous bribes, and that 
Guo Gong is exerting all efforts to get Wang released Guo hopes to 
kill Xiong Tingbi, and he has concocted his list to remove everyone who 
opposes him." Concluded Liu, "the primary qi of the dynasty consists of 
impartial opinion and the good species. Guo Gong with his foul mouth 
and poisoned hand wants to repress me. I must plead with the ruler." The 
Palace replied that "impartial opinion" was clear, and that there was no 
need for Liu's attack.105 
On April 14, Censor Zhou Zongjian provided his colleagues with a tri-
umphant public statement of his achievement thus far. He said that his 
fact-based exposure of Guo Gong's collusion with Wei Zhongxian had 
beaten both malefactors into fear and silence. "I was not wrong to say as 
I did that I put myself at risk to untangle the nets," stated Zhou. Happily, 
public opinion has been favorable; thanks to Zhou, the ruler-father will 
have his rightful powers restored to him; officials will fear denunciation 
no more; and the palace eunuchs will soon withdraw and "use no longer 
their authority as city foxes and country rats to spread their strange poi-
sons." Zhou invited Guo Gong to confess his errors publicly and return 
to the good graces of the realm.106 
Censor Fang Daren followed Zhou's statement with a memorial to the 
throne asserting that very few people ever wanted to save Xiong Tingbi. 
Many made statements about him that tried to be fair, but Guo Gong 
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kept reading wrong messages into them, accusing perfectiy innocent 
people of being "clique bandits." Meanwhile Guo Gong said nothing 
of his own efforts to save Wang Huazhen! And there was evidence to 
corroborate Zhou Zongjian's charges against Wei Zhongxian. Fang had 
seen with his own eyes the imperial-scale sepulcher Wei was having built 
for himself at the Biyunsi, in the Western Hills! Guo Gong, moreover, 
has never replied effectively to Zhou's impeachments of him; Guo said 
nothing of Wei Zhongxian, but simply vowed to have Zhou flogged 
and exiled, which in itself is clear proof that Guo Gong is in league with 
Wei Zhongxian! Censor Fang demanded that Guo Gong be severely 
punished.107 
The Palace informed the Grand Secretariat that it would not tolerate 
any further disputes among the speaking officials. It said they had joined 
into self-interested cliques, battiing each other for victory in the loss-of-
territory (fengqiang) issue. They cared nothing for the ruler or the dynas-
ty. They all deserved flogging and imprisonment. The ruler had so far 
been lenient, but (threatened the Palace) he will not forgive those who 
disobey him in the future.108 
However, early in May, Guo Gong asked the emperor to authorize a 
court conference to review the charges and countercharges between him-
self, Zhou Zongjian, Liu Honghua, and Fang Daren.109 Accordingly, 
Minister of Personnel Zhang Wenda convened a discussion and, upon its 
conclusion, made the recommendation that all the officials mentioned 
had spoken too recklessly and shown inadequate self-cultivation, but that 
all had acted in good faith and should be given a chance to reform them-
selves and do their jobs. The Palace agreed, and it also fined both Zhou 
and Guo three months' salary for their contumely.110 
In the fall of 1623, Zhou Zongjian was sent away to serve in a provin-
cial position.111 Then he took mourning leave. In 1625, he was arrested 
and tortured to death in the Decree Prison in Beijing. But, for the 
moment, his radical bid to force change in Ming governance came to 
nothing; stronger hands and cooler heads had prevailed. 
The Donglin Unraveling 
Late in 1623, however, Minister of Personnel Zhang Wenda's request to 
retire from government was granted. He was replaced by another north-
erner, Zhao Nanxing. As things turned out, it was not a good choice. 
Zhao Nanxing, seventy-three years old, had spent many years in private 
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life outside Beijing, in compulsory political exile. In his younger years, 
Zhao had been a bureaucratic turf fighter and administrative disciplinari-
an, a man who hated corruption and anyone engaged in it. Although he 
was not philosophically inclined, his personal ties to Gao Panlong and 
others in the Donglin camp were close and of long standing. 
Anyone who held the office of Minister of Personnel had, not a deci-
sive role, but an important influence upon personnel selection, and there-
fore upon the partisan struggle in progress in Beijing. Zhao Nanxing was 
not a conciliator. His style of behavior was dictatorial rather than colle-
gia!. In vain his friends warned him about his self-righteous coldness.112 
Without intending it, he helped to widen the rift between the Donglin 
and their opponents. Indirecdy he bears some responsibility for the 
bloody destruction of the Donglin in 1625-1627. 
Take, for instance, his attitude toward palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian. 
Report has it that Wei was, at the outset, favorably disposed toward Zhao 
and expedited favorable Palace rescripts to Zhao's memorials.113 Wei 
wanted to go further and consolidate a personal relationship. To that end, 
he sent his nephew Fu Yingxing with a gift to Zhao's house. Zhao curt-
ly refused him admittance. There also came an occasion when Zhao and 
Wei were seated together at a meeting inside the Forbidden City. Under 
discussion was a minor appointment. What Wei said is not recorded, but 
Zhao replied to him with a righteous air, "The emperor is young, and we 
officials inside the Palace and out must strive to do good." Wei Zhong-
xian did not reply, but his anger was visible on his face.114 Zhao had called 
Wei Zhongxian's ethics into question. 
It was also Zhao who provoked the hostility of Wei Guangwei, ap-
pointed a grand secretary over the objections of the outer court in Feb-
ruary 1623. Wei was the son of a deceased colleague and friend of Zhao's, 
but for reasons that are not entirely clear (Wei's hatred of Xiong Tingbi 
may have been partly the cause), Zhao despised Wei Guangwei and said 
that he was no true son of his father's. Wei went to Minister Zhao's home 
to pay a courtesy call. Zhao told his gateman to inform Wei that he had 
gone to bed and would not receive callers. Wei tried two more times to 
pay a call, but Zhao rebuffed him each time. Understandably, Wei 
Guangwei was deeply offended.115 Personal dislike notwithstanding, that 
was no way to treat a grand secretary. Zhao was also cool toward Ye 
Xianggao.116 
As minister of personnel, Zhao Nanxing's self-appointed mission was 
to purge government of sloth, corruption, and incompetence, and fill 
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vacancies with upright and capable men. Unfortunately, he discharged 
that task in such a way as needlessly to kindle hatreds. 
The trouble began in April 1624, when he peremptorily appointed one 
Zou Weilian to a vacancy in his own Ministry of Personnel. He ignored 
the standing procedure of clearing a candidate with his coprovincials 
among the censors and supervising secretaries before sending his name 
up to the Palace for confirmation. He also forgot or dismissed the fact 
that there already was a coprovincial of Zou's—Wu Yuwen—serving in 
the same bureau. The province in question was Jiangxi. The Jiangxi offi-
cials raised a storm of protest, demanding to know why they had not been 
consulted. Wu Yuwen immediately resigned his position. Zou Weilian 
soon resigned as well. Zhao Nanxing confessed to the Palace that he had 
muddled the affair; the Palace consoled Zhao and directed both Wu and 
Zou to resume their positions. Zhao asked to be allowed to resign. The 
matter raged on, and in June it took an ominous turn. 
Zhao Nanxing's rationale for summarily appointing Zou Weilian was 
that he knew Zou to have an outstanding reputation for uprightness and 
competence; that Jiangxi people were well known for their Confucian 
study (daoxue) and their principled righteousness (jieyi); and that there-
fore it came as a complete shock to him when Zou's coprovincials pro-
tested his appointment. The coprovincials in question were Supervising 
Secretaries Zhang Yunru, Chen Liangxun, and Fu Kui. All had good rep-
utations. None was known to be anti-Donglin. They should never have 
become antagonists. But they were deeply offended at having been ig-
nored; and they also suspected that Zou Weilian had advised Zhao to 
ignore them. When the Palace disallowed their initial protest, they sensed 
that, behind the scenes, a conspiracy was making its force felt. This was 
the atmosphere in which, in June 1624, Supervising Secretary Fu Kui sent 
up a sensational impeachment that threatened to destroy several key play-
ers in the Donglin faction.117 
That there existed, if not a conspiracy, then at least a suspiciously 
opaque mechanism for discovering and promoting "good men" is be-
yond doubt. Fu Kui felt excluded and victimized by it, and he was not 
alone in that feeling. The situation was this: an opening occurred in the 
position of chief supervising secretary in the Office of Scrutiny for Per-
sonnel, a plum assignment. There was an informal waiting list of candi-
dates for it. The first man on the list had to take emergency leave. Wei 
Dazhong (Supervising Secretary of the Left in the Office of Scrutiny for 
Revenue, soon to become a major Donglin figure) understood that he 
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was the next man in iine. Actually he was not. Ruan Dacheng, a super-
vising secretary of rank slightly lower than Wei's, was next. 
Ruan Dacheng (his notoriety as a playwright would develop later) con-
sidered himself a member of the "pure current," an alternative label for 
the Donglin. He happened to be home on leave, far from Beijing, in 
Tongcheng county in modern Anhui province. So his county compatriot, 
Assistant Censor-in-Chief Zuo Guangdou, sent him an urgent letter ad-
vising him to hurry back to Beijing. Ruan did so. 
Ruan hosted a gathering for his pure-current comrades when he re-
turned to Beijing. Supervising Secretary Wei Dazhong, Censor Huang 
Zunsu, and the Jiangxi men Zhang Yunru and Chen Liangxun joined 
him over rice beer, and, according to Huang, they all vowed to Heaven 
that they would cleave together. But not long after this gathering Ruan 
found that "outer-court opinion" was against him, in part because of 
negative comments (superficiality, carelessness in speech) that had been 
placed in his evaluation file. His friend and patron, Zuo Guangdou, sug-
gested that perhaps Ruan should withdraw and make himself available for 
another, slightiy lesser vacancy in the Office of Scrutiny for Works. 
Ruan Dacheng was stung. He felt that Zuo Guangdou had betrayed 
him. A clique had formed against him! He turned a cold shoulder toward 
Zuo and Wei Dazhong. He would have revenge! Through Fu Kui, the 
disaffected supervising secretary from Jiangxi, he made contact with pal-
ace eunuch Wei Zhongxian's nephew Fu Jijiao. Then, at some point (the 
chronology is not clear), Ruan and Fu Kui met Wei Zhongxian himself at 
Zhuozhou, twenty miles south of Beijing, where the eunuch was paying 
a ceremonial visit. Reportedly, Ruan paid obeisance to Wei and gave him 
a list of his friends and enemies in the bureaucracy. On May i, 1624, Ruan 
got the appointment he coveted. 
Ruan's former friends were horrified. Wei Dazhong tried to reason 
with him. Censor Li Yingsheng wrote Ruan of his disappointment and 
regret, and reminded him that while the junzi of the Northern Song had 
had their mutual disagreements, they had never sought the help of xino-
rcn in their mutual struggles. "Unfortunately," wrote Li, "schemers have 
dragged you into the vines."118 Censor Huang Zunsu, likewise, chided 
Ruan for his behavior. "Why do you stalk off because of a difference of 
opinion?" he asked. "The xiaoren are pleased to see this. They see a rift 
they can exploit. They're doing everything they can to win you over. 
They've painted the whole dragon except for the eyes, and they want you 
to paint those."119 
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Rnan resigned his new post within days of receiving it and retired 
home. Perhaps he found the partisan cross-fires too intense. However, 
before leaving Beijing he reportedly helped Fu Kui to draft a searing me-
morial of impeachment of his former Donglin friends, a memorial whose 
verbal pyrotechnics left no doubt but that the Donglin partisans were 
about to destroy each other. 
On June 4, the Palace rescripted and released to the public Fu Kui's 
sensational memorial. In it, Fu alleged the existence of a dangerous con-
spiracy of deviant and vile men aiming to dominate Ming government. 
He asked the ruler to consider that even in good times there are preda-
tory owls among the phoenixes, thorn bushes among the orchids, and 
xmorcn among the junzi. As long as the xiaoren do not have high posi-
tion, or form cliques, the evil they can do is minor. But, charged Fu Kui, 
we now see the ugly faces and predatory heart-minds of Zuo Guangdou 
and Wei Dazhong! They consider themselves red-blooded males, and 
others think them intelligent, but in fact they belong to the evil species 
(jtilci)l Until lately they kept their weapons hidden, but they could not 
keep up forever their pretense of being junzi, and so now they have open-
ly joined other xiaoren and have launched an assault on the junzi! 
By "other xiaorenFu Kui had one person specifically in mind. It was 
aooe other than Wang Wenyan, last seen as a middleman for eunuch 
Wang An in the Palace Case of 1620, when he was known as Wang 
Shoutai. He was now back in Beijing under the new name Wang Wenyan, 
busily brokering appointments for Minister of Personnel Zhao Nanxing. 
Fu Kui revealed some awful facts about him: 
Wang Shoutai was originally a servant in She county [in Huizhou prefec-
ture, modern Anhui province]. He became a government storehouse clerk 
there. For embezzlement he was sentenced to a garrison, but he escaped, 
ttxlame secrctly to Beijing where he served Wang An as a son his father. 
WtaiAat collusion was exposed, people thought that was the end of him. 
But then he changed his name [to Wang Wenyan] and purchased his pres-
empew: [« Secretariat Drafter]. Instead of prosecuting him, the Censorate 
Zxxo Guangdou became his intimate friend! Far from eradicating 
him, Supervising Secretary Wei Dazhong abetted his corruption! Thus 
I w ^ r T ^ T ^ W£POnS rcadicd> m e n r c c r u i t e d > official ap-The excuse is opposition to the eunuch [Wei 
^ ^ T t l t ! ? * * adVanta*c *at ^ accrued to viUainous 
^ 1 1 X 1 ^ aBt*vor a1** upright men have been receiving!130 
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Fu Kui demanded that the ruler dismiss Zuo Guangdou and Wei Da-
zhong, and punish Wang Wenyan, for the sake of the security of the dy-
nasty and the well-being of the realm. The Palace rescript ordered that 
Wang Wenyan be arrested immediately and interrogated under torture.121 
Fu Kui's memorial, and the imperial rescript to it, sent shock waves 
rolling through Beijing officialdom. Fu Kui used the Donglin's own mor-
al taxonomy (the "good species," the junzi) and turned it against die 
Donglin itself. The arrest of Wang Wenyan and his consignment to the 
Decree Prison was serious business, likely the first step in a sweeping 
purge of Donglin men from government. 
Chief Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao tried to allay the turmoil by send-
ing a statement to the Palace in which he accepted sole responsibility and 
blame for having agreed to the appointment of Wang Wenyan as a secre-
tariat drafter. He offered to resign. Perhaps that would stop an impend-
ing partisan war and prevent "a disaster for officialdom." By rescript of 
June II, the Palace asked Ye to stay on the job.122 
In his memoirs, Ye gave further details about the shadowy Wang Wen-
yan and his role as contact man for the Donglin: 
Minister of Personnel Zhao Nanxing, the Censorate officials Yang Lian 
and Zuo Guangdou, and the Supervising Secretary Cheng Zhen were all 
friendly with Wang Shoutai, and when it fell to the Grand Secretariat to se-
lect imperial college students to serve in the history office [as Secretariat 
Drafters], they all spoke up in Wang's behalf. At this time Wang had 
changed his name to Wenyan. 
I said to those gentiemen that Wang was fortunate to have returned 
home alive, and that I couldn't understand why he was now angling to ad-
vance himself; and that if they liked him, they should tell him to leave at 
once, and not stay in the capital where his life was at risk. 
Those gentiemen didn't agree, so I dropped the matter. Soon Zhao 
Nanxing and the others argued forcefully in Wang's behalf, and ten or 
more officials of the Censorate pleaded for him as well. They got their col-
leagues to join them. There was nothing I could do but write a request for 
his appointment. 
And so Wang Wenyan consorted with those gentiemen, and whenever 
they wanted to communicate with Zhao Nanxing about personnel selec-
tions, they did so through Wang Wenyan. Wang never accepted money for 
this; but he was a small man (xiaonn) of limited understanding who 
thought highly of himself for being able to suggest people suitable for ap-
pointments and promotions. Zhao Nanxing kept aloof from the other 
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court officials, who resented him for that, but there was no one besides 
Wang upon whom they could vent their anger. I knew that, and I called 
Wang in, and I warned him that he should leave at once, and that if 
he didn't, there would be serious trouble which would involve other peo-
ple. I also asked Grand Secretary Han Kuang and the others to urge him 
likewise.123 
Ye went on to explain that Zhao Nanxing needed the services of Wang 
Wenyan to help make the controversial appointment of Zou Weilian, and 
so Wang did not leave but stayed on, and so made himself a ripe target 
for Fu Kui's frightening expose. 
On June 4, Zuo Guangdou was stunned to read Fu Kui's memorial in 
die Capital Gazette (Dibao). He replied by memorial at once. Zuo said 
that Fu Kui was applying labels like "clean path," "possessing the Way," 
and "good species" to the wrong people. What possible motive could he 
have? What of his own tie of sworn brotherhood with the vile Fu Jijiao, 
Director of Punishments in the Eastern Depot? If Fu Kui believed Zuo to 
be corrupt, why did he fail to substantiate that charge with facts? Zuo 
offered to resign. The Palace consoled Zuo, praised him, and asked him 
to stay on the job.124 
Fu Kui's memorial, meanwhile, placed Donglin firebrand Wei Da-
zhong in grave difficulty. On June 3, the Palace endorsed his promotion 
to the contested post of chief supervising secretary of the Office of Scru-
tiny for Personnel. On June 4, Wei Dazhong, too, read Fu Kui's memo-
rial in the Capital Gazette. Because Fu Kui had impeached him, he could 
not now assume his new post. He replied by memorial the same day. He 
denied ever having bribed Wang Wenyan and accused Fu Kui o f making 
life so difficult for Zou Weilian, Wu Yuwen, Zuo Guangdou and various 
other "gentiemen" that they could not enjoy even a moment of security 
in their positions. He accused Fu Kui himself of corruption, and of call-
ing people by the wrong labels. He asked the ruler to reject Fu Kui, to 
preserve the "good species," and to dismiss Wei himself as a sop to Fu 
Kui's feeling of personal insecurity. On June 8, the Palace directed Wei 
Dazhong to go ahead and assume his new post.125 
Wei Dazhong's friends urged him to go ahead and formally assume his 
new duties. But Wei was still technically under impeachment, and so he 
hesitated. On June 10, Supervising Secretary Zhen Shu memorialized 
in his behalf on the matter, and the Palace replied that its directive of 
June 8 was still valid. So, urged on by his colleagues, Wei assumed the 
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post on June n. On June 12, the Court of State Ceremonial placed his 
name in its memorial scheduling a routine ceremony in which new ap-
pointees personally thanked the emperor. It therefore came as a complete 
surprise to Wei to read the Palace rescript of June 13: "The mutual attacks 
of Wei Dazhong and Fu Kui haven't been clarified yet, so how can he take 
up the post? The Court of State Ceremonial should not have listed his 
name." On June 14, a worried Wei Dazhong memorialized that he would 
not dare to assume the post and was staying home awaiting punishment. 
The Palace reply of June 15 gave a detailed defense of its own procedures 
in all this and directed Wei to take the post, though it forbade him to 
attend the ceremony.126 
Now Fu Kui reached for his pen. He expressed shock that the Palace 
had appointed Wei Dazhong but denied him the ceremony. That was un-
precedented. Obviously the decision had been taken inside the Palace, 
bypassing the Grand Secretariat. Evidently favorites inside the Palace had 
seized power. The dispute between himself and Wei Dazhong was left in 
doubt and unresolved. And why, moreover, wasn't the Palace interrogat-
ing Wang Wenyan more severely?127 
On or around June 18, Censor Liu Fang echoed Fu Kui's consternation 
over the Palace's inept handling of Wei Dazhong. "Especially now, when 
we have a disordered clash of views, when a war of words is in progress, 
and ugly accusations fly about, the writing and issuing of rescripts from 
inside the Palace [bypassing the Grand Secretariat] creates bewilderment 
and paranoia (ccticun) in the outer court," he stated in his memorial to 
the emperor. "The court needs consistent orders to quell the paranoia, 
reduce conflict, and restore harmony Yet just when the officials' pas-
sions (xueqi) have quieted and their verbal assaults have eased, and the 
disputes have slackened, you stir everything up with these contradictory 
rescripts. This will only rekindle the controversies, and the national right 
(jjuoshi) will suffer." The Palace was unimpressed by Liu Fang's argument 
and stood by its previous rescripts.128 
Chief Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao did not contest the Palace's right 
to formulate its own rescripts. He did express anger at Wei Dazhong. Be-
cause Wei was under impeachment, he should never have accepted his 
new appointment under any circumstances. Ye displeased Wei Dazhong 
by telling him that to his face. "This matter shows," concluded Ye in his 
memoirs, "that while those fellows [of the Donglin] made a good show-
ing by standing upright and not riding the waves of common custom, 
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they were by no means averse to struggling for their own advancement 
and reputation. They completely ignored the larger issues in the political 
crisis of die time. I earnesdy spoke about this [to Wei], but he didn't lis-
ten, and so he ended up humiliating himself, getting himself killed [in 
1625], and ruining the affairs of the realm."129 
Meanwhile the Donglin appointments broker, Wang Wenyan, lan-
guished in the Decree Prison. The main charge against him was accept-
ing a bribe of 2,000 taels of silver from Zou Weilian to plead the case for 
his promotion to Minister of Personnel Zhao Nanxing. There were fur-
ther allegations of his having trafficked with Zuo Guangdou and Wei 
Dazhong.130 
The Palace ordered Wang interrogated under torture. The Donglin 
men were extremely worried. Wei Dazhong often visited Censor Huang 
Zunsu's house to talk about what they should do. One day when he came 
by in alarm, Huang Zunsu was not at home, and so Wei wrote an urgent 
note and gave it to Huang's young son Huang Zongxi (the future phi-
losopher) to pass along to his father.131 The note begged Huang Zunsu 
to intervene to effect Wang's release. Huang Zunsu knew Liu Qiao, the 
director of the Decree Prison, and paid him a secret visit. "Wang Wenyan 
himself is of no account," argued Huang, "but we can't have him be the 
cause of a disaster for the scholar-officials."132 Liu Qiao agreed. On his 
own authority, he made sure that Wang Wenyan was not pressed hard. 
The Palace was angered by Liu Qiao's noncooperation, and, on or about 
June 16, it ordered him dismissed and stricken from the official register.133 
Thus the Palace's case against Wang Wenyan was botched. On August 9, 
Minister of Personnel Zhao Nanxing memorialized that Wang Wenyan 
was being detained for no reason in the "black prison" and asked that he 
be granted a release. On August 11, the Palace replied that Wang Wenyan 
was a thoroughly bad character who ought to be put in the cangue, but 
the ruler had decided to be lenient and ordered him to be flogged a hun-
dred times at the Meridian gate, removed from official status, and for-
bidden to return to the capital ever again.134 
< 
The Beijing situation was volatile. It was unclear how long the Palace 
could continue to play the bureaucratic factions against each other, lean-
ing first to one side, then to the other. At some point the Palace would 
have to choose, because the rhetoric of character assassination had come 
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to a near boil, factional differences were becoming more and more sharp-
ly drawn, and some erstwhile Donglin supporters who deserted the ship 
did so in the same provocative spirit of absolute moral righteousness that 
the Donglin itself had grown accustomed to enjoying as its unique pos-
session. 
It was also unclear who the preeminent Donglin leader or spokesman 
might be. Zhou Zongjian made a loud bid for that role in 1623, but his 
timing was premature and he lacked adequate career credentials. How-
ever, his effort seemed to show, even in its failure, that in order to march 
to the front of the corps of Donglin adherents one had to attract public 
attention; and nothing served that purpose better than the language of 
moral terrorism—language at its logical extreme, language at its most 
uncompromising, language heated to the highest possible degree of emo-
tional incandescence. And that was Yang Lian's rhetorical bombshell of 
July 1624. 
C H A P T E R 3 
Political Murders, 1625 
I N M I D - J U L Y 1 6 2 4 , the political stale-
mate in Beijing was blown apart by means of a verbal high explosive: the 
shattering "Twenty-four Crimes" memorial submitted by Yang Lian. The 
twenty-four crimes were imputed to palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian. The 
memorial was addressed to Tianqi, and it asked him, in effect, how he 
could continue to protect and abet a national criminal. The repercussions 
of this memorial were such as to bring on one of the darkest episodes of 
political repression in the long history of China, highlighted by the pub-
lic arrests and secret murders of twelve leading figures of the Donglin fac-
tion, including Yang Lian, and the suicide of a thirteenth, Gao Panlong. 
It required uncommon courage—indeed utter recklessness, a willing-
ness to court martyrdom—to send up to the throne an indictment as 
sweeping and as damning as the "Twenty-four Crimes" memorial, and 
incidents are related of Yang Lian in his youth that suggest a need, or at 
least an ability, to reach on occasion the requisite state of mental and spir-
itual exaltation. For instance, there was the occasion when, as a county 
student, on a snowy night he and a friend pledged themselves to become 
heroes (haojie) and then walked singing all through the county seat, now 
and then leaning on pillars and howling crazily, writing words in the 
snow, crying bitterly—strange behavior whose meaning onlookers could 
not grasp.1 
Since his voluntary retirement in the wake of the Palace Case of late 
1620—the event that secured his national leadership credentials—Yang 
Lian lived at home, in Yingshan county, Hubei, where he was active in 
local affairs and kept up with developments in Beijing when from time to 
time copies of the Capital Gazette (Dibao) reached him. People saw him 
weep and curse when reading about eunuch Wei Zhongxian's latest out-
rages. 
Yang Lian had been right at Taichang's bedside in 1620 when the dying 
emperor had laid a deathbed command (guming) on the emergency 
gathering of officials, begging them personally to help Tianqi be a good 
ruler. "If I could see [Tianqi] face-to-face," vowed Yang to his comrades, 
"I'd break my head telling him about how his father had entrusted him 
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to us. I must kill that bandit [Wei Zhongxian] to requite [the Taichang 
emperor's] friendship!" Two comrades argued with Yang. Power, they 
said, now lay in enemy hands, and voicing "empty ideas" (kong yan) at 
this juncture would be fruitiess and perhaps disastrous. To avoid argu-
ment Yang Lian agreed with them.2 
In May 1622, the Palace endorsed a number of recalls of officials, 
among them Yang Lian. Earlier chief supervising secretary of the Office 
of Scrutiny for War, he was now assigned the same position in the Office 
of Scrutiny for Rites.3 His young sons were pleased, but Yang Lian set 
them straight about the matter. "Do you think I'm going back to serve 
like a horse or an ox?" he shouted at them. "We have a young, isolated 
ruler, a military crisis on the frontier, a eunuch in charge in the Palace, 
and all that could well be killing grounds for me. There's no time even to 
fret. What are you pleased for?" 
The partisan struggle in Beijing was hot in 1622. The Three Cases were 
being reargued with vehemence. Yang Lian had of course been a chief 
actor in the Palace Case, and his behavior in it was being praised to the 
skies by his friends and denounced by his enemies.4 Furthermore, the 
Ming military collapse in Manchuria had led to the arrest of the com-
manders Xiong Tingbi and Wang Huazhen, and partisan battles were rag-
ing over the question of who was more to blame and what punishments 
should apply. Yang asked friends to take care of his family. "When old 
Yang leaves the mountains this time," he laughed, "who knows how the 
return trip will be?"5 
In August 1622, Yang Lian was promoted to the post of vice minister 
of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices. He maintained a low profile. In March 
1624 he was promoted again—to vice censor-in-chief, a more responsible, 
visible, and strategic position.6 The newly appointed vice censor-in-chief's 
"Twenty-four Crimes" memorial of July 1624 would, as things turned 
out, make its author a martyr and a national hero in the eyes of posteri-
ty. A number of witnesses, including Yang himself, have attested to the 
thought and emotions surrounding its composition and submission. 
Yang Lian had begun drafting the memorial at home, before his recall 
to Beijing in 1622. He would get up during the night to work on it, when 
family members could hear him sobbing. He lied to them about what he 
was doing. They did not, apparendy, find out the truth until the memo-
rial was sent up and the deed was done.7 
Later in Beijing, however, some colleagues did find out. Someone told 
Censor Huang Zunsu that Yang Lian would stop at nothing until he had 
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gotten rid of the eunuch, and that he would "win an immortal name for 
himself." Huang doubted that Yang's plan would work; he needed col-
laborators inside the palace, and he had none. "If his strike misses, we're 
all going to be destroyed as a species," said Huang.8 Huang confronted 
Yang Lian himself, and Yang showed him the draft of his memorial. "You 
have no [inside collaborators]. And you must erase the hearsay from your 
allegations about the palace women," advised Huang, "because if the 
emperor can't confirm every detail of that, he'll reject even your well-
founded allegations." Yang Lian took no heed.9 
Assistant Censor-in-Chief Zuo Guangdou, Yang's supporter in the Pal-
ace Affair of 1620, also knew what Yang Lian was doing, but he encour-
aged him, and he told his colleague Miao Changqi about it. Miao 
thought an all-out impeachment of Wei Zhongxian was likely to fail, but 
Zuo said nothing when Miao told him that.10 Indeed, Zuo had already 
prepared an impeachment of his own, charging eunuch Wei with thirty-
two crimes, which he planned to submit as a follow-up to Yang's.11 Cen-
sor Li Yingsheng was also privy to what Yang was planning and tried to 
dissuade him. "If your strike misses, you'll be eaten and you'll harm the 
national body (guoti),n urged Li. "I'm a speaking official, not a high offi-
cial like you," he continued, "so you should let me do this instead of 
you." At home, Li had prepared a sixteen-count impeachment of Wei 
Zhongxian; but his older cousin, an usher in the Court of State Cere-
monial, at some point seized it in horror and destroyed it.12 It is unlikely 
that Yang Lian would have agreed to Li's proposal in any event. 
In fact Yang Lian was not thinking about practical politics in the short 
term at all. He was thinking about martyrdom and future history. " I 
know full well this will fail," he is said to have remarked, "but I've about 
mounted the tiger, and I'll not have posterity say that among the officials 
there to receive [Taichang's] deathbed instructions, there was not one 
with the qi of a male. I made up my mind long ago; I will sacrifice myself 
in the name of righteousness."13 
On July 14, Tianqi was scheduled to make a personal ceremonial ap-
pearance before all the assembled officials. It was Yang Lian's intention to 
use that opportunity to read his memorial of impeachment aloud for 
maximum effect, "like a clap of thunder that makes people cover their 
ears." Also, the often secluded emperor would be sure to hear it. But 
something went wrong. Apparently the Palace caught wind of what was 
going on. Unexpectedly, the ceremony was canceled.14 
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Yang Lian was stunned. If he waited for a rescheduling of the ceremo-
ny, it was likely that the Palace would in the meantime find out more 
about what he was up to and stop him. He decided, therefore, to preempt 
that possibility. He went to the Huiji gate and submitted his long im-
peachment in its written form first. Perhaps there would be an opportu-
nity in the next several days to deliver an oral version of die impeachment 
direcdy to Tianqi. 
So the deed was done. The impeachment itself was horrific in what it 
alleged that Wei Zhongxian had done: usurped the powers of the Grand 
Secretariat; driven a dozen and more excellent men from office; mur-
dered Wang An; murdered two palace women; caused the empress to 
abort her child; seized control of the palace army; seized control of the 
secret police of the Eastern Depot; built an imperial-scale tomb for him-
self; and acted as though he himself were emperor of China, not Tianqi. 
The memorial, as Hucker has described it, "almost jeers" at Tianqi for 
allowing Wei Zhongxian to get away with these monstrous acts.15 
"I nearly died of anguish," wrote Yang to a colleague, explaining what 
happened on July 14. "But the memorial was already written, and so I 
had to submit it sealed. I knew it would be of no avail, but it expressed 
what was in this red heart of mine, and if by any chance fortune smiled, 
perhaps die spirits of the dynasty would be present and save matters."16 
When the emperor finally made a ceremonial appearance on July 20, 
the Palace made sure there would be no oral memorial from anyone on 
that occasion. Armed guards surrounded Tianqi. The ushers of the Court 
of State Ceremonial were under orders to allow no one to speak out. 
Yang Lian attended, but was silent. To onlookers it appeared as though 
the Palace had managed to cow the outer court.17 
Some inside source conveyed the story to Yang Lian that his written 
bill of impeachment had created acute distress inside the palace. Wei 
Zhongxian went about from room to room wailing. Madame Ke and her 
eunuch servants stayed up all night figuring out how to prepare Tianqi 
for the bad news. At lunch the next day, the memorial was brought in and 
laid before the emperor, who may or may not have attempted to read it. 
Wei Zhongxian, hat in hand, knelt to one side and lamented about how 
faithful he had been to Tianqi's dead mother. Tianqi just nodded and 
said: "You can get up and go. I'll send the memorial to the Grand 
Secretariat for a draft rescript."18 
When the memorial arrived at the Grand Secretariat, Ye Xianggao, the 
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steady hand the situation required, was not on duty. Grand Secretary 
Han Kuang looked at it, but backed off. Grand Secretary Wei Guangwei, 
angered that Yang's memorial indirecdy alluded to him as a "protege" 
of Wei Zhongxian, agreed to write the rescript. The rescript, issued on 
July 16, merely acknowledged the receipt of Yang's memorial, announced 
Wei Zhongxian's offer to resign, and followed it with a statement from 
Tianqi forgiving Wei Zhongxian and retaining him on duty. 
This was unheard-of procedure. In a confidential note of the same day, 
July 16, Han Kuang and Ye Xianggao protested to the Palace that it must 
release Yang Lian's memorial so that it could be publicly discussed in the 
outer court, where a climate of paranoia was rapidly growing. The Palace 
hotiy denied any procedural irregularity.19 
On July 18, the Palace released Yang Lian's memorial, together with 
a rescript directed to the eighth, ninth, and tenth charges, that Wei 
Zhongxian had caused the deaths of two imperial concubines plus 
Tianqi's own child by empress Zhang. "The memorial is reckless and 
widiout foundation in what it alleges," stated the rescript. "Matters re-
garding imperial concubines and palace women are confidential, and [the 
impeachment] provides no facts. How [in any case] would the outer 
court know anything about it? This is just deliberate speculation aimed at 
dividing me from people close to me, leaving me alone and isolated on 
high." The emperor (or, rather, Grand Secretary Wei Guangwei writing 
in his behalf) went on to insist that he made all decisions personally and 
warned officialdom not to send up any memorials of rejoinder in support 
of Yang Lian.20 
Chief Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao was sick in bed at home when he 
received copies of Yang Lian's sensational memorial and the imperial 
response to it. These he read in what he described as a state of shock.21 
"My belief was," he later wrote, "that these matters should not have been 
forcefully contested, for fear it would cause a rupture (juelie), and I said 
this at the time to people I knew."22 
At about this time, Miao Changqi paid Ye Xianggao a visit. Another 
visitor was there already. They discussed Yang Lian's memorial. Ye said he 
thought the memorial too slapdash. He went on to share several anec-
dotes favorable to Wei Zhongxian. "That is how conscientious [Wei 
Zhongxian] is," said Ye, "and I'm afraid that if Yang's memorial succeeds 
in what it demands, it will be hard to find a replacement as careful and 
responsible to serve the emperor." Miao by his own account exploded in 
anger. "Whoever said that said it to deceive you, and should be execut-
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ed." Ye's face changed color. Miao got up and left. Ye escorted him out. 
Informed of Ye's favorable remarks about Wei Zhongxian, Yang Lian 
seethed. Miao calmed him down.23 
Meanwhile in the days following the release of Yang's sensational me-
morial, some seventy officials in Beijing and Nanjing defied the Palace's 
explicit warning and sent up written memorials in Yang Lian's support, 
imploring the emperor to punish the villainous eunuch Wei Zhongxian. 
Not one memorialist defended the eunuch. Chief Grand Secretary Ye 
Xianggao rejected pleas from Yang Lian's friends that he openly lend his 
weight to the attack. He did, however, write a confidential note to Tianqi 
urging him to allow Wei Zhongxian to leave the Forbidden City—not be-
cause Wei was necessarily guilty as charged, but because the realm was fast 
descending into turmoil over the issue. On July 25, the Palace rejected 
that advice and gave notice that it was retaining Wei Zhongxian.24 
The Palace proposed to place under arrest everyone who had ignored 
its injunction and had memorialized on Yang Lian's behalf. Ye Xianggao 
argued against that idea.25 The Palace backed down, because it was not 
yet in a position in which it felt strong enough to take severe measures 
against Yang Lian and his Donglin supporters in the bureaucracy. 
-<1 
Meanwhile, the Palace found two surrogate targets for its wrath. The first 
was Wan Jing, a mid-level official in the Ministry of Works. In the thick 
of the turmoil just raised by Yang Lian, Wan Jing resubmitted a request 
that the Palace had earlier denied, to use scrap copper in the Forbidden 
City to help defray the cost of building Taichang's tomb. 
The trouble with this apparendy routine memorial was that, in it, Wan 
Jing direcdy accused Wei Zhongxian of usurping Tianqi's authority by di-
verting Palace funds to finance a pet project—the construction of his own 
grandiose tomb. With his own eyes Wan Jing had seen the eunuch's mag-
nificent mausoleum being built at the Biyunsi outside Beijing, using 
funds that should have gone to the construction of Taichang's tomb! On 
his own authority, Wei Zhongxian was forcing Tianqi to assume the pos-
ture of an unfilial son. Surely, Wei Zhongxian must be punished.26 
Wan Jing's awful memorial was sent up on July 29. The rescript was is-
sued the next day. The Palace denied that there was enough scrap copper 
with which to accomplish anything. Wan Jing had already been told that. 
Now comes this contumacious memorial accusing the emperor of filial 
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impiety. And at what a time! The emperor's sick infant son had just died. 
The Embroidered-uniform Guard was ordered to fetch Wan Jing up to 
the Meridian gate and there flog him a hundred times. After that, Wan 
Jing was ordered dismissed from civil service, never to be rehired.27 
Ye Xianggao, sick in bed at home, was shown the draft of this rescript 
before it was issued. Stunned, he sent a frantic note back to the Palace, 
begging the emperor to reduce the punishment to a demotion and a fine. 
The Palace notified Ye by a rescript dated July 31 that Wan Jing's memo-
rial was exceptionally offensive and therefore it was rejecting Ye's plea.28 
Ye asked to resign. If he could not dissuade Tianqi from reviving the 
evil practice of flogging officials, which wounds the national body 
(guoti), then, he argued, his usefulness as grand secretary was over. A Pal-
ace rescript of August 5 consoled Ye and denied his request to resign.29 
Later, Ye stated in his memoirs that the Palace's savagery in the Wan Jing 
matter was owing to the radicalizing effect that Yang Lian's "Twenty-four 
Crimes" memorial had had upon it.30 
Wan Jing was flogged on August 1. The scene was horrifying. Wan had 
a history of conflict with the palace eunuchs, which explains why a squad-
ron of them left the Forbidden City, broke into his home, and lacked and 
pummeled him as they marched him up to the Meridian gate. Wan Jing 
was physically frail. A colleague from the Ministry of Works, Peng Qi-
sheng, was right there as the eunuchs dragged him up. Wei Zhongxian 
was also there, and he yelled for guards to shut the gate. Peng was there-
fore unable to witness the delivery of the hundred strokes or the stomp-
ing and kicking the eunuchs allegedly applied afterward to Wan Jing's 
prostrate form. When they carried Wan Jing out he was scarcely con-
scious. "This is why the dynasty has nurtured shi for two hundred years," 
Peng heard him say. Wan Jing's point was not sarcastic. His legs were 
flayed to a pulp. His friends carried him to a Buddhist temple. Peng Qi-
sheng helped with medication. Colleague Li Banghua brought him food. 
When colleague Li Mingjun visited him, Wan Jing just stared open-eyed, 
no longer able to speak. Around August 7, he died.31 
There was more violence. During the same days when Wan Jing was 
mauled and flogged and lay dying, Censor Lin Ruzhu, on police duty in 
Beijing, had a violent confrontation with several palace eunuchs over a 
local crime case. The eunuchs complained to the Palace, which drafted an 
edict ordering Lin to be flogged and removed from civil service. The 
draft: was shown to the Grand Secretariat. Han Kuang and Ye Xianggao 
immediately protested: yet another flogging, within the space of two 
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days? They warned of dire effects on official morale. In reply to this pro-
test a rescript of August 4 explained that Lin had acted wantonly; that he 
had to be punished in order to deter others; that flogging was less severe 
a penalty than the arrest and torture he really deserved.32 
At some point during these days the speaking officials (censors and su-
pervising secretaries) met in the office of the Grand Secretariat to protest 
the sentences given Wan Jing and Lin Ruzhu. Censor Huang Zunsu de-
scribed what happened. "A crowd of several hundred eunuchs massed 
outside, shaking their fists and screaming. The grand secretaries were red-
faced and speechless. None dared to stop them. I said [to the eunuchs]: 
cThe Grand Secretariat is off-limits to the eunuch Directorate of Ceremo-
nial except when an imperial order is being delivered. How dare you act 
like this? You're disobeying all the Ming emperors!' The eunuchs then 
backed away."33 
But where was Lin Ruzhu? Several hundred armed eunuchs descended 
upon his house, and failed to find him. A citywide search was begun. Lin 
was from Fujian, and a county compatriot of Ye Xianggao. Someone 
thought he was Ye's nephew. Maybe he was hiding in Ye's house. "A 
crowd [of eunuchs] surrounded my house and demanded to come in and 
search it," Ye recalled. "I said to the eunuchs that if the court orders the 
arrest of a censor and the grand secretary hides him, then the grand sec-
retary's defiance of the emperor is the more serious crime. If you search 
my house and you find him, then that's what I'll be guilty of. The eu-
nuchs milled about and then they left."34 
It turned out that Lin Ruzhu had put on a disguise and taken refuge 
with Deng Mei, grand coordinator of Shuntian prefecture. Lin was will-
ing to take the flogging. He had fled because he feared the kicking and 
mauling inflicted on Wan Jing might be applied to him as well. Deng Mei 
negotiated Lin's surrender. Lin took his hundred lashes, recuperated, and 
went home to private life.35 
But it was the eunuchs' attempted search of his home that compelled 
Ye Xianggao to insist upon leaving the Ming government once and for all. 
He informed the Palace that never in the two hundred years of Ming his-
tory had eunuchs surrounded the house of a grand secretary. He had, he 
said, completely lost face and therefore could under no circumstances 
continue to serve. He moved out of Beijing. On August 20, the Palace 
endorsed his resignation. Tianqi seemed reluctant to see him go.36 Ye had 
tried all along to dampen "paranoia" (caicun), to prevent "rupture" 
(juelie), to "negotiate compromises" (tiaotinjj) between the Palace and 
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the warring bureaucratic factions, but it had all been unavailing. With Ye 
gone, the struggle would become even more bitter. 
The bureaucracy, through its speaking officials (the censors and supervis-
ing secretaries), protested strongly the Palace's abuse of Wan Jing and Lin 
Ruzhu, and perhaps for that reason the Palace henceforth confined the 
eunuchs to the Forbidden City and forbade their venturing out as armed 
gangs again. The batdefront between Palace and bureaucracy shifted back 
to the issue of appointments. 
In the days and weeks after his "Twenty-four Crimes" memorial was 
made public, Yang Lian lay low and kept quiet, unsure whether to remain 
in Beijing or submit his resignation and leave. In a letter to his family back 
in Hubei, he expressed a desire to return home but said he was being 
pressured by colleagues to stay. "The junzi chide me about the great is-
sues at stake, and they tell me that my staying in government so worries 
the inner court that it doesn't dare act with abandon; but that once I 
leave, it will relax in the expectation that it will have no more trouble."37 
Huang Zunsu, however, thought it was useless for Yang to remain in 
Beijing and urged him to leave for the sake of his own safety; but Yang 
disagreed, saying to Huang, "No one but me cares about the critical life-
and-death issues, and, if my death is beneficial in that respect, then I 
won't mind death." Then Yang had second thoughts, and he sent Censor 
Li Yingsheng to ask Huang again to help him decide. Li thought a junzi 
should not have to ask colleagues to decide a question like that for him.38 
But Huang's letter to Yang Lian ignored Li's point, and again he urged 
Yang to leave Beijing. "They've flogged Wan [Jing] and Lin [Ruzhu] just 
to show who has the power, and they won't be stopped," counseled 
Huang. He told Yang that making himself a martyr over the matter 
would achieve nothing.39 Yang decided to stay. Assassins tried to force 
entry into his house in Beijing. Censors on city patrol organized a body-
guard for him, 
< 
Ye Xianggao's resignation in August left the "good species" without 
effective support in the Grand Secretariat. Han Kuang was supportive, 
but he was not effective. Wei Guangwei had been offended by Yang Lian, 
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Zhao Nanxing, and other leading members of the Donglin, and was hos-
tile. Some of the Donglin ignored contrary advice and made the reckless 
decision to attack Wei Guangwei. 
In November 1624, Grand Secretary Wei Guangwei showed up very 
late for a solemn sacrifice at the imperial ancestral temple just south of the 
Forbidden City. It was so obviously an act of disrespect that everyone 
noticed it. Although the offense was punishable by law, Censor Huang 
Zunsu thought impeachment tactically unwise and sent an urgent plea to 
Supervising Secretary Wei Dazhong not to impeach the grand secretary. 
He thought Wei Dazhong already had enough of a reputation for right-
eous daring; there was no need now for him to try to enhance that rep-
utation, and put "our party" in danger.40 
But Censors Wei Dazhong and Li Yingsheng and several other officials 
went ahead and on November 17 impeached Wei Guangwei for flagrant 
disrespect, demanding that the corporal punishment specified in the Da 
Ming lii be applied to him.41 Wei Guangwei asked to be allowed to step 
down. The Palace consoled him and on November 20 replied harshly to 
his attackers. At about this time a thoroughly infuriated Wei Guangwei 
created an enemies list, marking up his copy of the official roster with 
three circles for big enemies and two circles or one for lesser enemies. The 
circled names identified a "deviant clique" (xiedang).42 His was neither 
the first nor the last such list. Dismissals of his enemies soon followed. 
On November 22, a Palace rescript dismissed Wei Dazhong and two 
others for having made an inappropriate recommendation for an impor-
tant vacancy.43 On December 4, another Palace rescript, released in the 
middle of the night, targeted Yang Lian, Zuo Guangdou, and Vice Min-
ister of Personnel Chen Yuting for making clique-related recommenda-
tions for vacancies. They had been told ahead of time by Grand Secretary 
Gu Bingqian who the acceptable recommendees were, but Chen and the 
others had blatantly defied him.44 Yang and the others were not simply 
demoted and dismissed; they were reduced to commoner status, and 
were no longer officials at all. Grand Secretary Han Kuang protested the 
decision, to no avail.45 
Yang Lian and Zuo Guangdou left Beijing together on horseback. At 
Zhuozhou they parted ways; Yang went back to Yingshan in Hubei, and 
Zuo to Tongcheng in present-day Anhui. Neither man carried much bag-
gage. Miao Changqi ignored warnings to stay away from these dismissed 
colleagues: "I said of course I'll send off people who have been cashiered! 
I know informers will report that, but I'll do it anyway."46 
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Censor Li Yingsheng filled his letters to distant colleagues and to fam-
ily back home with gloom and foreboding. He was certain his own re-
moval was imminent. Over the winter of 1624-1625 several leading offi-
cials of the Donglin party resigned: Minister of Personnel Zhao Nanxing; 
Grand Secretary Han Kuang; Censor-in-Chief of the Left Gao Panlong; 
and Hanlin Reader-in-Waiting Miao Changqi, among others. 
In late December, a sensational incident momentarily upset the Palace. 
The commander of Ming forces on the Manchurian frontier, Sung 
Chengzong, decided that he had to come see Tianqi in person. Despite 
his military position, Sun was a civil official. He and Tianqi had gotten on 
well when Sun tutored him in the classics for a short while in 1620. He 
owed his position as commander to recommendations made in his behalf 
by Donglin men Gao Panlong and Zuo Guangdou. Word had reached 
him that these and other supporters of his had been cashiered or forced 
to resign. "The emperor is just a youth and he is being controlled by vil-
lains," Sun reportedly said. "He doesn't necessarily read or understand 
the memorials sent him." That was why he believed a personal meeting 
with Tianqi was necessary.47 
A military advisor of Sun's, Cai Ding, tried to dissuade his chief. Sun 
ignored him.48 Accompanied only by his civilian aide, Lu Shanji (a bureau 
director in the Ministry of War), plus personal servants and runners, Sun 
left: his base at Ningyuan and made his way some two hundred miles by 
cart to Tongzhou just east of Beijing, which he reached on December 20. 
From there he sent word to the Palace that he would enter Beijing the 
next day, see Tianqi in three days, congratulate him on his nineteenth 
birthday, discuss strategy with him, confer with the court officials, and 
then return to Ningyuan on the Manchurian frontier. 
The Palace received Sun's notice that same day, December 20. Grand 
Secretary Wei Guangwei guessed at once that Sun Chengzong must have 
a large army with him, and that he had come to "cleanse the ruler's side," 
that is, forcibly remove Wei Zhongxian and all his adherents. Wei Guang-
wei also guessed that Sun must have an agent on the scene already—and 
who would that be> It must be Li Banghua, vice minister of war! Wei 
Zhongxian panicked and went to Tianqi's bedside and wept. Troops were 
mobilized inside Beijing. Eunuch guards at the outer gates were in-
structed to shut them against any attempted entry by Sun. Chief Grand 
Secretary Gu Bingqian hurriedly wrote a stern edict informing Sun that 
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his unauthorized visit was most unwelcome, and that he must return at 
once to the frontier. Sun obeyed. His mission failed. The Palace's panic 
subsided.49 
The Interrogation of Wang Wenyan 
By late December 1624, it was clear that the Palace had decided to purge 
the Donglin party from the political life of the nation. Discussion of the 
Three Cases heated up again, and the Donglin interpretation of those 
controversial events came under fierce challenge. Hostile memorialists 
fingered one Donglin adherent after the other for falsity, corruption, 
bribe trafficking, and other political crimes. 
More information was needed, however. Censor Liang Menghuan 
asked the Palace to authorize the rearrest of the former Donglin appoint-
ments broker Wang Wenyan. The Palace complied by a rescript of Febru-
ary 1,1625, ordering mounted police of the Embroidered-uniform Guard 
to proceed seven hundred miles south to Xiuning county and fetch Wang 
Wenyan back to Beijing.50 By April 11, Wang Wenyan had arrived, and a 
Palace rescript of that day ordered him sent to the Decree Prison run by 
the Embroidered-uniform Guard, located somewhere among the other 
military agencies south of the Imperial City. Wang Wenyan was to be 
interrogated there under "severe torture."51 
When Wang Wenyan was placed in the same prison a year earlier, 
Censor Huang Zunsu had interceded with Prison Director Liu Qiao and 
gotten him to agree not to apply torture. But Liu Qiao was no longer 
director. He had been replaced by Xu Xianchun. This time there would 
be torture.52 
The first round of interrogation under torture did not go well. The 
Palace already had made up its mind about which officials it wanted Wang 
Wenyan to name. Tormented to the point of unconsciousness, Wang 
Wenyan gave Xu Xianchun what he wanted, only to recant the testimony 
when he revived. Assistant Prison Director Wu Mengming suggested to 
his chief that, for their own protection in case of a future political rever-
sal, Wang Wenyan be made to testify only to a few names, and that the 
amounts of all alleged bribes be kept vague.53 Indeed, Xu Xianchun's long 
and detailed memorial to the Palace of April 22, though damning, con-
tained unspecified bribery allegations and targeted minor figures more 
than it did the big game.54 The Palace reply of April 23 demanded that Xu 
Xianchun reinterrogate Wang Wenyan and this time make all the details 
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clear. Complaints having been made about Wu Mengming, the Palace re-
moved him from civil service on May 2. His replacement as assistant 
director was Cui Yingyuan, a former street thug who had been serving in 
Wei Zhongxian's police agency, the Eastern Depot. This time things 
would proceed as the Palace desired.55 
Rumor had it that Wang Wenyan refused to the end to testify as his tor-
turers wished. It may well be that the Donglin people were correct in 
their belief that the confession submitted to the Palace as Wang Wenyan's 
was in fact not his at all, but the creation of Prison Director Xu Xianchun. 
The confession listed twenty-one names of officials who had eitiier taken 
bribes in silver and in return had made recommendations for appoint-
ments to vacancies in Beijing bureaucracy; or, worse, had accepted huge 
payments in silver from imprisoned commander Xiong Tingbi, in return 
for which they had acted in evil ways to mitigate his rightful punishment. 
It was important to have Wang Wenyan testify to these corrupt transac-
tions because he was allegedly the middleman for each of them. 
The Palace rescripted this confession on May 3. It ordered mounted 
police (yuanqi) of the Embroidered-uniform Guard to go out and arrest 
and fetch back to Beijing six of the twenty-one men named in the con-
fession. The six would soon become nationally known as the "Six junzi." 
They were: Yang Lian; Zuo Guangdou; former Censor Yuan Huazhong; 
former Supervising Secretary Wei Dazhong; former Vice Minister of the 
Court of the Imperial Stud Zhou Chaorui; and Gu Dazhang, former vice 
director in the Ministry of Justice. All were accused of accepting bribes 
from Xiong Tingbi. The rescript directed that the six suspects be interro-
gated in the Decree Prison alongside Wang Wenyan.56 
The Palace's initial expectation was that under joint interrogation the 
true facts would come forth, the full scope of the infamy would be re-
vealed, all the malefactors would be justly punished, and a cleansed Ming 
court could then return to the business of renovating the realm and allay-
ing its crises. But then it turned out that Wang Wenyan was not going to 
be a cooperative witness, and so the prosecution was going to fail. It 
would be preferable, therefore, not to have Wang Wenyan on hand to 
contest the charges and ruin the whole case. Sometime between May 3 
and May 10, Wang Wenyan's "death due to illness" was reported to the 
Palace. On May 10, a Palace rescript to that notification stated: "It was 
never reported that Wang Wenyan was ill. How did he die all of a sud-
den? Henceforth regulations must be observed. If [prisoners] become ill, 
they should be medicated."57 
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So Wang Wenyan, the one-time Donglin power broker and chief wit-
ness for the prosecution, was dead.58 Probably he was killed by prison 
guards at Xu Xianchun's direction. Despite its statement of shocked 
surprise of May 10, the Palace may have been secredy complicit in the 
murder. 
The Arrest and Ordeal of Tang Lian 
To send out squadrons of silk-robed imperial guards to the home prefec-
tures of each of the six accused, publicly arrest them, publicly read out the 
charges against them, and bring them back to Beijing riding partway in 
special prisoners' carts suggests that the Palace and its supporters in bu-
reaucracy were, or were affecting to be, morally certain of the tightness 
of what they were doing. Nothing was going to be done in the dark. Hei-
nous crimes had been disclosed. Villains had been named. All the solemn 
moral power of the Ming emperor and his court was being put on dis-
play. Surely the realm would be impressed and overawed. Six leading 
malefactors were going to be made the targets of national outrage and vil-
ification. Six malefactors! Or, were they six good men wronged? The gen-
eral public of China was going to be drawn into a national judicial drama 
as a kind of ultimate judge of the moral guilt or innocence of the Donglin 
faction. 
Foremost among the "Six junzi" was Yang Lian, leader of the group 
that had forced Lady Li to leave the imperial palace in 1620 and, of 
course, author of the sensational "Twenty-four Crimes" memorial of 
1624. The main charge against him was that he had accepted a bribe of 
20,000 taels of silver from Xiong Tingbi. 
It is not clear on what day Yang Lian left his home county of Yingshan, 
or on what day official proceedings were conducted in the prefectural 
capital of De'anfu (now Anlu, in Hubei, about forty miles southwest of 
Yingshan). Whatever the day, a near riot developed outside the city wall 
of De'anfu. Reportedly, "several thousand braves pressed to get into the 
yamen inside and assault the imperial police," but the officials closed the 
city gates against them and prevented the mob from entering. On the day 
of the public reading of the charges against Yang Lian, "several myriad 
literati and people from the prefecture and county gathered outside the 
south wall and raised a din that reached to Heaven." The crowd refused 
to disperse, until Yang Lian himself appeared in the tower above the wall 
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and pleaded that his arrest was not necessarily going to lead to his death; 
that if the crowd rioted in his behalf, they would make a loyal official like 
himself into a rebel, and would put his entire family in jeopardy. The 
crowd then went away.59 
Yang Lian was fettered hand and foot and placed in a prisoner cart for 
the journey north to Beijing. Besides the imperial police, a procession of 
local sympathizers accompanied the prisoner. Yang's personal servants 
(including a kinsman, disguised as a servant) carried along his coffin. 
Yang persuaded his oldest son and son-in-law to go back home. They had 
come in the fear that the police might kill the prisoner en route. "My 
body has already been committed to the court," said Yang. "Sooner or 
later they'll kill me, what difference does it make if it's in the Decree Pris-
on or on die road?" But son Yang Zhiyi and son-in-law Huang Dengxuan 
went ahead secretiy to Beijing. 
The procession made its way through scorching summer heat some 
two hundred miles northwest to Yunyangfu (now Yunxian), where there 
was another near riot until Yang Lian spoke to the crowd as he had done 
at De'anfu. Vegetable merchants and hawkers passed a sack and took up 
a cash collection for him. "In village after village, men and women came 
up weeping to the prisoner cart and peered in to see what a 'loyal official' 
looked like." 
As the procession crossed Henan province, men and women in the vil-
lages along the way held up tablets reading "loyal official" and burned in-
cense and offered rituals on Yang Lian's behalf. At length the prisoner 
and his escort reached Zhuxianzhen, a commercial town some 250 miles 
northeast of Yunyangfu. There his guards let Yang Lian visit a shrine to 
Yue Fei, the twelfth-century loyalist hero and martyr; there Yang gave the 
hero's shade a long account of his own career and of his hatred of eunuch 
Wei Zhongxian, who needed to be reminded of the "master-servant dis-
tinction."60 Somewhere along the journey there was a ten-day layover 
while Yang recuperated from a fever.61 By July 31, Yang Lian had arrived 
in Beijing. The Palace ordered him sent to the Decree Prison for interro-
gation under torture.62 
Zuo Guangdou 
Meanwhile another unit of imperial police approached Tongcheng coun-
ty to arrest Zuo Guangdou. (For some unknown reason, proceedings 
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were conducted there and not in Anqingfu, the prefectural capital.) As in 
De'anfu, so also in Tongcheng the people refused to share the Palace's 
moral vision of the situation. Many of the county people "acted crazed, 
as though it were their own parent who was under arrest." Handbills dis-
tributed at the four gates of the county seat reminded everyone that Zuo 
was a local benefactor, an "upright spirit" (zhengqi) at court, a behavioral 
model to the official class, tiiat his arrest orders were "false," and that die 
imperial police should be prevented from making the arrest, violently if 
need be.63 As Yang did, so did Zuo. He pleaded with the mob: "You're 
hastening my death! If you want to keep me alive, why do this?" The 
edict of arrest, though "forged" by palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian, was 
still an edict issued in the name of the "ruler-father" and was therefore 
"valid" (zhen)J* 
So the police made the arrest. The charges were read out. Like Yang, 
Zuo was accused of receiving a bribe of 20,000 taels of silver from Xiong 
Tingbi, the imprisoned former Ming commander at Shanhaiguan. 
Someone then drafted a memorial to the throne in behalf of the peo-
ple (venmin) of Tongcheng. The memorial described the reaction the 
news of Zuo's arrest created: "Officials wept in the yamen, the clerks 
wept in their offices, the peasants wept in the fields, the merchants wept 
in the market, travelers wept on the roads, and the womenfolk wept in 
their homes." The memorial reminded the emperor of Mencius' dictum 
that killing an official was not a prerogative of the throne. "The right 
(quan) to kill people lies not in the ruler's entourage, nor among the 
high officials, nor even in the Son of Heaven. It lies with the people of 
the state (guoren)." The memorial expressed disbelief that native son Zuo 
had ever accepted 20,000 taels from Xiong Tingbi to exonerate him from 
the charge of losing ancestral territory (fengqiang) in Manchuria. After 
twenty years in office, Zuo owned nothing but a bare house of a few 
rafters and a few mou of land. Where would he have put 20,000 taels? 
Surely die charges were false, and Zuo should be exonerated at once. 
Armed with this memorial, a wailing crowd of local "fathers, sons, and 
brothers" escorted prisoner Zuo from Tongcheng north for some thirty 
miles, at which point a delegation of a hundred was selected and provi-
sioned to complete the rest of the trek to Beijing. Zuo dissuaded them: 
the memorial they were carrying would accomplish nothing, and might 
even get the presenters killed. He urged the crowd to go home. Most did. 
A few followed surreptitiously as far as the Yellow River, and turned back 
there.65 
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Wei Dazhong 
Far to the east of De'anfu and Tongcheng, in Jiashan county in Zhejiang 
province, former Supervising Secretary Wei Dazhong chose to live in 
strict poverty, his demeanor "stern and cold," his clothing threadbare, his 
diet vegetarian, "beyond what was normal."66 He barred his gate and 
refused visitors, and found no peace of mind in the disturbing news he 
read in the Capital Gazette. He ended his personal diary on May 29,1625, 
the day the imperial police arrived and arrested him. His elder son, Wei 
Xueyi, continued the diary from the point where his father left off. 
"A myriad" gentry and common people (shimin) wailed in the streets 
as the police escorted Wei from Jiashan. The prisoner and his guards pro-
ceeded north by water through Suzhou, where they stopped for three 
days. There Zhou Shunchang, vice director of the Ministry of Personnel, 
on home leave, cast all caution to the winds and flamboyandy paid Wei a 
visit. "He is truly one of ours," said Zhou, and then and there he be-
trothed his youngest daughter to Wei's grandson.67 (Zhou's own sensa-
tional arrest, provoked by this defiant gesture, would come in 1626.) 
A 
The exact route and the timing of Yang Lian's journey to Beijing are not 
clear. The paths of Zuo Guangdou and Wei Dazhong, however, con-
verged nearly simultaneously at Dingxing and Rongcheng, two counties 
about fifty miles southwest of Beijing, where several colleagues, friends, 
and proteges of theirs lived. At Dingxing resided Lu Zheng, father of Lu 
Shanji, an official in the Ministry of War, who was at the time on duty at 
Shanhaiguan as an aide to commander Sun Chengzong. From Suzhou, 
Wei Dazhong's friend Zhou Shunchang had sent a letter by special couri-
er to Lu Shanji at Dingxing, asking for help for Wei. Wei Dazhong him-
self had sent his son Wei Xueyi ahead to Rongcheng with a similar request 
for help from Sun Qifeng. A support network for the prisoners sprang 
into action. 
Sun Qifeng sent his brother with a letter for Sun Chengzong (no rela-
tion), begging him to intercede in Wei's behalf.68 Nothing came of that 
venture. But at Baigouhe, a market town about ten miles south of the 
Xincheng county seat, and very near Dingxing, lived Zhang Guozhong— 
a student of Lu Shanji, a son-in-law of Sun Qifeng, a protege of Z u o 
Guangdou, and an acquaintance of Wei Dazhong. While Lu Zheng let 
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the prisoners' emissaries stay at his house in Dingxing, Zhang Guozhong 
and his brother ran errands on the prisoners' behalf and mobilized their 
comrades (tongzhi) to collect donations of silver to help pay the prison-
ers' fines. It was dangerous to do this, because Xincheng, Dingxing, and 
Rongcheng lay so close to Beijing that the volunteers' activities were cer-
tain to attract the attention of spies and informers. Palace eunuch Li 
Zhaoqin owned an estate right next to Lu Zheng, and Li was Wei Zhong-
xian's personal secretary. (Allegedly, Li received reports of what the 
volunteers were up to, but he said nothing to Wei Zhongxian because, 
long before, Zhang Guozhong had helped his parents when they were 
destitute!)69 
Zuo Guangdou and his police escort arrived at the market town of 
Baigouhe sometime during the month of July 1625. There Zhang Guo-
zhong greeted him. Zuo wanted to talk to Sun Qifeng. Zhang delivered 
the message. Sun and another comrade came at once to Baigouhe and 
met with Zuo, surrounded by the imperial police, who listened in. Zuo 
unburdened himself of his anxiety. Sun consoled him. Zuo said his guards 
had told him that "those in power definitely plan to kill Yang Lian," 
which, if true, meant that he and Wei Dazhong would be killed as well. 
Sun Qifeng told Zuo that through contacts he had learned that Ke 
Guangxian, Madame Ke's younger brother, had offered to intercede with 
his sister in the prisoners' behalf. "How can I seek help from a woman?" 
huffed Zuo. " I wouldn't be a man if I did." 
Wei Dazhong's son Wei Xueyi and Zuo Guangdou's brother Zuo 
Guangming, traveling under assumed names, needed a place to stay. Sun 
said his own home was too small and poor, so he arranged for them to 
stay with Lu Zheng at Jiangcun in Dingxing, a few miles west of 
Baigouhe. 
A day after Zuo Guangdou reached Baigouhe, Wei Dazhong and his 
guards arrived after their long journey from South China. Zhang Guo-
zhong had gone to Shanhaiguan to confer with Sun Chengzong and Lu 
Shanji. Sun Qifeng had gone off on an errand as well. Wei Dazhong 
angrily demanded to wait at Baigouhe for their return, but his guards 
were in a hurry, and so, unhappily, Wei was forced to depart at once for 
Beijing.70 
Wei Dazhong entered Beijing on July 16 and was placed in temporary 
confinement. Zuo Guangdou may have arrived die day before. On 
July 18, a Palace rescript ordered the incarceration of both prisoners in the 
Decree Prison. Their interrogation would wait until Yang Lian arrived. 
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The other three junzi had already been waiting in the Decree Prison since 
early June. Finally Yang Lian arrived on July 31, and the awful ordeal 
began. 
< 
As the prisoners made their way to Beijing, some of the Beijing officials 
began to express misgivings about what was soon to take place. Cao 
Guang, Minister of the Court of Judicial Review, tried to get the prison-
ers transferred from the Decree Prison to the Ministry of Justice, where 
they would not be subjected to secret torture. He persuaded Vice Min-
ister of War Zhang Fengxiang to talk to Grand Secretary Zhu Yanxi, 
whom he thought might be sympathetic. Zhang did so, but he reported 
back to Cao that Grand Secretary Zhu was unable to help.71 Several years 
later, recalling this incident, Zhu Yanxi said he had been "unbearably 
pained" by the arrest order for Yang Lian, and though he wanted to help, 
he could not "stop the tigers who had access to the imperial throne."72 
On July 8 and 9, anti-Donglin censors impeached Zhu Yanxi for collud-
ing with Zhang Fengxiang in an effort to make himself look virtuous by 
alleviating the treatment in store for Yang and Zuo and the others, shift-
ing resentment to the emperor, and placing others in peril. The Palace 
removed Zhang from civil service, and on July 12, it ordered Zhu Yanxi 
to retire. Cao Guang was removed from civil service not long after.73 
Then the remaining two grand secretaries—Gu Bingqian and Wei 
Guangwei—panicked and entered last-minute pleas in the prisoners' be-
half. Minister of Personnel Cui Jingrong wrote an urgent note warning 
Wei Guangwei of the ugly consequences of what was about to occur. 
How, he asked, could the grand secretary in good conscience involve 
himself with an endorsement of a Palace directive to apply lethal torture 
to Yang Lian and the others? The prisoners had committed serious 
crimes, but torture was uncalled for, and future generations would sure-
ly condemn the grand secretary for assenting to it. Wei Guangwei was 
taken aback. On August 2, he wrote an endorsement supporting the 
directive, but he wrote another one protesting it, plus an accompanying 
note expressing his shock at the Palace's savagery. He begged Gu 
Bingqian to join him, and Gu followed with a protest of his own on 
August 3.74 
Word leaked out that Wei Guangwei's newfound hesitation angered 
Palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian: "You urged me to take these actions, 
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and now you affect a virtuous pose so as to put the blame on me!" Wei 
Zhongxian then had the grand secretary shown all die paperwork related 
to the case that the grand secretary himself had written.75 The grand sec-
retaries' protests were not well received. Cui Jingrong was dismissed. Wei 
Guangwei was allowed to resign in September.76 Gu Bingqian remained 
for another year as chief grand secretary. 
What happened to Yang Lian and die otiiers inside the Decree Prison is 
known from several eyewitness accounts, including especially that by the 
pseudonymous "Beijing Guest," who may well have been Gu Dazhang's 
younger brother, Gu Dawu.77 The Beijing Guest disguised himself as an 
orderly and saw more than any other eyewitness what took place in the 
Decree Prison. 
Prison Director Xu Xianchun's first task was to make the prisoners con-
firm what was in the "confession" of the now dead Wang Wenyan. The 
ordeal began on July 31. 
Interrogations were held outdoors. The prisoners were hauled from 
their cells and arranged on the ground in front of a building called the 
Mingxin tang ("Hall for Clarifying the Mind"). At a table under the eave 
of the Mingxin tang sat the prison director, and behind him sat a "re-
corder," actually a Palace agent. Guards and beaters stood along the 
sides. To some or all of the prisoners, the beaters applied a hundred 
squeezings of the finger press, fifty applications of the leg crusher, plus 
forty blows with a stick, with the victims being roped in such a way that 
they could not move.78 
Wei Xueyi's informant was not close enough to hear distincdy what was 
being said.79 However, an informant for Yang Lian's family heard some 
bits of Yang Lian's interrogation and reported it partiy in the colloquial 
language. "Why did you take the lead in the Palace Removal [the Palace 
Case of 1620]?" Yang replied that he was not the only person involved. 
"Why did you force the emperor into a position where he was made to 
look unfilial?" To that, Yang Lian replied indirectiy: "As the sky and sun 
are up above, this is the Hall for Clarifying the Mind! Let's not change it 
into a place for obscuring the mind!" Asked about the capital evaluations 
of 1623, in which the Donglin people had done well, Yang said he was 
at home tiien and had not taken part in it. Finally he was asked about 
receiving a big bribe from Xiong Tingbi. He denied it: " I impeached 
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Xiong Tingbi even before his defeat in Liaoyang, so how would I do him 
favors after the defeat at Guangning? Check Xiong Tingbi's original con-
fession. Or did you alter it?" At this juncture, Xu Xianchun called for tor-
ture to be applied to Yang Lian. Cried Yang: "Well, now it's you saying 
to use torture, you're killing me to curry favor, you'll stand condemned 
in the eyes of future generations, your flesh won't be fit [even for dogs] 
to eat!"80 
After this opening round of interrogation under torture, the prisoners 
were dragged back to their cells. Word was then relayed from the Palace 
to the prisoners that if they would agree not to dispute the charges made 
against them, they would emerge alive from the ordeal. Zuo Guangdou 
convinced the others to cooperate. "We'll get out of this and some day 
serve again," he is said to have said. "What benefit is there in just dying 
here?" None of the other prisoners truly desired to die, and they agreed 
with Zuo that it made sense to confess even to false charges.81 
Thus, on August 2 there was a reinterrogation, and this time the pris-
oners acknowledged guilt in all die charges laid against them in Wang 
Wenyan's "confession" of early May. Xu Xianchun wrote up a detailed 
report and sent it to the Palace. The report stated that Yang and Zuo had 
indeed accepted 20,000 taels of silver each from Xiong Tingbi to plead 
his case. Yang and Zuo had colluded with Palace eunuch Wang An in 
forcing Lady Li to evacuate the Qianqing palace in 1620. Yang Lian 
worked the capital evaluations of 1623 in his own favor. Prisoners Yuan 
Huazhong and Wei Dazhong "leaned on die ice mountain" and accept-
ed bribes, unashamed of their greed, uncaring of the national right 
(gruoshi); Zhou Chaorui and Gu Dazhang had tried to rescue those guilty 
of military failure and national humiliation. 
The Palace rescripted this report on August 3. It now demanded that, 
since Yang Lian had fully admitted his guilt, he was to be tortured at in-
tervals until the full amount of the bribe he confessed to having taken was 
repaid, at which time he was to be sent to the Ministry of Justice for final 
adjudication.82 
This was a double cross. The Palace rescript amounted to a betrayal of 
the deal it had struck with the prisoners to obtain their confessions. Ap-
parently Wei Zhongxian had been persuaded that to release "those tigers" 
would be to invite their fiiture retaliation; that "if we don't kill that fel-
low [Yang Lian], we will not overawe the realm."83 
On August 6, the "Six junzt" were fetched from their cells—groaning 
from the effects of die earlier torture, their heads shaved, cotton cloths 
100 P O L I T I C A L M U R D E R S 
wrapped around their foreheads—and laid prostrate in front of Xu Xian-
chun. Yang and Zuo were in the middle, the others at their sides. What 
was said is not reported, but no torture was applied to them. Xu Xian-
chun clearly wanted the prisoners off his hands. He memorialized a re-
quest to transfer them from the Decree Prison to the custody of the 
fast—the Ministry of Justice, the Court of Judicial Review, and the Cen-
sorate. That body should collect the bribe repayments and determine the 
appropriate punishments. But on August 9 the Palace denied his request. 
"[Yang Lian's] crimes mount to Heaven," thundered die rescript. "How 
can Xu Xianchun on his own authority try to send him to the Ministry of 
Justice? Surely he is doing it for personal reasons. I won't probe into that 
for now. I order the Prison Office to retrieve all the stipulated amounts 
of the bribes. Report every five days. Do not be lenient."84 
On August 11, the prisoners were again laid out in front of the Mingxin 
tang. Having been scolded for his leniency, Xu Xianchun began calling 
die prisoners by disrespectful pronouns, as though they were servants. 
Five of the six were beaten ten times with the stick (Yuan Huazhong was 
ill and was excused). 
The procedure was established tiiat the alleged bribes were to be paid 
in installments. At dawn on collection days, the prisoners' family servants 
were admitted to the interrogation area outside the Decree Prison with 
whatever amount of silver they had collected. One at a time, they turned 
over the silver. As they did this, the servants knelt behind the prisoners 
and could speak briefly with them, though Xu was obliged to order that 
they kneel several feet away and speak in a loud voice and not use dia-
lect.85 Identity checks of the servants were loose, however. For example, 
Wei Dazhong's friend and neighbor Liu Qixian disguised himself as a 
family servant, and as such he entered the prison and conferred with Wei 
on collection days. 
After each round of silver collection, the Prison Office reported to the 
Palace the amounts received. The Palace was dissatisfied with the pace of 
the collections. On August 14 it complained: "Yang Lian and the others 
are repaying huge bribes in such small installments. When will these ever 
be repaid in full? For now, I won't investigate Xu Xianchun on the mat-
ter. Henceforth apply severity to get the amounts repaid. Don't be lax as 
you were, or you'll be punished."86 
On August 15, Xu Xianchun bore down more harshly. He now de-
manded that each prisoner pay 400 taels every five days or else they 
would be beaten heavily with the stick—as they were on this day, perhaps 
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for demonstration effect. Each received thirty blows on the bare upper 
legs. By this time the prisoners' leg wounds had become infected, Yang's 
the worst. The wounds were wrapped in cotton cloth. Yang had hoped 
up to this moment that he might yet survive the ordeal. Now he was sure 
he would not. He began drinking large quantities of cold water in the be-
lief that it might help him die sooner. He scribbled notes and letters and 
statements using as ink the blood oozing from his wounds. 
The silver payments were still too small. On August 18, the Palace 
seethed: "Yang Lian and the others aren't making their payments. Obvi-
ously the selling of law is going on. Xu Xianchun and Cui Yingyuan are 
each to be demoted one rank. They are to recover the amounts and re-
port every five days. If they are lax again, they will be heavily punished 
without mercy."87 
On August 19, Yang Lian and Zuo Guangdou each received another 
thirty blows with the stick, and full torture was threatened if their pay-
ments continued to fall short. The other four prisoners were excused. Wei 
Xueyi sent word through Liu Qixian that he wanted to see his father. Wei 
Dazhong refused, and said: "I'm in extreme pain . . . I can't last, but don't 
tell my son that." He wanted Wei Xueyi to hasten the silver payments so 
that he would not have to endure further torture. 
On August 21, for reasons unknown, heavy torture was applied to all 
the prisoners. Yang, Zuo, and Wei suffered a hundred squeezes of the fin-
ger press, plus forty blows with the stick. Zhou Chaorui and Gu Dazhang 
were given half those numbers. Yuan Huazhong received fifty finger 
squeezings but was spared the stick. Yang Lian was heard to utter scream-
like croaks. Zuo Guangdou cried like a child. Wei Dazhong told his peo-
ple, within the hearing of the "Beijing Guest," that he had no more 
appetite, that a container of cold water and half an apple was all he could 
manage to eat in a day, and that it was time to prepare a coffin, because 
he believed he would not live much longer.88 
A Palace rescript of August 22 again complained of meager repay-
ments.89 On the following day, Yang, Zuo, and Wei Dazhong were each 
beaten thirty times with die stick, which was unusually heavy, because it 
was raining. Xu Xianchun accused Yang Lian of telling his family servants 
not to hand in any silver at all. Yang Lian raised his head to argue, but no 
words came out. The beating session over, Yang and Zuo were dragged 
away and dropped momentarily at the doorway of the prison, blood seep-
ing from their wounds, and looking as though they had died already. 
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"Pity!" cried Yang. Zuo Guangdou looked at his family servants, but said 
nothing.90 
< 
Meanwhile, the prisoners' servants and relatives and friends were making 
desperate efforts to collect the silver that the Palace demanded every five 
days in restitution for the bribes the accused were alleged to have pock-
eted. Yang Lian's eldest son, Yang Zhiyi, sent his brother-in-law Xu Ying-
zheng back to Yingshan county in Hubei to sell Yang Lian's property 
there. A family servant had charge of fulfilling Yang Lian's food requests. 
Yang Zhiyi himself left Beijing and made hurried visits to several places in 
north China looking for loans or contributions. The coffin that Yang Lian 
had had portered up from Hubei was confiscated by the police. Several 
friends in the capital area took up a collection and bought another one 
for him.91 
Wei Dazhong's son Wei Xueyi ran about madly trying to collect silver 
for his father. The family property in Jiashan county was small, and 
Jiashan was three thousand li away. Silver had somehow to be collected 
in the Beijing area in a hurry. Sun Qifeng helped to arrange safe houses 
and escorts. Among those who gave Wei Xueyi a safe place to stay was Xu 
Xianda of Dingxing county—a kinsman, no less, of Prison Director Xu 
Xianchun. The Dingxing county magistrate gave Wei Xueyi 100 taels from 
his own pocket. Lu Zheng traveled all around in the heat and collected 
some 300 taels altogether, mostly in tiny contributions. "Righteous men 
have small resources, while the rich are seldom righteous," noted Sun 
Qifeng.92 
In Beijing, Wei Xueyi wrote long, urgent, impassioned letters to some 
of his father's Zhejiang colleagues, in which he defended his father's pro-
vocative political behavior and heatedly denied his ever having accepted 
the 3,300 taels in bribes from Xiong Tingbi with which he was charged. 
Some of Wei Dazhong's former colleagues, afraid of implicating them-
selves in the case, refused to help his son. Wei Xueyi later described how 
in several instances he was treated "like a ghost with the plague." He 
knocked at someone's gate and found himself eye-to-eye with the man he 
was looking for. "Come back late tomorrow!" was the answer. "When I 
showed up again at the appointed time," wrote Wei, "a gateman hissed 
at me: 'He's sound asleep, and I don't dare disturb him. Come back 
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tomorrow.' I scurried about in terror through the night, fearing death at 
the hands of the police (luozu), and I never was able to get to see him."93 
However, some colleagues did help. Cang Zhaoru gave Wei Xueyi a 
place to stay and some silver.94 Supervising Secretaries Huang Chenghao 
and Yu Tingbi, coprovincials of Wei's, contributed funds. Huang con-
tacted other coprovincials and sent a letter to his son back in Zhejiang, 
directing him to sell 200 mou of property there and to forward 1,000 or 
so taels of proceeds to Beijing. Huang thought Wei's charge of 3,300 taels 
not too large a sum to raise, and that raising it might deprive Wei's tor-
mentors of an excuse to kill him.95 
Zuo Guangdou had many friends in north China because of his recent 
service there as educational intendant and state farms commissioner. Lu 
Zheng mobilized dozens of government students (shengyudn) and other 
people, and within a few days they collected several hundred taels of sil-
ver. Zhang Guozhong and others took turns forwarding the silver to 
Zuo's servants in Beijing.96 
One shengyMn, Shi Kefa (later a famous Ming loyalist), bribed die 
prison guards, who let him dress as a night-soil collector and enter the 
Decree Prison to see Zuo Guangdou. He found Zuo sitting on a mat, 
leaning against a wall: his face was so disfigured as to be unrecognizable. 
The bones and tendons below his left knee were mangled. Shi knelt and 
wept. Zuo could not see, but he recognized the voice, and then he forced 
open an eyelid with his hand and said in anger: "You idiot, what are you 
doing in this place? The dynasty is rotting away, and you're doing a stu-
pid thing risking your life to come in here when the realm needs your 
support! Leave now, or before a traitor gets you, I'll kill you myself." He 
groped about for a stick, and made as if to strike. Shi left at once. Later 
he would tell people about this and saying, "My teacher's lungs and gall 
were made out of iron and stone."97 
The silver installments, when paid on time, eased the physical abuse of 
the prisoners. When their assessments were fully paid, people presumed 
that the prisoners would be released, although it was not for certain. On 
August 26, Yang, Zuo, and Wei were put to yet another round of torture. 
Prison Director Xu Xianchun then ordered the three separated from the 
others. A guard explained to the "Beijing Guest" that they were going to 
be killed. That night, a guard by the name of Ye Wenzhong killed them. 
Their deaths "from illness" were reported to the Palace. A rescript o f 
August 28 acknowledged the deaths of Yang and Zuo "by illness." An-
other rescript of August 31 acknowledged the death of Wei Dazhong, also 
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"by illness." (Apparently, the split dates avoided the awkwardness of hav-
ing diree "accidental" deaths all occur at the same time.) Thc fast (judi-
cial officials of the outer court) were ordered to verify the identities of the 
corpses and release them for burial. Provincial officials were ordered to 
arrest and imprison the family members of each dead prisoner and force 
from them the repayment of the "bribery" charges still unpaid.98 As of 
August 31, the accounts looked like this:99 
TABLE 1 
Taels Charged 
Repaid as of 
August 30,162s 
Yang Lian 20,000 none? 
Zuo Guangdou 20,000 43.6 
Wei Dazhong 3,300 550 
Yuan Huazhong 6,330 1,224.5 
Zhou Chaorui 10,000 1,517.4 
Gu Dazhang 40,000 803.3 
Tianqi himself, at least in a general way, was aware of all this. On Sep-
tember 13, after a tutorial, he remarked to the grand secretaries that Yang 
Lian's crimes were many; that although he had died in prison, uncollect-
ed bribes remained, and the provincial authorities were going to recover 
those from his home area.100 
A 
So three of the "Six junzi" were dead, those furthest behind in their 
repayments. Three were still alive, but not for long. By September 13, 
former Censor Yuan Huazhong's people paid his account in full, and by 
September 15, former Supervising Secretary Zhou Chaorui's account 
was fully paid as well. According to the "Beijing Guest," Zhou's family 
was rich. Neither prisoner was turned over to the fast for final adjudica-
tion, however. On September 20, guard Yan Zi killed Yuan with his own 
hands. The prison reported that Yuan "died of illness." On September 23, 
Yuan's corpse was dumped outside the prison for his family to remove for 
burial. 
Prison Director Xu Xianchun reported Zhou Chaorui to be ill, though 
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he was not. The Palace sent in a physician to treat him. Xu sent the physi-
cian away. On September 29, guard Guo Er interrupted Zhou while he 
was at lunch with Gu Dazhang and another prisoner (Meng Shukong, to 
whom Yang Lian had entrusted his last writings). He marched Zhou off 
and killed him with his own hands. Again, the death was officially 
ascribed to "illness."101 
Former vice director of the Ministry of War, Gu Dazhang, the last re-
maining prisoner, lingered on for another few weeks. On October 13, he 
was actually taken before the fasi for formal adjudication. He refused to 
confess. Then he was taken back to the Decree Prison. On October 14, 
he committed suicide by self-strangulation. The official announcement 
stated that he had died "of illness." His corpse was ordered removed 
from the Decree Prison on October 18. Provincial authorities were or-
dered to press his family back home (in Changshu county in the Yangtze 
delta region) for the unpaid balance on his account.102 
< 
So all of die "Six junzi" were dead. Four of them still had large arrears 
outstanding on the bribes they had been charged with having received. 
The job of retrieving those amounts was shifted from the Decree Prison 
to xhcfuan—the leading officials in the victims' home provinces. In that 
connection, former Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao commented that "the 
cruelty of these punishments is something wholly unprecedented in 
history."103 
On August 31, the corpses of Yang Lian, Zuo Guangdou, and Wei Da-
zhong were wrapped in hemp cloth and reed mats and tied with rope and 
pushed through a small stone door in the rear of the Decree Prison. The 
men had been dead several days in hot weather. Their stench filled the 
street. Maggots fell from their wrappings. 
Family servants brought Yang Lian's coffin back from Beijing to Ying-
shan county.104 People wept and performed rituals as Yang's coffin passed 
through the villages. One elder with a load of firewood on his back stuck 
a note on Yang's coffin. "The master's heart was a heart that was loyal to 
his ruler, and his mouth a mouth that hated traitors," it read. "He is 
dead, but he will live a thousand ages!" The old man refused to give 
his name.105 
In Yang Lian's home county of Yingshan, the officials confiscated the 
family property, forcing Yang's widow and stepmother into the streets. 
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But provincial and local officials did what they could to ease things, ar-
ranging, for example, for public contributions to help pay Yang Lian's 
assessment. It was secretly arranged for a young grandson to be taken 
away to Lushan in Jiangxi province to live disguised as a Buddhist monk, 
to continue the Yang line in case none of the family in Yingshan should 
survive. The local authorities also helped by being dilatory in making the 
repayments. A Palace edict of January 26, 1626, complained that nothing 
had yet been sent, and demanded immediate action.106 Yang's nephew 
and two of his five sons were imprisoned. One of the sons died in prison, 
as did several servants. By the time of the death of Tianqi and the collapse 
of the Wei Zhongxian regime in 1627, nearly all of the 20,000 taels 
charged to Yang Lian had somehow been collected.107 
Zuo Guangdou's corpse was picked up by two of his brothers and an 
in-law as well as his student Shi Kefa. The proceeds from the confiscation 
of Zuo's property in Tongcheng county came to less than a thousand 
taels. Zuo's eldest brother died in prison. The county magistrate wept as 
he punished Zuo's son; it was unjust, he acknowledged, but there was 
nothing that he as a lowly magistrate could do about it. Some kinsmen 
fled into hiding. But apparently all 20,000 taels were collected by 1627.108 
On September 1, guards deposited the decomposing corpse of Wei 
Dazhong in the street outside the prison. Apparendy he had been suffo-
cated to death, because his face was squashed flat. His son Wei Xueyi and 
some others gathered up his remains, placed them in a coffin, and hur-
ried away with the deceased back to Jiashan county, some eight hundred 
miles to the south. En route, Wei Xueyi wrote a long, searing letter to an 
acquaintance detailing in graphic language the excruciating and com-
pletely unjustified torment his father had just been put through.109 
Back in Jiashan, the local elders offered to take up a collection, but Wei 
Xueyi declined, showing them a note written from prison by his father on 
August 5 refusing any such charity: "I have been poor all my life, and have 
never given any charity to my neighbors; my personal disaster is not the 
public business of the [people of the] county, and I cannot obligate 
them." But Wei Xueyi did beg the elders to encourage someone to buy 
their "dilapidated house and a few mou of fields" and to "give some food 
and shelter to my mother." 
For his part, Wei Xueyi refused to go to prison and there serve as 
hostage for the forced repayment of his father's silver arrears. He went 
into deep mourning for the father whose life he had been unable to save. 
He rejected food and drink. "Who gave our father anything to drink at 
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midnight in the Decree Prison?" he said to his younger brother, Wei Xue-
lian. Wei Xueyi died of slow suicide on December 20,1625.110 The provin-
cial authorities put Wei Xuelian in prison. The local elders took up a col-
lection of silver after all. By July 24,1626, the Palace acknowledged that 
the Zhejiang provincial officials had collected 2,360 taels on Wei Da-
zhong's account, and it directed that the sum be delivered at once to Bei-
jing to help pay for palace reconstruction in the Forbidden City.111 
< 
The Palace rested its case. Never mind Gu Dazhang—all the principals 
had confessed! All of them, starting with Wang Wenyan, had (most re-
grettably) died "of illness" in prison. The public execution of the villain 
general Xiong Tingbi was announced in September 1625. Provincial offi-
cials were at work recouping all the silver Xiong and others had alleged-
ly handed out as bribes. 
At last, on October 21, the fasi (legal organs of the outer court) con-
vened and prepared the formal criminal charges (yuanshu). On October 27, 
the Palace gave its public response. Now the main charge was no longer 
Xiong Tingbi but the Palace Case, wherein Yang Lian, Zuo Guangdou, 
Zhou Chaorui, and Wang Wenyan had conspired together and had inhu-
manely driven Lady Li from the Qianqing palace, forcing Tianqi into a 
posture of filial impiety. Following that crime, the same four had leagued 
with Wei Dazhong, Yuan Huazhong, and Gu Dazhang and pocketed 
mountainous bribes from Xiong Tingbi, in return for which they had 
sought to win leniency for him. Nothing at all was said of Yang Lian's 
"Twenty-four Crimes" memorial. 
The Palace ordered that all the documents relating to these two infa-
mous cases be sent to the History Office for eventual publication, so that 
the true facts might be made clear to posterity—or, in the words of the 
Palace, "to make manifest the justice, enlightenment, benevolence, and 
filiality of Our rule, and convince the minds of the future generations o f 
the realm."112 No less than the martyrs, the Palace hoped that history 
would ratify the extreme measures it had been compelled to take. This 
was not yet the end of the story, however. More arrests, tortures, and 
secret murders were about to follow. 
C H A P T E R 4 
The Murders Continue: 1626 
< 
I T i s A L M O S T beyond belief that the 
shocking arrests, doubtful charges, tortures, and secret murders of six 
leading Donglin figures in 1625 failed to satisfy the Beijing authorities' 
desire for retribution. Obviously, however, the authorities felt that they 
had not yet done enough. The year 1626, therefore, saw a second and 
equally grim round of arrests and murders, this time targeting seven of 
the most renowned and articulate scholar-officials of south China. Again, 
contemporaries recorded for posterity the harrowing stories of this new 
wave of martyrs, with undiminished relish for intense, day-by-day detail. 
By 1625-1626 an elaborate machinery of political repression had devel-
oped. There were two principal organs. One was the so-called Eastern 
Depot, of which palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian was director. It consisted 
of some one thousand uniformed police and two headquarters complex-
es, one inside the Forbidden City, and the other outside, at the Forbidden 
City's eastern wall. The Eastern Depot could not directiy arrest or inter-
rogate officials, or anyone who enjoyed official status (jinshen); its juris-
diction was confined to commoners.1 The available records show that, 
indeed, Wei Zhongxian was regularly rewarded for his work in prosecut-
ing thieves, counterfeiters, Manchu spies, and other small-time suspects 
who were not of the official class. 
The prosecution of officials (such as the Donglin) was the responsibil-
ity of the Embroidered-uniform Guard, whose offices and infamous 
"Decree Prison" were located south of the Imperial City, in the same 
government quarter that housed all the other military offices of the outer 
court. The Guard's Northern Prison Office (Bei zhenfusi), of which Xu 
Xianchun was director, conducted the interrogations and tortures of offi-
cials. The Embroidered-uniform Guard grew in size from 17,760 in 1620 
to 36,360 in 1627.2 Thus Wei Zhongxian's hand in the arrest and torture 
of the Donglin and other officials was indirect and came by way of his 
informal control of Tianqi's powers of edict and rescript rather than by 
his direct management of the Eastern Depot. 
With the cooperation of the Palace, anti-Donglin officials proceeded 
during 1625-1626 with the piecemeal removals of hundreds of perceived 
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enemies from bureaucratic life. Most were reduced from official to com-
moner status and were ordered to hand back the patents of official rank 
that had been awarded to their parents. However, for a select few of those 
purged, much worse was in store. 
In the spring of 1626, there was engineered a second round of arrests 
of seven more leading lights in the Donglin faction. They were made be-
cause the Tianqi court was still struggling to recover China's moral high 
ground, and the seven men, although they had been removed from of-
fice, were still seen as threatening the country's moral credentials. These 
arrests struck at the cultural heart of late Ming China, the wealthy region 
of Jiangnan, including especially the city of Suzhou. 
Censor Zhou Zongjian (who in 1623, in a failed bid for Donglin leader-
ship, had scathingly assaulted Wei Zhongxian and his then collaborator 
Guo Gong) was home on mourning leave in Wujiang county, not far 
soutii of Suzhou, when in April 1625 he was placed second in a list of four 
Donglin officials accused of partisan activity and removed from civil serv-
ice. Zhou was also accused of taking bribes. The governors (fuctn) of 
Nanzhili province were ordered to determine and recover the full 
amounts of the alleged bribes.3 
After nearly a year had elapsed, the Palace had received no report from 
die Nanzhili governors about their investigation of Zhou Zongjian. It 
therefore ordered a detachment of the Embroidered-uniform Guard to 
go to Wujiang, arrest Zhou, and bring him to the Decree Prison for inter-
rogation.4 Upon receiving this directive, Governor (xunfu) Mao Yilu be-
latedly reported having collected 1,000 taels from Zhou. The Palace was 
dissatisfied widi Mao's report; it said there was much more silver than 
that to be accounted for, and it directed Mao to "severely press" Zhou 
Zongjian's family for more.5 
Also placed under arrest by the same Palace rescript was Miao Changqi 
of Jiangyin county, about twenty-five miles northwest of Suzhou. In Fe-
bruary 1625, Miao had received permission to leave Beijing and go home 
to recuperate from an illness.6 Three months later, while he was at home, 
Miao Changqi was removed from civil service because he was one of 
those named in Wang Wenyan's "confession" for taking bribes from the 
imprisoned commander Xiong Tingbi. Miao allegedly took 3,000 taels.7 
Had Miao then secluded himself, he might have escaped arrest. He was 
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certainly warned. Li Yingsheng warned him.8 So did Qian Qianyi, by let-
ter from Beijing dated May 16, 1625 (and thus probably too late to have 
any effect). Qian gave Miao Changqi a detailed account of how the anti-
Donglin men were exploiting what he firmly believed was Wang Wen-
yan's falsely concocted confession to prepare the ground to kill their ene-
mies. "Living at home, you must be exceptionally careful," he cautioned. 
"You'll find it hard to keep your tongue quiet, but things have come to 
the point where we're not just in an age of decline (moshi), but in a killing 
cycle (shayun) as well, so you must keep quiet to save your life When 
you left the capital, I warned you, and you agreed, but you didn't restrain 
yourself... .These things get reported to the eunuch [Wei Zhongxian]. 
You were lucky not to get arrested I don't know why you defended 
Xiong Tingbi that day, but it has provoked this big case "9 
The Palace rescript of March 15,1626 (which also ordered Zhou Zong-
jian's arrest) noted that, despite Miao Changqi's removal from civil serv-
ice, he continued to wear official paraphernalia, to invite guests, and to 
act with no restraint, and therefore his arrest was required.10 
About two weeks later, on March 28, the Palace ordered five more ar-
rests of Donglin principals. This order came by way of a rescript to a me-
morial of complaint ostensibly sent up by Li Shi, eunuch Textile Com-
missioner of Suzhou and Hangzhou, but actually drawn up in the Palace 
itself by eunuch Li Yongzhen and others acting at the behest of Wei 
Zhongxian. 
Nominally, the key figure in this roundup was Zhou Qiyuan, a long-
time partisan battier in the Donglin behalf, who, in 1624, as governor 
(xunfu) of Nanzhili, had clashed with Li Shi in a dispute over Palace silk 
procurement.11 Early in 1625, Zhou Qiyuan was removed from civil serv-
ice for that and other offenses.12 Li Shi's memorial of March 1626, actual-
ly composed in the palace, alleged that Zhou Qiyuan had not only defied 
imperial orders in the silk procurement matter but had pocketed funds 
intended to pay the silk workers. And not only that! He was now using 
daoxue—that is, Confucian study and discussion—as an excuse to gather 
sympathizers Zhou Zongjian, Miao Changqi, Zhou Shunchang, Gao 
Panlong, Li Yingsheng, and Huang Zunsu. And, in addition, Huang 
Zunsu recently had a spy or agent serving right in Li Shi's staff. And 
Zhou Zongjian had acted disrespectfully when he was arrested, just as 
though he had chosen not to recognize his ruler-father! And Zhou 
Shunchang! Removed from the official register, he should have retired in 
self-reproach; instead, he continued to dress as an official, to act in a 
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domineering way, and even went so far as to urge die imperial silk weavers 
to stop work.13 
As in 1625, so again in 1626, squadrons of imperial police proceeded 
south from Beijing to the homes of the accused to carry out the arrests. 
However, both Li Shi's memorial and the imperial rescript to it were con-
fidential, so no one who saw or was aware of the departure of the police 
knew for certain who they were after. Any of a number of famous per-
sonalities living in the greater Jiangnan area had reason to believe he 
might be the target. Each of them had to consider carefully what to do 
and how to behave in such circumstances. 
Some fled into hiding. Others defiantiy stood their ground. Perhaps 
neither response was correct. Already in 1625, Gao Panlong wrote a letter 
counseling Liu Zongzhou in the matter. "To close your gate and refuse 
guests is the right way," he urged. "If they want to kill us, barring the 
gate won't stop them, but that's to die fulfilling the Way.... Principle 
(daoli) lies at the apex of the ordinary. Even the slightest mind to escape 
deatii ruins the Way. Even die slightest mind to seek death wrecks it as 
well. I'm afraid that in your extreme anguish you haven't tiiought of 
that."14 
Zhou Zongjian 
The imperial police (by now commonly referred to as tiqior "horsemen 
dressed in colored silk") came down to south China and arrested Zhou 
Zongjian and Miao Changqi about a month ahead of the other five. 
Zhou Zongjian somehow found out ahead of time that the tiqi were 
coming for him, and so he left his home in Wujiang without telling his 
family where he was going and proceeded on his own to Suzhou, the pre-
fectural capital, where he turned himself in. The order of arrest was read 
out in a public ceremony. Zhou was then placed in a prisoner transport 
cart. Crowds of Suzhou people gathered about the cart and wept. It was 
murmured that the arrest order was a fake concocted by palace eunuch 
Wei Zhongxian and should not be obeyed. Some onlookers hovered 
about, looking as though they might try to rough up the guards. Zhou 
scolded them, and they backed away. (A month later, when Zhou Shun-
chang was arrested, die Suzhou crowds rioted in earnest.) By May 5, pris-
oner Zhou had arrived in Beijing and was placed in the Decree Prison for 
questioning under torture.15 
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Miao Changqi 
Meanwhile, on April i, in Jiangyin county, Miao Changqi went by him-
self to the magistrate's office, where he was placed in irons and forbidden 
any further contact with his family.16 Scholars and common people wept 
in the streets of Jiangyin as prisoner Miao departed, by boat, to the pre-
fectural capital, Changzhou. En route, a brief meeting was somehow 
arranged with Gao Panlong. "To humiliate a high official is to humiliate 
the dynasty, and I will not be humiliated," asserted Gao. Miao replied, 
"Unless I go to prison, I cannot fulfill my duty, so that is what I am 
doing."17 
At Changzhou, "several tens of myriads of country people crowded the 
roads" to greet Miao on his arrival. "They all put their palms together 
and chanted the Buddha's name. They said: 'Today we see a bodhisattva 
appear in the world!' Miao laughed and thanked them, acting as though 
this was just an ordinary affair."18 
In Changzhou, where the charges were publicly read out, Miao was 
fortunate to fall into the hands of prefect Zeng Ying, a Donglin support-
er, who eased his circumstances and offered him some financial assistance. 
Family servants were allowed for the first time to bring Miao food and 
drink. Miao's sons paid a short visit to their father. Miao had prepared an 
autobiography, and he gave it to one of his sons. His former colleagues 
Li Yingsheng and Zhou Shunchang also visited him. 
At length, Miao's prison cortege departed Changzhou. Across the 
Yangtze at Yizhen, the local students (shengyuan) tendered Miao a recep-
tion and wept as they escorted him out of town.19 He arrived in Beijing 
on May 5, and on May 6 was consigned to the Decree Prison, where Zhou 
Zongjian had also just arrived.20 While prisoners Zhou and Miao were still 
on the road to Beijing, the arrests of the other five former officials got 
under way. 
Zhou Qiyuan 
Zhou Qiyuan lived the farthest away, in Haicheng county, Zhangzhou 
prefecture, Fujian province. The date of the arrival of the two tiqi and 
their entourage is not known, but, as in every other such instance, the 
local expenses of the police were paid by contribution or extortion. 
Zhou was somehow aware of his coming arrest, and he made his own 
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way from Haicheng some hundred miles northeast to die prefectural 
capital. As he left, onlookers gathered and sighed as they observed his 
three litde sons clinging to his knees. Zhou patted the boys on the head. 
"Your father won't get to teach you," he was heard to say. "You let your 
mother raise you. Don't cry." 
Disturbed by the news of his arrest, local citizens received official per-
mission to place collection boxes at Zhangzhou's four city gates to help 
pay Zhou Qiyuan's expenses. Many donated, anonymously tossing in a 
few taels. They say old women from the back alleys pawned their .hairpins 
for cash and donated that. Even chair bearers carrying passengers were 
seen throwing a few coppers into the collection boxes as they rushed by. 
Then came the public reading of the charges. A retired official, aged 
and bedridden, demanded to be taken by sedan chair to the yamen where 
die reading took place. He had something he wanted to say. "You've of-
fended die government by opposing the eunuch [Li Shi] in the people's 
behalf," wailed the invalid. "You've repaid the favor the dynasty gave you 
in nurturing you. You'll die right. I wish I weren't too old to join you in 
the punishment." Replied Zhou: "When I wrote those memorials, I knew 
today would come. I have no regret." 
It was possible for street mobs to overpower the imperial police. 
Whenever a mob gave signs that it was about to become violent, it was 
essential that the prisoner-hero himself intervene to help defuse the situ-
ation. So when the angered crowd in Zhangzhou indeed threatened the 
police, Zhou Qiyuan got on his knees and pleaded with them: "When the 
subject official serves his ruler, his body is no longer his own. Thunder 
and rain come by favor of the ruler. If you local people care for me, you 
won't have me put in legal jeopardy." The crowd calmed down. The po-
lice were grateful. At length the prison cortege left Zhangzhou, escorted 
by thousands of weeping locals.21 So long was the journey that Zhou 
Qiyuan did not arrive in Beijing until early August, by which time all the 
other Donglin victims had undergone their ordeals and were dead.22 
Li Yingsheng 
Li Yingsheng at thirty-two years of age was the youngest of all the Dong-
lin martyrs of 1625-1626. Removed from civil service, he did not want to 
draw attention to himself and went into seclusion in his native Jiangyin 
county. Miao Changqi—whose wife was Li's aunt—lived in the same 
Jiangyin county and had behaved provocatively and been arrested on 
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April i. But it did not matter; on April 13, Li received written notice of his 
own arrest. 
Li's wife and mother fell weeping into each other's arms. Li's litde son 
Li Sunzhi grabbed his robe and cried. Li consoled his family and depart-
ed by boat to the prefectural capital, Changzhou, which he reached on 
April 15. There he met his old teacher and others, and jokingly speculat-
ed that his arrest must be revenge for some wrong he had committed in 
a previous incarnation. Li said he would not commit suicide, because his 
father was still alive. 
The reading of the charges was delayed while the imperial police went 
about extorting compensation from the people in the streets. Angry 
mobs gathered. Word was passed that Li's arrest was completely unjust. 
Threats were uttered. There were scufflings and flurries of violence as 
some of the police were assaulted. Prefect Zeng Ying tried to calm things. 
Li Yingsheng—described as young, vigorous, refined, and like a "sylph 
visiting from another world"—rode through the streets on horseback 
pleading with the crowd, which then relented. The imperial police were 
removed from the streets and brought inside the yamen for their own 
safety. Prefect Zeng paid them some silver from his own pocket. The 
reading then took place on April 19 under tight security because news had 
just arrived of the full-blown riot in Suzhou, April 11-14.23 
Li and his escort of guards left Changzhou, crossed the Yangtze to 
Yizhen, left Yizhen on April 24, and reached Dezhou, in northern 
Shandong, about 175 miles south of Beijing, on May 10. There Li wrote 
his father: "Changed from sedan chair to cart, which is uncomfortable, 
but no matter. Here I guess we wait for Zhou [Shunchang] and Huang 
[Zunsu] to arrive As for the silver, there's no way to get it except to 
sell fields Elder brother must keep himself well hidden in the capi-
ta l . . . he'll tell you all the rest. I don't know if I'll be able to write 
again."24 
Gao Panlong 
Gao Panlong, cofounder and leader of the Donglin academy in Wuxi 
county (thirty miles northwest of Suzhou, twenty miles south of Jiang-
yin), was living not altogether quietly at home since his removal from civil 
service in 1625. He had made it clear to close colleagues what he planned 
to do in case of arrest, but he did not tell his family. 
The Gao home was surrounded by water. By activating a movable 
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bridge, Gao Panlong admitted occasional students and select guests. 
While he was entertaining some guests on April 12, news came from some 
friendly source in Suzhou that his arrest was imminent. "If this news is 
true," smiled Gao, "then I just look on death as a return. There is no life 
and death, no life and death. How can we make life and death two things? 
If on the verge of death you begin rethinking your thoughts, you fall into 
the bitter sea. How can you achieve your fixed fate that way?" 
That evening, Gao assured his family tiiat he would submit to arrest. 
But during the night, while everyone was asleep, he crept out of bed and 
out of the house to the water's edge, where he plunged in, fully clodied. 
The next morning they found his body floating upright in the water, his 
hat on the surface, not far away.25 
The Palace was informed by governor Mao Yilu of Gao Panlong's sui-
cide and was not pleased. It wanted to know how Gao had learned ahead 
of time that he was under arrest and ordered the seizure and interroga-
tion of his son, Gao Shiru. However, Prefect Zeng Ying was able to pro-
tect Gao Shiru, and the Palace never did find out the source of the leak.26 
Gao Panlong left a note for the imperial police to take to Tianqi: " I 
have been removed from civil service and the patents given my parents 
have been rescinded. But once I was a high official, and when a high offi-
cial is humiliated, die dynasty is humiliated. I kowtow facing north and 
follow the example of Qu Yuan [by drowning myself]. I have left unre-
paid the ruler's favor; I hope to settle that in a future life. Written by your 
servant Gao Panlong, on the verge of death. (I ask that a messenger deliv-
er this to the emperor.)"27 
Zhou Shunchang 
The arrest by tiqi of Zhou Shunchang ignited the famous Suzhou riot of 
1626. Even more than Beijing, Suzhou was the cultural and fashion cen-
ter of China in the late Ming. Zhou Shunchang lived in Suzhou—in self-
imposed poverty, in a small house of three rooms, decorated only with a 
few potted plants—with his plainly dressed wife and eight children. He 
had been there since 1622, when as a vice director in the Ministry of 
Personnel he took leave to see to the burial of his parents. He was active 
as an advocate for the people of the city (as Yang Lian too had been, in 
Yingshan). He exchanged letters with colleagues and friends and so kept 
abreast of political developments in Beijing. He was a Donglin sympa-
thizer of long standing, because, as he put it when asked, it happened that 
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those colleagues with whom he found himself naturally attuned were all 
Donglin adherents. "There was an attraction of flavor, an unplanned-for 
union, and they didn't have to recruit me like those who bang the drum 
to gather outiaws under some banner."28 
Zhou Shunchang made no secret of his hatred for die Donglin baiters 
at court. Indeed, he deliberately provoked them. In 1624, he wrote a 
message for Governor Zhou Qiyuan upon his impeachment, in which he 
said such things as "never in the two hundred years of the Ming has any-
one so qualified and of such good repute been removed from officialdom 
by the emperor"; that "the emperor's action only enhances your reputa-
tion"; that "the stars are fading, the frost descends, and heroes of talent 
are no longer welcome."29 Within a month, it is said, copies of this mes-
sage were circulating i n Beijing, where his enemies could of course read 
them.30 Then came his well-publicized embrace of Wei Dazhong in 1625, 
when Wei, under arrest, passed through Suzhou and Zhou betrodied his 
youngest daughter to Wei's grandson. In August 1625, die Palace re-
moved Zhou along with several others from civil service.31 
The imperial order to arrest Zhou Shunchang was delivered to the 
provincial governors Mao Yilu and Xu Ji in Suzhou on April 11, 1626.32 
The governors in turn directed Suzhou prefect Kou Shen to order Chen 
Wenrui, magistrate of Wu county, to go to Zhou's house that night and 
inform him that he was under arrest. As it happened, Zhou Shunchang 
knew Magistrate Chen well; Chen had been an outstanding local student 
when Zhou was an official in Fujian province some years before. Chen 
Wenrui leaned on Zhou's bed and wept as he broke the news to him. "I 
knew all along this order was coming," said Zhou. "I expected it. Don't 
be upset." 
There were several other ousted Donglin officials living in Suzhou, and 
they soon learned of the arrival of the imperial police. Each man thought 
the target of the arrest order might be himself. In the afternoon ot 
April 11, someone roused former Hanlin Senior Compiler Wen Zhen-
meng from a nap and told him the terrifying news. Wen had been sent 
home in 1622 for his scathing critique of Tianqi's personal shortcomings 
and was surely a possible target. However, after some hours, Wen's son-
in-law came by to tell him it was Zhou Shunchang they were after. To 
Wen it seemed like waking from a bad dream. Aldiough it was raining, 
Wen Zhenmeng and several other friends went over to Zhou's house that 
night to console him. They found Zhou calm. Two of his sons were 
standing by. His wife had fainted. 
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At dawn on April 12, Zhou changed into prison garb and climbed into 
a sedan chair. News of his arrest had meanwhile spread throughout Su-
zhou, and the streets were filling with sad, angry, and perplexed people 
wanting to know why villains far away in Beijing had incriminated a pure, 
loyal, and blameless official like Zhou. Governor Mao Yilu hoped to 
avoid a riot, and so, as crowds gathered at one detention site, he would 
move the prisoner to another. The day appointed for the public reading 
of the charges was April 14. 
On April 13, the streets again filled with sad and angry people, as the 
imperial police negotiated with Zhou Shunchang's self-appointed per-
sonal agent, Zhu Zuwen, a student who worshipped Zhou, about their 
recompense. The police said they needed 800 taels. They said they knew 
Zhou Shunchang could not pay such an amount, but surely the Suzhou 
gentry (xiangshen) could donate funds in his behalf. Zhu Zuwen told 
them that was not possible, because of the fear that informers would de-
nounce those who donated. Nor could Zhou's relatives and in-laws help; 
they were poor. But the police found resources somewhere and managed 
to raise some 1,300 taels for themselves.33 
Rain was falling again in Suzhou as dawn broke on April 14. Zhou 
Shunchang was placed in a prisoner cart at the county magistrate's 
yamen, and he and his guards made their way with difficulty through 
thick crowds of weeping and muttering people to the Western Censorate 
office, where die imperial police were waiting and the charges were to be 
read out. At several points, Zhou had to plead for the crowd to make way 
so that the cart could proceed. 
The Western Censorate building stood in its own walled compound. 
Even before the front gate had opened to admit the prisoner, some men 
had climbed die wall and stood around. They refused to climb down. 
Outside and below, the crowd increased in size. Eventually Provincial In-
spector Xu Ji arrived, followed a bit later by his superior, Mao Yilu. Mao 
ordered the gate opened. In swarmed a great crowd of people, including 
some five hundred students. As they all stood in the mud left by the rain, 
before them on a platform in front of the building lay the prisoner, while 
above him stood two imperial police officers. Near at hand lay the fetters 
diat would be placed on Zhou after the reading of the charges. 
Several student leaders surrounded Mao Yilu. A long and heated argu-
ment began as the students, supported by the mood of the crowd, 
demanded to know why this unjust arrest could not be postponed 
and appealed, and why an imperial order forged by palace eunuch Wei 
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Zhongxian could not be legitimately resisted. Mao's face turned pale and 
sweaty from the strain. He pleaded with the students. No matter how the 
arrest order was arrived at, it was still an imperial order, he insisted. How 
could the students defy their father-ruler and still call themselves disciples 
of Confucius? 
The argument went on and on, and the imperial police grew impatient. 
The crowd pressed closer and closer in order to hear what the students 
were saying. Xu Ji seemed to sympathize with the students. Mao Yilu was 
promising them that he would submit a memorial to the throne that 
expressed dieir concerns. 
The appointed noon hour for the formal reading of the charges came 
and went. The patience of the imperial police was wearing thin. They 
made motions to get on with the ceremony. One of them called the stu-
dents "rats with no right to stick their mouths in." Several commoners in 
the crowd (later to win immortality as the "Five Men") shouted back that 
the arrest order was illegal. Then, all of a sudden, as the students shrank 
out of the way, the hecklers mounted the platform and assaulted the im-
perial police. The crowd below began flinging stones and tiles and wood-
en mud-clogs at them. The police covered their heads and scattered. One 
climbed a tree and got on the Censorate roof. Anotiier hid in a latrine. 
Imperial policeman Li Guozhu escaped over the wall of the compound, 
but the crowd outside seized him and kicked him to death. 
While the melee was in progress, Mao Yilu and Xu Ji managed to call 
in a local defense unit for protection. Prefect Kou Shen and Magistrate 
Chen Wenrui used their good reputations to go out into the crowd and 
urge everyone to go home, promising that they would do all in their 
power to protest Zhou's arrest through official channels. But it was dark 
before the crowds dispersed. 
Late on the very same day, April 14, another squadron of imperial 
police, en route south to Yuyao county in Zhejiang province to arrest 
Huang Zunsu, had decided to stop for the night in Suzhou. Having no 
idea of what was taking place inside the walls, they moored their boat 
outside the Xu gate on the west side of Suzhou, which, unknown to 
them, was the gate closest to the epicenter of die riot. The guards pro-
ceeded to make the usual peremptory demands for food, drink, and ac-
commodations. The street crowd would have none of it. Fights broke 
out. Word spread and more rioters appeared. They tossed the policemen's 
baggage overboard and set their boats on fire. The imperial arrest orders 
were lost. Most of the police escaped the mob by clinging to pieces of 
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lumber and paddling out of harm's way. The two commanders eventual-
ly made it to Nanjing, where they informed the court by written memo-
rial of what had happened. 
For the next several days, remnants of the crowd camped in die streets 
and refused to go home. Zhou Shunchang, nearly forgotten in the com-
motion, was moved from the Western Censorate office to die Wu coun-
ty yamen, where he expressed his annoyance to his devotee Zhu Zuwen. 
"Except for the riot, I'd be on the road by now. Why all this turmoil?" 
Zhou was impatient to get the whole ordeal over with. Finally, in the 
early morning hours of April 22, eight days after the riot, Zhou was 
placed on a boat, and the much harried imperial police at last made off 
with their prisoner for Beijing.34 Zhou Shunchang arrived in Beijing in 
late May. A Palace rescript of May 23 ordered him placed in the Decree 
Prison.35 
< 
But what was the Palace going to do about the riots? Let them go unpun-
ished? Or conduct mass arrests? Rumors flew about Suzhou that mass ar-
rests and executions were imminent, and many people began fleeing from 
the city. 
In Beijing, some of the anti-Donglin officials in power urged savage re-
prisals. Palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian was ultimately responsible for de-
livering imperial edicts and rescripts, so everything depended on how he 
was persuaded. It is related that Suzhou native Xu Ruke, on duty as chief 
minister of the Court of Imperial Entertainment, lobbied hard with chief 
Grand Secretary Gu Bingqian to convince him that harsh retaliation 
would (1) jeopardize the vital flow of Suzhou tax revenue to Beijing and 
(2) invite a mob attack on the grand secretary's own family estate in near-
by Kunshan county.36 
It is also related that when the first reports of the Suzhou riot reached 
Wei Zhongxian, he burst into the Grand Secretariat yelling that "the em-
peror was angry" and demanding that the grand secretaries draft a re-
script calling for harsh retaliation. Gu Bingqian was sick at home. But 
Grand Secretary Ding Shaoshi convinced Wei that a harsh crackdown 
might provoke another riot as well as cause serious revenue losses.37 
Thanks to such representations, the Palace in its rescript of May 5 made 
the prudent decision "not to deeply probe" the matter.38 Mao Yilu and 
Xu Ji were instructed to identify and punish a few ringleaders, no more. 
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The "Five Men" who incited the riot were executed on August 28. Five 
student leaders were expelled. A few other rioters were flogged and ex-
iled. The legal case was thereby closed, but the rioters as moral heroes 
lived on in history and literature, and in dramatic presentations on the 
popular stage.39 
Huang Zunsu 
There was still Huang Zunsu to be arrested. Imperial police had been 
sent to fetch him, but their mission was aborted by the riot in Suzhou on 
April 14. The Palace decided not to send another mission. Instead, it or-
dered the governors of Zhejiang province to make the arrest. The gover-
nors in turn ordered the Yuyao county magistrate to go to Huang 
Zunsu's house with troops and fetch him. 
The magistrate did so. But Huang Zunsu was not there! The magis-
trate guessed that he had fled into hiding. Actually, after hearing what 
had happened in Suzhou, Huang had gone on his own to the prefectur-
al capital of Shaoxing to turn himself in. "Even if I covered my head and 
hid like a rat I would not escape death," wrote Huang to the magistrate. 
"How can you think so littie of us real men of the realm?"40 
In Shaoxing, there was an opportunity for Huang to have a meal at a 
Buddhist temple with a philosopher and former colleague Liu Zongzhou. 
There were tears. Huang and Liu discussed "national right" (guoshi). Liu 
came away realizing that he had not yet achieved sufficient psychic equi-
librium to get through the "barrier between life and death" without his 
heart racing out of control.41 
By early June, the Zhejiang provincial authorities delivered prisoner 
Huang Zunsu to Beijing, and a Palace rescript of June 13 ordered him 
placed in the Decree Prison for interrogation under torture.42 
< 
The interrogations of the men who had arrived in Beijing in May were 
already long under way. According to rumor, which the Palace evidendy 
believed to be true, Miao Changqi was the actual writer of Yang Lian's 
"Twenty-four Crimes" memorial of 1624, and Prison Director Xu 
Xianchun applied especially heavy torture to him for that reason. Miao 
was initially asked why he had associated with Yang and Zuo to do such 
a thing. Miao's reported reply was: "When Yang Lian was magistrate of 
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Changshu [in 1608-1614], I visited with him. Zuo was a year-mate of 
mine. We were friends. Why wouldn't I associate with them? And I don't 
know what you mean by 'such a thing.' " Miao also denied ever having 
accepted bribes. "The Hanlin academy is a 'cold' office; it has always 
prided itself on its purity and honor. How would I engage in bribery?" 
The Palace was not satisfied with these "vague and unclear" replies and 
demanded further interrogation under torture.43 
After ten days of interrogating him under torture, Prison Director Xu 
Xianchun reported that Miao Changqi had confessed to having taken 
1,000 taels in bribes. The Palace was not satisfied with that amount, nor 
with the 5,200 that fellow prisoner Zhou Zongjian had confessed to, and 
it demanded that Xu Xianchun press both men harder.44 On May 20, the 
Palace finally agreed to the revised figures of 3,000 taels from Miao and 
7,000 from Zhou.45 Meanwhile, prisoner Li Yingsheng arrived in Beijing. 
On May 18, the Palace ordered him placed in the Decree Prison for inter-
rogation under torture and die restitution of all bribes.46 
At this juncture, chief Grand Secretary Gu Bingqian unburdened him-
self of some misgivings about the interrogations going on in the Decree 
Prison. In a memorial to the emperor, he said that the Grand Secretariat 
had been routinely endorsing the rescripts relating to Miao and Zhou 
that were issuing from the Palace, but just now, he said, a eunuch had 
told them orally that a rescript was en route from the Palace ordering 
Li Yingsheng to be placed in the Decree Prison, and the Grand Sec-
retariat would surely endorse that; however, he suggested diat after their 
interrogations, Miao, Zhou, and Li should be sent before the judicial au-
thorities of the outer court, so that the officials there could examine and 
restate their crimes in an open and credible way. Should the prisoners die 
in their present custody without appearing before the fasi, then, predict-
ed Gu, the people of the realm will think they were all unjustly killed in 
the "black prison," and, instead of vilifying them, will mourn them as 
martyrs.47 To this memorial the Palace did not reply. 
Having confessed to 3,000 taels, Miao Changqi was subjected to the 
bribe-restitution procedure. Every five days his family servants had to 
produce so much silver, while Miao lay ready to be beaten and tortured 
if they failed. On or about May 24, Miao died "of illness." On May 26, 
the Palace ordered officials to verify the identity of the corpse and deliv-
er it to his relatives for burial. It demanded that the provincial officials 
press from his family the balance of the 3,000 taels with which he was 
charged.48 
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Meanwhile, prisoner Zhou Shunchang at last arrived in Beijing from 
Suzhou, and on May 23 he was ordered to be placed in the Decree Prison. 
Zhou's student and admirer, Zhu Zuwen, had already reached Beijing 
twenty days earlier and had worked frantically during that time to set up 
a system for the repayment of the bribes, amount yet to be determined, 
with which Zhou would be charged. Zhou had provided Zhu with letters 
for Sun Qifeng and Lu Shanji, who had helped Yang and Zuo when they 
were arrested in 1625. 
On the afternoon of May 11, Zhu Zuwen (who recorded everything in 
his diary) reached the Lu homestead in Dingxing county. Lu Shanji was 
no longer on duty at Shanhaiguan but was right there, at home. He or-
dered a servant to take Zhu to see Sun Qifeng in Rongcheng county, 
some eight or nine miles south. They arrived that night. Sun urged that 
Zhu contact Wang Qimin, an Embroidered-uniform Guards officer who 
had helped Wei Dazhong the year before. 
Zhu departed from Rongcheng at once and reached Beijing early the 
next morning. Security in the city was tight. He needed a place to stay. 
What about the Zong family, whom his father had known in military serv-
ice? Zhu went to their gate, and spoke with two of the Zong sons. They 
explained that it was unsafe for them to take him in. There were spies 
everywhere. They could not let him leave baggage there either. They sug-
gested that Zhu and the two servants of Zhou Shunchang who were with 
him look for an inn. 
Zhu was carrying 500 taels' worth of silver deposit tickets from Suzhou. 
He desperately needed to find some trustwordiy people in Beijing who 
would agree to redeem them, so that Zhu would have the silver in hand 
whenever the Decree Prison decided that the repayments should begin. 
Meanwhile he hunted up Jiang Shiheng, a family friend from Suzhou 
who was a student in the Imperial College and was living in student lodg-
ings. He asked Jiang to contact Xu Ruke (minister of the Court of Im-
perial Entertainments) and Gu Zongmeng (a censor), both Suzhou 
natives, and to ask them to arrange with Wang Qimin for a safe place to 
redeem the silver tickets. Zhu did not know Wang Qimin personally and 
could not approach him himself. Zhu stayed overnight in Jiang's dormi-
tory bed. 
At dawn on May 15, student Jiang went out to look for Xu and Gu. 
After a long time, he returned and told Zhu that he had learned that 
Wang Qimin had been removed from service, but that Xu Ruke and Gu 
Zongmeng had agreed to help with the silver. They suggested another 
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Embroidered-uniform Guards officer—Zhu Ruzhong, a Suzhou native— 
as a good person to help set up a facility for redeeming the tickets. Zhu 
Zuwen at once contacted Zhu Ruzhong, gave him the silver tickets, and 
begged him for a place to stay. However, the officer refused, directing 
him instead to a Buddhist temple. Over the next several days, Zhu Zuwen 
deployed Zhou Shunchang's servants on various errands, endeavoring all 
the while to ensure that their activities were inconspicuous to the ever-
present spies and informers. A "climate of fear" (weihuo jingxiang) lay 
thick over Beijing. 
On the night of May 20, Zhou Shunchang and his police escort 
reached Beijing. Family servant Qian Zhen had accompanied them, and 
somehow he found Zhu Zuwen and told him some other bad news—that 
prisoner Zhou Zongjian's son had not come, and that Zhou Zongjian 
had only four servants to help him; and that city police had arrested 
Huang Zunsu's father, confiscated the 50 taels he had on him, and re-
leased him only after receiving a further 500 taels' bribe.49 
Zhu Zuwen did not dare try to see Zhou Shunchang in person. For 
news of him he relied on Zhou's servants, who had taken quarters near 
the Decree Prison. They said Zhou had been tortured for the first time 
on May 23, and on May 25 was charged with having taken 2,000 taels in 
bribes. 
Two thousand taels! How could such a huge sum be raised? Zhu Zu-
wen spent a sleepless night thinking about it. It was a fifty-day round trip 
from Beijing to Suzhou and backl 
A servant delivered to Zhu a note from Zhou in prison, in which Zhou 
urged that Zhu himself should return to Suzhou. Meanwhile Zhu re-
ceived news tiiat the amount charged to Zhou had been raised to 3?ooo 
taels, and that installments of 100 taels every five days was die repayment 
rate demanded by the Decree Prison. Zhu decided not to return to Su-
zhou himself, but to send servant Tang Yuan there with letters for Zhou's 
friends asking them for money. Zhu himself went back to Dingxing coun-
ty to find Lu Shanji and Sun Qifeng and have them help collect silver 
nearer Beijing. 
On May 28, three mounted patrolmen stopped Zhu Zuwen and the 
two servants accompanying him south from Beijing. Zhu and one servant 
distracted the patrolmen with talk, giving servant Tang Yuan the oppor-
tunity to destroy the letters he was carrying to Zhou Shunchang's friends 
in Suzhou. Finding nothing suspicious, the patrolmen let them all go. Af-
ter that narrow escape, they proceeded to Zhuozhou, forty miles south-
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west of Beijing, where they parted ways, servant Tang Yuan for Suzhou, 
and Zhu Zuwen and the other servant for Dingxing. 
On May 30, Zhu Zuwen appeared at Lu Shanji's gate, and they dis-
cussed the situation. Sun Qifeng was summoned. He and Lu agreed to 
help with funeral arrangements in case Zhou Shunchang died in prison. 
They also agreed to fan out and ask friends in north China to make loans 
or contributions of silver in Zhou's behalf.50 
< 
At exactly this juncture—with Miao Changqi dead and prisoners Zhou 
Shunchang, Zhou Zongjian, Li Yingsheng, and Huang Zunsu undergo-
ing abuse in the Decree Prison, servant Tang Yuan en route to Suzhou, 
and Zhu Zuwen in Dingxing arranging silver collections—a series of tre-
mendous explosions occurred in Beijing at around nine o'clock in the 
morning of May 31. Shock waves caused damage in the Forbidden City. 
A timber was blown off the Huangji palace, which was then undergoing 
reconstruction. In die emperor's private apartment in the Qianqing pal-
ace, some big screens fell over, injuring two eunuchs. There was damage 
in Wei Zhongxian's office.51 According to one story, the emperor was in 
the palace dining hall when the explosions occurred. He ran out in panic, 
followed by a eunuch, who was struck in the head by a tile from the Jianji 
palace, some distance away. Tianqi was fortunate to escape harm.52 
It took some hours before officials were able to investigate and inform 
the Palace of what had happened. Censor Wang Yehao ventured on 
horseback out into the smoke and fire and reported that he saw "women 
and children and old people weeping in the streets and realized many 
buildings had been destroyed and many people crushed. I urged my 
horse ahead and saw crowds fleeing in panic because the elephant house 
had been destroyed and the elephants were running loose." Censor Wang 
ascertained that gunpowder stored in big jars in an arsenal known as the 
Wanggongchang, adjacent to the elephant house, had exploded.53 The 
arsenal lay about two miles southeast of the Qianqing palace. 
In the days following, the authorities determined the extent of the 
damage: 537 male and female casualties, and some twenty thousand units 
of housing leveled. Tianqi contributed 10,000 taels of his own silver for 
relief purposes.54 
By edict of June 1, the Palace—perhaps it was even Tianqi himself— 
expressed deep unease about the portentous implications of this awful 
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catastrophe. The emperor announced that he would undergo ritual puri-
fication and then conduct a solemn sacrifice at the imperial ancestral tem-
ple. All the officials were commanded to don plain costume and "wash 
dieir minds" before doing their duties. Everyone must introspect. Ways 
to stop "Heaven's disorders" needed to be found. And the prisoners in 
the Decree Prison could rejoice: the Palace ordered the suspension of all 
tortures and punishments!55 
< 
Down in Dingxing county, Zhu Zuwen learned of the explosion in Bei-
jing two days after it happened. Later he read the details in the Capital 
Gazette and was especially cheered by the imperial edict of expiation and 
stay of punishments. He thought it likely that Zhou Shunchang might 
survive and continued the job of arranging loans and contributions with 
renewed vigor. He did note, however, that "this area is desolate and there 
are very few rich families in it." By June 13, he had collected a mere 300 
taels from some half-dozen different sources.56 
On June 15, accompanied by a servant of Lu Shanji's, Zhu returned to 
Beijing with the 300 taels and gave it to Zha Xianke, an imperial college 
student, who in turn passed it to one of Zhou Shunchang's servants for 
delivery to the Decree Prison. Zhu noted that the Beijing gate tax had 
doubled since the previous month, and that the atmosphere (qixiang) of 
the city was even tenser than it had been. On June 19, Zhu received a per-
sonal note from Zhou Shunchang. Zhou was worried about the silver 
repayments. He urged Zhu to go to Wuqiao county, some 150 miles south 
of Beijing, to look into the possibility of raising funds from Fan J ingwen, 
an official colleague who lived there. 
Zhu did not know Fan Jingwen, but he left Beijing and on June 2 4 
came to Lu Shanji's gate in Dingxing. Lu knew Fan well: "That is one o f 
the best men in the realm!" he exclaimed. He wrote a letter of introduc-
tion and plea for funds and gave it to Zhu. Zhu then visited Sun Qi feng 
at Rongcheng, and over the next several days, June 28 to July 2, he made 
his way on horseback in intense heat over the hundred miles from R o n g -
cheng south to Wuqiao. 
Fan Jingwen was receptive. Out of friendship for Lu Shanji, he agreed 
to help raise a loan of 300 taels. Together with silver forthcoming f r o m 
Suzhou, and from Xu Ruke and other friends of Zhou's in Beijing, Z h u 
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Zuwen calculated that he would have a total of 800 taels, which should 
suffice to meet the five-day payments for some weeks yet and spare Zhou 
the abuse for failure to meet payment deadlines.57 
Fan Jingwen promised to forward as soon as possible the 300 taels to 
Lu Shanji, so Zhu left Wuqiao on July 7, and after another hot ride 
reached Sun Qifeng's place in Rongcheng on July 11. Zhu was worried 
that all his travels might have attracted the notice of informers. Sun 
agreed to have his younger brother Sun Qiyan make the next silver-
delivery trip to Beijing; and while he reassured Zhu that he had "one or 
two" contacts among the palace eunuchs who could extend some pro-
tection, he agreed that Zhu should do as Wei Xueyi had done, and not 
make himself conspicuous.58 
Zhu arrived at Lu Shanji's place the next day. On July 14, Fan Jing-
wen5 s emissary appeared with 200 taels and an elaborate explanation from 
Fan as to his failure to gather the full amount of 300 that he had prom-
ised. No matter. On July 15, Sun Qifeng's brother, accompanied by a ser-
vant of Zhou Shunchang's and a servant of Lu Shanji's, left Dingxing 
county for Beijing with 380 taels—Fan's 200, plus 180 collected by Lu 
Shanji—to deliver to those in Beijing who were managing the silver fund 
in Zhou Shunchang's behalf.59 
It was all in vain. On July 17, Zhou's servant returned from Beijing 
with the shattering news that Zhou Shunchang had died in the Decree 
Prison. Zhu Zuwen was devastated. " I had every hope that the emperor 
was regulating his conduct because of the adverse portents," he wrote in 
his diary. " I never expected this, and I am extremely disturbed. I couldn't 
talk, even to Lu [Shanji], and Lu too was distraught."60 
< 
Zhu Zuwen later learned the details of what had happened to Zhou 
Shunchang in the Decree Prison. An unexplained hardening in the Pal-
ace's plans for Zhou and the other remaining prisoners had indeed taken 
place. 
For a while, it had appeared as though the torture murders might be 
called off altogether. Some leading anti-Donglin officials in the bureau-
cracy were persuaded that the killings must now stop. Zhang Liiduan, a 
bureau secretary in the Ministry of War, drafted a memorial stating, 
among other things, that the Decree Prison abuses were ruining the 
1 2 0 T H E M U R D E R S C O N T I N U E 
emperor's virtue, and that, in order to ensure justice, the prisoners and 
their cases should be turned over to the fasi. He took the draft to his su-
perior, Minister of War Wang Yongguang, who gave it careful thought, 
and on or about June 2, revised it and submitted it in his own name to 
the Palace. In the course of his wide-ranging criticism of the Palace, Min-
ister Wang called attention to a "serious situation" in the Decree Prison, 
where "people have been killed in the process of recovering bribes— I 
ask that henceforth all penal cases be given to the legal authorities, that 
punishments be reduced, and that there be shown concern for the chil-
dren, grandchildren, and parents of the victims."61 
On June 1$, the unease initiated by the arsenal explosion was further 
deepened by an unexplained fire that burned down the Chadian palace, 
some two miles northwest of the Forbidden City, once occupied by the 
Yongle emperor but now used by the officials to rehearse rituals and store 
their ceremonial robes.62 On June 18, Minister of Rites Li Sicheng pub-
licly interpreted that fire as a sign of Heaven's displeasure, insisted that 
"everyone" agreed with what Wang Yongguang had said in his memori-
al of early June, and urged the emperor to heed it.63 On June 19, Wang 
Yongguang spoke out again in defense of what he had stated earlier.64 On 
June 24, Minister of Personnel Wang Shaohui, a notorious hater of the 
Donglin, sent up an emotional plea in behalf of the prisoners whose 
"wails of grief and resentment rise, but nowhere can they appeal."65 On 
June 28, there were earthquake tremors in Beijing. Early in the morning 
of June 29, an infant son of Tianqi's died.66 
Almost inexplicably, in the face of these mounting signs of Heaven's 
anger and the protests coming in from the top levels of the bureaucracy, 
the Palace took a defiant stance. A long, rambling Palace edict of July 4 
restated the criminal acts and refractory behavior that Zhou Zongjian, 
Zhou Shunchang, and the others had engaged in; they had brought on 
their own torments—by taking themselves so lightly, by humiliating the 
ruler, by placing blame on the Palace for their own misdeeds; the emper-
or was being forbearing and was actually treating them leniendy; those 
officials who were questioning what was going on in the Decree Prison 
should calmly ask themselves whether they thought the ruler was really 
acting on the basis of mere whim and rumor. Surely they knew he had 
unimpeachable evidence of the crimes charged!67 
Minister of Personnel Wang Shaohui sent up a rejoinder to that edict 
on July 5. He argued that the "villain clique" had already been extirpated 
and that the unnecessary prolongation of the repression was creating re-
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sentment. The Palace called Minister Wang's rejoinder inappropriate and 
rejected it.68 So the Decree Prison tortures resumed. 
< 
Prisoner Zhou Shunchang, from the time he was placed in die Decree 
Prison on May 23, refused to confess to anything. He was aware of the 
perfidy of the Palace the year before, when it had promised leniency to 
Zuo Guangdou and the others and then reneged on its promise. Accord-
ing to the report of his personal servant Gu Xuan, Zhou's first day of in-
terrogation featured forty blows with the stick, sixty squeezes with the 
ankle crusher, and a hundred and twenty applications of the finger press. 
After the arsenal explosion of May 31, things eased for him. Torture re-
sumed on or about Ju ly 4, when he received ten blows with die stick. 
On July 9, it appears that Zhou suffered anodier round of torture, after 
which he stumbled while wearing a heavy cangue on his neck, struck his 
head on a stone, and bled profusely. A discussion was witnessed between 
Wei Zhongxian and Prison Director Xu Xianchun. It is not known what 
was said. However, the Decree Prison reported to the Palace on July 10 
that Zhou Shunchang had "died of illness." According to servant Gu 
Xuan, Zhou was smothered to death by jailer Yan Zi (the same guard who 
had killed several Donglin prisoners the year before) sometime during 
the middle of the night July 9-10. On July 13, the Palace ordered Zhou's 
corpse verified and released, and it directed that the provincial fuan (Mao 
Yilu and Xu Ji) force his family back in Suzhou to pay the remainder of 
his silver assessment.69 
Former Censor Z h o u Zongjian also died sometime during die night of 
July 10. Censor Zhou had been in the Decree Prison since May 5. His ini-
tial dose of torture featured finger presses applied to each hand, an ankle 
press on one leg, eighty blows with a big stick, and forty blows with a 
light stick. Zhou confessed at first to having taken 5,200 taels in bribes, a 
figure with which the Palace was not satisfied. On May 20, the Palace 
agreed to a new confession of 13,500 taels. Collection deadlines were an-
nounced, at first every five days, then every three. Then he, like Zhou 
Shunchang, was taken to the "black room" and killed by jailor Yan Zi, 
either with a rock o n his chest or a sandbag over his face, or perhaps 
both.70 On the next day, July 11, the Decree Prison announced Zhou's 
death "of illness." Zhou's corpse was released five days later. The provin-
cial Juan, Mao Yilu and Xu Ji, were ordered to collect from his family all 
the silver remaining on his account.71 
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Four of the original "Seven junzi" in the arrest orders of 1626 were 
dead: one (Gao Panlong) by suicide, the others by secret murder in the 
Decree Prison. That left Li Yingsheng and Huang Zunsu still alive in the 
prison and Zhou Qiyan still in transit from Fujian. 
On June 25, Prison Director Xu Xianchun presiding, Huang Zunsu was 
heavily beaten and abused and charged with having taken 2,800 taels in 
bribes. It was arranged that repayments be made every three days. When-
ever the payments failed, Huang was flogged forty times with the heavy 
stick.72 Unfortunately Huang's father was discovered and arrested in 
Beijing, as was noted above. That left Huang's son, sixteen-year-old 
Huang Zongxi, in charge of collecting silver in Beijing to meet the install-
ment payments, which meant taking out loans from Zhejiang merchants 
in the capital and dunning his father's colleagues for whatever they could 
contribute.73 
Huang Zongxi was making good progress collecting money when on 
July 23 a friendly guard warned Huang Zunsu that a "eunuch-transmitted 
Palace directive" (neichuan) ordered him to be killed that night, and that 
he should write down any final arrangements he wished to make. Ac-
cording to a later statement of his son's, Huang Zunsu then kowtowed 
facing north, thanked the emperor for his mercy, and wrote a poem o f 
which the last two lines read: "[My] upright qi will forever linger sadly 
over the seas and mountains; resolutely I go off—what more is there fo r 
me to seek?"74 On July 23 (the date was later confirmed by a merchant 
who was a cell-mate) Huang was taken away and killed. On July 27, the 
Palace issued what by now had become its routinely false and delayed 
statement that Huang had died "of illness." Provincial officials back in 
Zhejiang were ordered to recover the remainder of his assessment from 
his family.75 
Li Yingsheng was put in the Decree Prison on May 18. Some time in 
June he was able to have smuggled out a letter to his father back in Jiang-
yin county: 
I was interrogated as soon as I got here and was injured badly, but there's 
been no more, and I'm still alive. After a month lying down, the wounds 
still haven't healed; they need another month.... Once the bribes are fully 
repaid, I'm to be sent to the Ministry of Justice. Now they're doing col-
lections every five days. I'm desperate to get a letter from home. There's 
no way to appeal here, no way to escape torture. Here in prison I worry 
about the payments by day and suffer pain at night, but I'm in good spleen 
and my health is strong and I have more food and drink than before, which 
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should relieve some of your worries... .I've gotten you parents in trouble 
over [my love of] honor (mingjie)... ,76 
The assessment charge against Li was 4,000 taels of silver.77 A second 
letter to his father was smuggled from prison some time in July. Li still 
hoped he might survive the ordeal, but things were not looking favorable 
for him: 
I still have some hope of surviving this, but I worry that the silver might 
not arrive. Yangsu [Liu Yangsu, a friend] has been rushing here and there, 
and he's been able to redeem 1,000 taels, thanks to my friends. Recendy 
things had eased because of the ominous disaster [the arsenal explosion], 
but now they've tightened again. You see cruel wounds [on the prisoners]. 
Myself and Bo 'an [Huang Zunsu] are die only ones [of the original group] 
still alive. And they've gotten very severe on collection days. Twice I've re-
ceived diirty blows of the heavy stick. Bo'an has let me use a lot of his sil-
ver. I'm really indebted to him. Elder brother [i.e., his elder cousin, 
Li Yimao, a minor official] has been sick all month, and Yangsu has had a 
hard time running about, plus he's been looking after each one of the fam-
ily servants.78 
A final farewell note dated noon on July 25 was smuggled out to Li's 
father. Five days later, responding to a Decree Prison report of Li's death 
"by illness," the Palace issued its usual rescript. Li's corpse, on release, 
was scarcely recognizable. Neither Li Yimao nor Liu Yangsu was ever able 
to learn the details of how or when Li Yingsheng died.79 
The last of the "Seven junzi," former governor Zhou Qiyuan, arrived 
in Beijing early in August. A Palace rescript of August 9 charged him with 
having embezzled and received in bribes a total of 100,000 taels.80 Three-
day repayment deadlines were imposed, and heavy torture was applied. As 
in the case of the others, the Palace did not intend to wait long, and on 
November 1, Zhou's death "by illness" was reported by the prison, and 
the Fujian provincial officials were ordered to collect die remainder of 
what he owed from his family.81 
A 
What did the Tianqi court intend to accomplish by all these arrests? Dur-
ing the years 1625-1626 it purged hundreds of presumed Donglin sympa-
thizers from the government, while singling out thirteen of their leaders 
for the special treatment just described. 
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The court could not have made its intentions more plain. The prison-
ers were not, after all, arrested and spirited away in secret. They were 
made to stand in broad daylight before the general public while the 
crimes with which they were charged were read out for everyone to hear. 
They were then taken away in cages mounted on carts, like zoo animals 
on exhibit, so everyone could see their humiliation. Obviously, the peo-
ple were being invited to share in the Tianqi court's moral indignation, 
rally to the court's side, and, perhaps, rage in anger at the miscreants 
whose misdeeds their ever-vigilant government had exposed. 
Evidently, the court had endorsed at least partway the Donglin's own 
philosophy. It agreed with the Donglin that the men of this world are 
divided into the two colors white and black, into "gentiemen" and "small 
men," into selfless heroes and deceitful and corrupt villains. It differed 
with the Donglin only on the derivative question of the identity of the 
men to whom the labels ought to apply. 
There is more. That the arrests were made in public shows that the 
Tianqi court was morally serious, that it believed it was right in what it 
was doing. Now it was Donglin belief that, in the final analysis, the abso-
lutist moral philosophy expounded by the few derived from the inchoate 
moral leanings of all the people of China. The name for this was the 
"national right" (guoshi). "National right," once wrote Miao Changqi, 
"emerges from the unforced collective mentality (qunxin zhi ziran) and 
it expresses itself in a unison of voices. As such, it is determined neither 
by the ruler nor by the court officials, but by every man and woman in 
the realm. That which every man and woman in the realm labels as right 
or wrong, neither the ruler nor the officials may overrule."82 Elsewhere, 
he explained: "Because the common men and women have no part in 
governing the realm, they abide it passively, yet they see it clearly. It pen-
etrates their breasts, rises to their throats, and rushes out their mouths, 
and this is how right and wrong in the realm gets determined."83 
As though acting upon this belief, the Tianqi court took its case over 
and over again to the people of China as they gathered in the streets 
and yamens, and it asked them, in effect, to serve as the ultimate bar of 
moral judgment and to validate the purging the court was endeavoring 
to carry out. 
But, judging from the reactions it kept getting in the streets, the court 
failed in its appeal to the people's sense of what was right and wrong. 
Those whom the court would label villains, the people considered heroes. 
Even children got involved. Spectators were amused to watch young 
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street boys making a game of flogging each other to unconsciousness. 
"We're strengthening our bones and tendons to await the day when we 
become loyal officials at court!" the boys explained.84 
Indeed, the Tianqi court was able to sustain its public stance of com-
manding moral righteousness only to a certain point. In Beijing, the 
court never went so far as to sentence Yang Lian and the other Donglin 
prisoners to public execution, because, clearly, it could never develop a 
sufficiendy convincing case against them. Nor could it release the prison-
ers, in part because that would call into question the justification for the 
purge of the hundreds of lesser Donglin officials that was then in prog-
ress. Thus the Tianqi court groped for the tools of secret murder and 
overt terror. 
But the Tianqi regime intended that the utter extirpation of the Dong-
lin faction should be its opening card, not its final act. It clearly hoped to 
put the repression behind it, relegate it to past history, and move on to 
develop an attractive new political ethos for China and give its attention 
to solving the Manchurian and other crises that had been bedeviling the 
Ming court for so long. 
C H A P T E R 5 
Repression, Triumph, Joy, Collapse 
( 1 6 2 5 - 1 6 2 7 ) 
< 
T H E T I A N Q I R E G I M E openly prided 
itself on three main achievements. First, it had worked mightily to cleanse 
China of the Donglin and all its lingering influences. Second, it had man-
aged to finish the expensive rebuilding of three decaying palaces in the 
Forbidden City. Third, after years of Ming defeat, it had scored two en-
couraging military victories in Manchuria (at Ningyuan and Jinzhou). 
These things it somehow accomplished in the short space of three years. 
Then, in the fall of 1627, the Tianqi emperor died, and the whole Tianqi 
order collapsed forthwith. The triumphs, the new anti-Donglin vision for 
China espoused by the regime, and then the precipitous demise of the 
whole affair all shed light on the intensely personal nature of political 
power in the late Ming era. 
The repressiveness of the Tianqi order owed much to the vengeful an-
ger of its principal actors. Key players in the regime shared one experience 
in common—one or more stinging personal rebuffs by an exclusive, self-
styled moral elite of superior men (junzi). The Donglin attitude of 
absolute self-righteousness seemed to create enemies as a natural by-
product: Fu Kui, Ruan Dacheng, and Wei Guangwei, to name just three, 
not to speak of Wei Zhongxian (who at the outset had tried to reach out 
to Donglin men), and even Tianqi himself. 
Feng Quan and Cui Chengxiu 
The brilliant but flawed Feng Quan was one of the prime movers behind 
the Donglin repression. He too had been stung by Donglin moral barbs. 
A northerner from Zhuozhou, he had won his metropolitan degree in 
1613 at the exceptionally young age of eighteen and was placed in the 
Hanlin academy. Sometime late in the Wanli era, Feng's father, a military 
intendant in Liaoyang, was impeached for deserting his post. In vain did 
Feng turn to his colleagues for help in clearing his father. Even his close 
friend Miao Changqi (in 1626 a Donglin martyr) for some reason turned 
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against him and repeatedly humiliated him in front of others.1 Because of 
the impeachment of his father, Feng Quan was forced to resign from gov-
ernment and return home. Then, early in 1624, Wei Zhongxian made a 
ceremonial visit to Zhuozhou (where Fu Kui and Ruan Dacheng also 
contacted him); and there, according to rumor, Feng Quan knelt before 
the eunuch and in tears explained how the Donglin had ruined his father, 
and Wei Zhongxian, always eager to have support in the bureaucracy, 
helped him recover his Hanlin post. Wei Zhongxian desperately needed 
that support when Yang Lian submitted his "Twenty-four Crimes" me-
morial in July 1624. Feng made covert contact with the embattled eu-
nuch's nephew, Wei Liangqing, and through him advised that the "outer 
court was nothing to be afraid o f ' and that it could be "cut and con-
trolled" by "big cases" (i.e., the prosecution of political crimes) and the 
reinstitution of court flogging. And so it turned out. 
As did many others who opposed the Donglin, Feng Quan enjoyed the 
good things of life. The late Ming was an era of urban commercial growth 
and increasingly sophisticated life-styles and patterns of consumption 
among the elite. Many Donglin partisans defied this trend. Feng Quan 
did not. According to the memoirs of eunuch Liu Ruoyu, who knew him, 
the handsome young Feng Quan always dressed in the finest clotiiing, 
constandy checked his appearance in a mirror, and avidly collected valu-
able antiques, rare books, and lovely concubines. A filial son, Feng saw to 
it that his mother lived like an empress. He once gave a great party on the 
occasion of his mother's departing Beijing for Zhuozhou. She was show-
ered with gifts from Wei Zhongxian and others; she was surrounded by 
an entourage of twenty or thirty beautifully dressed maids and other at-
tendants; and on her procession south to Zhuozhou people cleared the 
roads for her. To onlookers it appeared as though she were leading a for-
eign embassy.2 
Liu Ruoyu has it that Feng Quan created strategy from behind the 
scenes during the final imprisonment and torture of Donglin power bro-
ker Wang Wenyan in the spring of 1625. Feng Quan, Cui Chengxiu, and 
others conferred at night; Wei Liangqing delivered their plans to palace 
eunuchs Li Yongzhen and Li Chaoqin, who read them aloud to the illit-
erate Wei Zhongxian, who then forwarded instructions via Li Chaoqin to 
the recorder sitting behind Prison Director Xu Xianchun at the interro-
gation sessions. According to Liu, Xu would not proceed without those 
instructions.3 
In April 1625, the Palace approved a big bill impeaching four Donglin 
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men (including Zhou Zongjian, Li Yingsheng, and Huang Zunsu) and 
recommending ten anti-Donglin men. The memorialist was not one of 
the expected speaking officials, that is, censors or supervising secretaries, 
but a bureau secretary in the Ministry of Works, a Jiangxi man by the 
name of Cao Qincheng.4 Feng Quan had been his examiner on the clas-
sics portion of the metropolitan exams when Cao achieved his degree in 
1619, which created a "student-teacher" bond of obligation between 
them. Feng Quan called in his former examinee Cao and dictated to him 
what he wanted him to do. Cao protested that he was not a speaking offi-
cial and had no business impeaching those who were. According to testi-
mony given by Cao in 1629, Feng then grew angry, saying, "I 've already 
agreed to it, so of course you'll do it." Cao left in fright. A few days after 
that, Feng called him in again and had his ally Li Lusheng show him a 
draft of what he wanted. "I've shown this draft to my old examiner, 
[Grand Secretary] Wei Guangwei, and he's agreed to it," said Li. " I f you 
decline, you'll be in trouble. You attached yourself to the gate of 
[Donglin partisan] Zou Yuanbiao to get [him to recommend] posthu-
mous honors for your father, so you have no choice." Li warned Cao not 
to say anything of this. Cao yielded to die blackmail. That night a copy-
ist came to Cao's house and put the draft into proper form as a memori-
al from Cao, and the next morning Cao reluctantly presented it at the 
Palace, which was expecting it. 
Then, continued Cao in his confession, early in 1626 Feng Quan de-
manded that Cao agree to send up yet another big impeachment, this one 
charging Zhou Shunchang and the other six of conspiracy to overthrow 
the regime. This time Cao refused. He did not say why. Feng Quan had 
him removed from civil service. In March-April 1626, Cao was on his way 
home when, he said, some thirty agents of Feng Quan descended upon 
him at an inn in Xuzhou, on the Grand Canal four hundred miles south 
of Beijing. Cao hid under a horse trough. Innkeeper Wang Er was killed 
in the fracas. The agents gathered up Cao's books, papers, and baggage 
and burned them, to destroy any evidence that might incriminate Feng.5 
On September 13,1625, Feng Quan was one of four new men appoint-
ed to the Grand Secretariat. At thirty, he may have been the youngest 
grand secretary in Ming history. Within a matter of days, he actively in-
trigued to help bring about the dismissal of Grand Secretary Wei Guang-
wei when Wei showed that he could no longer stomach the ongoing tor-
ture murders of die Donglin men.6 
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As grand secretary, Feng hastened the destruction of Xiong Tingbi. 
Since the Ming collapse of 1622 in Manchuria, both Xiong Tingbi and 
Wang Huazhen had been held in the prison of the Ministry of Justice 
while arguments raged over their punishment. The Donglin rallied, or 
were accused of rallying, behind Xiong. On September 22,1625, the em-
peror attended a tutorial in the Wenhua palace, and on that occasion 
Feng, allegedly in agreement with the other grand secretaries, showed the 
ruler a printed book called "The Liaodong Story" (Liaodong zhu an) > 
which had been purchased in the streets of Beijing. In its forty-eight epi-
sodes, it glamorized Xiong Tingbi. Feng told the emperor that Xiong 
Tingbi was himself the author.7 Four days later, the Palace issued a thun-
derous edict denouncing the awful Liaodong zhuan as the last of Xiong 
Tingbi's "terrible and unforgivable crimes" and ordering his immediate 
execution. Apparentiy, the execution took place on September 27.8 
In February 1626, Feng Quan was appointed one of the three main 
working editors of the Sanchao yaodian (Essential canon of three reigns). 
Surprisingly, within days of the July publication of that anti-Donglin 
monument, the young grand secretary was impeached for gross corrup-
tion and malfeasance. On July 24, the Palace ordered him to retire home 
pending clarification of "public opinion" (gonjjlun) on his case.9 Wei 
Zhongxian from that point tended to ignore the Grand Secretariat and 
look to Cui Chengxiu in the outer court as his main source of bureaucrat-
ic support. 
Like Feng, Cui Chengxiu also had a personal score to settle, because 
he had been devastatingly humiliated by the Donglin in the past. Cui was 
twenty years older than Feng, though he won his metropolitan degree in 
1613, the same year Feng did. Cui was also a northerner, from Jizhou, fifty 
miles east of Beijing. In 1624, Cui returned to Beijing for reassignment 
upon completing a three-year tour of duty as regional inspector of Yang-
zhou and Huaian.10 Before reassignment, it was necessary that his record 
be reviewed and cleared. Here Cui fell into serious trouble. 
Gao Panlong, head of the Donglin academy, now censor-in-chief, had 
already heard bad things about Cui Chengxiu from local students when 
he traveled north upon being recalled to government service in 1621.11 
Meanwhile other regional censors had sent up damaging reports about 
Cui's accepting a bribe of several thousand taels in return for recom-
mending a promotion for a salt official. Censor Yuan Huazhong (one of 
the six junzi killed in the Decree Prison in 1625) was sent from Beijing out 
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to Huaian and Yangzhou to find out more about Cui's behavior there, 
and he returned with a long and shocking list of Cui's malfeasances, in-
cluding his demand of 14,000 taels for personal expenses. 
Thus, in November 1624, Censor-in-Chief Gao Panlong decided the 
time had come to impeach Cui. He delegated the job of writing the for-
mal impeachment .memorial to Censor Li Yingsheng. On the night of 
November 3,1624, Cui Chengxiu came to Li's house and "knelt, begging 
to explain." Li coldly rebuffed him. On November 4, Li submitted the 
impeachment. On November 7, the Palace ordered Cui to stand down 
pending further review of his case, and it sent the matter to the outer 
court for discussion and recommendation.12 Speaking for the outer court, 
Minister of Personnel Zhao Nanxing proposed that Cui be exiled to a 
garrison. Cui insisted in his own defense that the corruption charges 
against him were based on nothing more than idle street rumor.13 No im-
mediate action was taken. 
Lucidly for Cui, by late 1624 the tide was turning against the Donglin 
faction. Yang Lian's July impeachment of Wei Zhongxian had failed. T h e 
November impeachment of Grand Secretary Wei Guangwei transformed 
a harmless "small man" into a "mad dog that will bite anything," just as 
Huang Zunsu had predicted. Wei Guangwei made a back-channel link 
with Wei Zhongxian with a view to engineering the removals of Donglin 
men. And so now, in turn, Cui paid a bribe to a lower-ranking palace 
eunuch and through him secured the support of Wei Zhongxian. H e 
secretly gave the Palace several new lists of pro- and anti-Donglin of f i -
cials.14 At some point, Wei Zhongxian reportedly welcomed Cui into his 
"family"—Cui called Wei "master" and Wei called Cui "son"—and when 
Wei's other "sons" gathered to kneel holding goblets and wishing the 
eunuch a long life, they say Cui outdid them by kneeling and holding o n 
his head a urinal with his name incised upon it! Wei was pleased by the 
gesture.15 
On February 6,1625, a Palace rescript declared that Cui Chengxiu had 
been slandered, that there would be no further investigation of his case, 
and that he was hereby restored to his position in the Censorate.16 As the 
destruction of the Donglin proceeded, Cui's star gradually rose, and Wei 
Zhongxian found him so effective and cooperative as a colleague that in 
effect he dumped Feng Quan and the Grand Secretariat and forged a 
direct relationship with the outer court, with Cui as censor-in-chief a n d 
concurrent minister of works. People commonly referred to this as the 
"Cui-Wei" regime. It lasted until Tianqi's death in 1627. 
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The Publication of the Sanchao yaodian 
The Palace and the triumphant anti-Donglin officials felt it essential to 
explain in detail to future generations how both concrete facts and the 
fundamental principles of Confucian political morality required that the 
Donglin be eliminated forever as a factor in the future governance of 
China. It had to be shown that many of China's most admired officials 
and intellectuals were not the "upright men" of the "good species" drey 
claimed to be. And solid evidentiary grounds had to be laid in order to 
identify all Donglin sympathizers and so justify their continuing purge. 
The vehicle for malting this case was the thick book called the Sanchao 
yaodian (Essential canon of the three reigns). An edict of February 10, 
1626, ordered its compilation under the token general editorship of Chief 
Grand Secretary Gu Bingqian. It was finished in a matter of months. An 
edict of July 13 ordered the work printed for "distribution to the realm."17 
The Sanchao yaodian reproduced, with editorial comment, memorials 
and other testimonies relating to the controversial Three Cases, in an ef-
fort to refute and overturn the Donglin verdict on them. It traced the 
origin of the Donglin error back to 1601, when Wanli had formally named 
Zhu Changluo as his heir apparent; and it continued the story of the con-
troversies over the whole quarter-century down to 1626, the year of its 
publication. 
The original crime of the Donglin partisans was to disbelieve Wanli's 
word on the succession and to insist that, had it not been for their con-
stant agitation on the issue, the emperor would have deposed Zhu 
Changluo and given the throne to Zhu Changxun, his younger son by his 
favorite concubine, Lady Zheng. The Sanchao yaodian endeavored to 
prove that the Donglin objection had been unnecessary and self-serving; 
Wanli had never intended to depose Zhu Changluo. Yet the Donglin 
made a case of Zhang Chai's 1615 intrusion into the Forbidden City to ar-
gue that behind the hapless stick wielder lay an assassination plot con-
trived by Lady Zheng and members of her family and directed against 
Zhu Changluo. That was nonsense! The Sanchao yaodian sought to show 
that there had been no plot, and that Zhang Chai was a lone madman. 
Then the Donglin tried to argue that the death of Zhu Changluo after 
only one month of rule was caused by acts of deliberately negligent homi-
cide committed as part of yet another plot by Lady Zheng and her fami-
ly. Nonsense again! The Sanchao yaodian provided evidence to show 
there had been no plot and no homicide. Finally, the Donglin maintained 
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that, except for the vigilance and forceful action undertaken by Yang Lian 
and Zuo Guangdou and others, Tianqi's guardian, Lady Li, acting in 
league with Lady Zheng, would have seized supreme power and ruled 
China from "behind the curtain." Again, the yaodian marshaled its evi-
dence to show that Lady Li had had no such intention, and that there-
fore the action taken by the Donglin to drive her out of the palace in the 
middle of the night was not only cruel and unnecessary, but had forced 
Tianqi to disobey his father's heartfelt request and thereby make himsel; 
an unfilial son. 
It must be said that the Sanchao yaodian does an effective job of calling 
into question the Donglin belief that the Three Cases plus the "root-of-
the-state" issue were all tied together as parts of an unrelenting quarter-
century of conspiracy against the security of the Ming throne. But the 
book's editors were not satisfied to stop there. They went on to advance 
a questionable conspiracy charge of their own: that the Donglin faction 
had conspired for years and years deliberately to destroy the emotional 
fiber and the moral constitution of the Ming ruling family. So states the 
imperial preface (Tianqi agreed that he was "too busy" to write the pref-
ace himself, so he accepted chief editor Gu Bingqian's offer to write it 
for him). 
In the preface, Gu has the emperor charge that "villainous bandits" 
(jianzei) have made themselves appear "loyal and good" (zhonpflianpf) by 
raising paranoid (caicun) suspicions about imperial family matters and, in 
so doing, have put under a dark cloud the emperors' true compassion as 
fathers and their true filial piety as sons; but now, at last, the batde is 
being won; uprightness is vanquishing deviance, yang is overcoming yin, 
and now everyone must continue to strive to root out all bandits from 
their hiding places in government, otherwise the whole purpose of com-
piling the yaodian will have been in vain.18 
Listed in the Sanchao yaodian along with excerpts from their memori-
als were the names of hundreds of officials on either side of the Thre< 
Cases controversies. By Palace directive, the yaodian was to supplant al 
the earlier enemies lists, which were said to contain mistakes, and serv< 
henceforth as the sole authoritative source for identifying good men fo 
promotion and villains to be eliminated.19 
Printed copies of the Sanchao yaodian were distributed by some means 
not only to the officials, but to some extent to the general public. In 1627, 
reportedly, a student groaned aloud while reading a copy of it in a book-
shop in the Jiangxi provincial capital, whereupon a police spy "rolled up 
12 8 R E P R E S S I O N , T R I U M P H , J O Y , C O L L A P S E 
his sleeves and threatened to take him to the provincial authorities"; but 
a crowd intervened, and the student was fined and let go.20 
The Suppression of Dissent 
As recounted earlier, the Wei Zhongxian regime sent imperial police into 
the China counttyside far from Beijing to bring off a dozen spectacular 
and terrifying arrests of leading scholar-officials of the Donglin opposi-
tion. But the regime was persuaded that more needed to be done to 
cleanse China of all lingering Donglin influences. Therefore it also tar-
geted the academies that were centers for jiangxue ("learning through 
discussion") and that also served as Donglin recruitment camps. 
A handful of China's many academies were known to be noxious hot-
beds of jiangxue activity. Chief among these was, of course, the Shou-
shan, founded in Beijing by Feng Congwu and Zou Yuanbiao in 1622. 
Feng and Zou had resigned under attack late that same year. But the 
Shoushan, forgotten in the swirl of other excitements, remained in oper-
ation until early in 1625. In February of that year, the Palace replied to a 
memorial about the matter from Supervising Secretary Li Lusheng. "The 
Way of the Sages is as bright as the stars and sun; men study it in prepara-
tion for government careers, so why after becoming officials should they 
still have to discuss it?" the Palace wanted to know. "Recendy some have 
used daoxue to gather factions and do self-interested tilings. The damage 
from that is not small." It thereupon ordered the Shoushan academy con-
verted into government office space.21 In March, in response to another 
memorial from Li Lusheng, the Palace changed its mind and ordered the 
academy made over into a shrine honoring loyal officials.22 
Then, in August, Censor Ni Wenhuan told the Palace that although 
the Shoushan academy's signboard had been taken down, the stone stela 
with former Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao's inscription on it was still on 
view, which was wrong, because it allowed the followers of false daoxue 
to leave behind a "red banner" in the wake of their defeat. So the Palace 
ordered the Ministry of Rites to destroy the offending stela.23 The wreck-
ers not only smashed the stela, but allegedly they also removed Confu-
cius' tablet from its shrine and tossed it into the street.24 Each room in 
the academy was then locked and sealed and the whole building was 
guarded by armed guards.25 
Beyond Beijing there were yet more dissenting academies. In May 1625, 
Censor Zhou Weichi explained in a memorial how hateful were the four 
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words qing rnicin men hu—literally, "sentiment and face, gate and door," 
meaning the affective ties binding together those within a political clique 
or camp. Those four words, he said, ruin people's behavior! Real moral-
ly superior men (junzi) stay away from such associations altogether. He 
urged the emperor to put an end to all cliques by ordering the destruc-
tion of academies everywhere in China where villains gather. "The devi-
ant clique should be allowed no place to hide," he concluded, "in order 
that the national right (guoshi) may be clarified." The Palace sent this me-
morial to the ministries for discussion.26 
In September 1625, Censor Zhang Na singled out four academies else-
where in China as especially active centers where members of the evil 
clique lay in wait, hoping to come back to Beijing and "challenge the su-
preme unifying power of the emperor." He explained that those acade-
mies attracted motiey crowds of scholar-officials, relatives of the imperial 
house, military men, lower degree holders, Confucian students, clerks, 
fortunetellers, hermits, merchants, and even criminals and outiaws. Their 
purpose was to influence court appointments, interfere in frontier de-
fense, and manipulate local government. By their stance in the Three Cas-
es controversies, they were working ferventiy to drive out good officials 
and diminish the filial piety of the emperor. He further charged that those 
academies were in mutual contact—as indeed they were—through visits 
and correspondence. 
The Palace rescript to Zhang's memorial ordered the four academies 
confiscated. Proceeds from the sales of their buildings and fields were to 
be sent to Beijing to help fund the ongoing palace construction projects 
in the Forbidden City. The leaders of those academies were ordered to be 
deprived of their official status.27 
Included on the fist was of course the notorious Donglin academy it-
self, in Wuxi. Local officials proceeded to confiscate it. In 1626, the Wuxi 
magistrate reported that the sale of the Donglin land and buildings 
yielded 687 taels of silver.28 In Shaanxi, Feng Congwu's Guanzhong acad-
emy was dismanded, and Confucius' image was reportedly tossed by the 
wreckers into a corner of the XT an city wall, where it lay exposed to the 
elements. Feng Congwu was left deeply depressed, certain that his arrest 
was imminent; according to later testimony by his son, he fell ill and re-
fused to eat, and he died early in 1627.29 
The Ziyang academy in Huizhou was another target.30 The fourth vic-
tim was the Renwen academy in Jishui county, Jiangxi, and it is perhaps 
fortunate that its leader, Zou Yuanbiao, had already died of natural caus-
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es and was not on hand to witness its demise. However, his successor, Li 
Rixuan, and his followers managed to continue their discussion meetings 
in secret.31 
<1 
But voices of dissent could be heard outside the academies. Some of that 
dissent was directed squarely at Tianqi and Wei Zhongxian. For example, 
just two months after Yang Lian's sensational 1624 impeachment of Wei 
Zhongxian, nationwide provincial-level examinations were held. Exami-
ners in five provinces worded some of their questions in such a way as 
covertiy to invite criticism of the emperor and his palace eunuch. The Pal-
ace was soon apprised of this matter, but Chief Grand Secretary Gu 
Bingqian argued successfully in March 1625 for limiting the punishments. 
As a result, six provincial degree winners were disqualified from taking 
the metropolitan exams, but only for six years; eight examiners were de-
moted three grades and sent away from Beijing.32 
Also in March 1625, a strange incident took place at the imperial tuto-
rial. Hanlin Junior Compiler Huang Daozhou (later a famous intellectu-
al and anti-Manchu resistance leader) was supposed to bring forward the 
text of the day on his knees and place it before Tianqi. Instead, he walked 
upright. Also he brought the wrong text. Wei Zhongxian glared at him. 
Tianqi wanted to know who the offender was. Grand Secretary Zhu 
Yanxi identified him and pleaded for mercy on his behalf. The Palace 
agreed to "overlook" the incident.33 Surely, however, it was a daring ex-
pression of personal contempt on Huang Daozhou's part. 
Something may have stung the emperor, because four days later, at a 
classics tutorial on March 20, Tianqi spoke directly to the grand secre-
taries. "Recendy some officials have formed a clique for personal purpos-
es and I've identified them and I'm punishing them," he said. "You tell 
[the others] that if they renovate themselves and rectify their errors I 
won't probe deeply into the matter The Ministry of Personnel and the 
Censorate should tell that to all the large and small offices in the capital 
and the provinces, so each official will rid himself of old habits, and satis-
fy my intention to be lenient." Tianqi's words were issued verbatim in the 
colloquial language as an edict.34 A few months later, however, the Palace 
was apprised that dissent still existed and acted forcefully to suppress it. 
In November 1625, a house servant named Cheng Yuande brought 
to the Eastern Depot (Wei Zhongxian's police headquarters) three doc-
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uments from the home of his master, a secretariat drafter by the name of 
Wu Huaixian. One document was a copy of Yang Lian's "Twenty-four 
Crimes" memorial of 1624, with Wu Huaixian's underlinings and sup-
portive marginal comments. Also he turned in a copy of a letter sent in 
1623 by Wu to a cousin, Wu Jing, also a secretariat drafter, in which Wu 
Huaixian complained about the increasing ability of "small men" with 
connections in the Palace to humiliate high officials. There was also a 
copy of a letter sent in early 1625 to kinsman Wu Changqi, a bureau secre-
tary in the Ministry of Works, in which Wu Huaixian expressed a hope 
that the current regime (jumian) might soon collapse. 
The Eastern Depot reported all this to the Palace, together with fur-
ther damaging particulars; and on November 19 a Palace rescript ordered 
Wu Huaixian arrested and sent to the Decree Prison for interrogation un-
der torture.35 
On November 23, Prison Director Xu Xianchun prepared a detailed 
statement of the case. Wu Huaixian was a native of Xiuning county in 
Huizhou prefecture. He was rich and, in 1596, had bought the status of a 
Nanjing imperial college student. Then he murdered several locals, and 
in 1623 he fled Huizhou for Beijing. In Beijing, he gave his local compa-
triot, the infamous Donglin power broker Wang Wenyan, a bribe of 1,600 
taels, in return for which Wang Wenyan got Chief Grand Secretary Ye 
Xianggao to appoint him a secretariat drafter. In return for a further bribe 
of 200 taels, Wang Wenyan put Wu Huaixian in contact with Zuo Guang-
dou and Wei Dazhong, and so Wu Huaixian entered the Donglin camp 
and leaked to them the contents of rescripts being prepared by the Grand 
Secretariat.36 
This was a shocking confession. On November 25, the Palace ordered 
Wu Huaixian transferred from the Decree Prison to the Ministry of Jus-
tice for their recommendation of punishment. On November 26, the 
transfer was made. But on November 28, Wu Huaixian died of the effects 
of the torture he had received in the Decree Prison.37 
Barely a month after the torture and death of Wu Huaixian, a squadron 
of imperial police descended upon the prefectural city of Yangzhou, six 
hundred miles away in the southeast. They extorted 2,000 taels from the 
locals, and then they placed Prefect Liu Duo under arrest. There was a 
public reading of the charges against him: "He occupies a regular office, 
but in his mind he favors the [Donglin] clique. He has slandered current 
government with a reckless poem. We have that in his own handwriting 
as proof. The Embroidered-uniform Guard is ordered to arrest him and 
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bring him to the capital for interrogation alongside the heterodox Bud-
dhist monk Benfu." 
Liu Duo was dumfounded. To be sure he was a noted drinker, poet, 
and calligrapher, and it also appears that he acted on the advice of his 
friend and coprovincial, Wan Jing (beaten to death in 1624), and visited 
the Donglin academy in Wuxi, which was still open in 1625, to hear the 
lectures and mend his ways. But he had never written any such poem. 
Eastern Depot agents, searching a Beijing monastery, had turned up a 
painted fan featuring a winter snow scene, with a poem that included the 
line "Dark with miasma, national affairs go wrong." It bore Liu Duo's 
personal seal. The painting had been in the possession of the monk 
Benfu, a hanger-on of the Donglin men. The regime, including especial-
ly Grand Secretary Feng Quan and his supporters, were eager to prose-
cute the case. An imperial rescript of February 19,1626, ordered both Liu 
D u o and Benfu sent to the Decree Prison for interrogation. 
In a lengthy affidavit, Liu Duo forcefully denied the charge. And in-
deed further interrogation revealed that he had been framed. An Em-
broidered-uniform Guards commander named Ouyang Hui had written 
the poem and had cut Liu Duo's seal from another fan he had given 
Benfu and pasted it on the painting after the offending poem. It may or 
may not have helped Liu that a fervent testimonial of support was pre-
sented to the court in the name of the "common people" of Yangzhou. 
It certainly helped that he was friendly with Wei Liangqing, Wei Zhong-
xian's twenty-seven-year-old nephew. 
And so Liu Duo was exonerated. In May 1626, the Palace endorsed 
Minister of Justice Xu Zhaokui's recommendation and had Liu Duo 
flogged forty times for mediating a small bribe while in prison, after 
which he was to be returned to duty. Monk Benfu and guardsman Ou-
yang Hui were each flogged a hundred times. Benfu was then sent into 
exile. Ouyang Hui was dismissed from the Guards.38 
But that did not end the matter. On August 28, Liu Duo was rearrest-
ed and sent back to the Decree Prison for further interrogation about the 
bribe he had allegedly mediated.39 Then, on September 21, Liu Duo's ser-
vant Liu Fu was stopped and searched at one of the Beijing city gates by 
Zhao San, an agent of the Eastern Depot. Liu Fu was carrying 250 taels 
on behalf of his master. A relative of Liu Duo's by the name of Peng Wen-
bing, hearing of this, laid a complaint with the Censorate that the arrest 
of Liu Fu and the seizure of the silver he was carrying had been improp-
er. So the Censorate had both Liu Fu and Zhao San sent to the Decree 
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Prison for questioning. At this juncture, a sixty-year-old police command-
er named Zhang Tiqian saw an opportunity to bring himself to the favor-
able attention of the Palace. It appears that Liu Duo's concubine had 
arranged a jicto sacrifice to celebrate Liu Duo's earlier release. But Zhang 
Tiqian tortured the servant Liu Fu into stating that what had really hap-
pened was that Liu Duo had hired a wife killer, occultist, and sometime 
Buddhist priest named Fang Jingyang to carry out, not a jiao sacrifice, 
but a voodoo rite—aimed at harming none other than Wei Zhongxian! 
And after the emperor had so magnanimously forgiven Liu Duo for the 
offensive poem! 
Liu Duo was beaten mercilessly. They say he screamed at his tormen-
tors: "Your fame is for the moment only. You won't escape the verdict 
(gonpflun) of history!" There was no secret murder of Liu Duo; by Palace 
order dated October 16, he was decapitated.40 The murder of Wu Huai-
xian and the execution of Liu Duo notwithstanding, expressions of dis-
sent continued. In early December 1626, an anonymous poster was put up 
at the north gate of the Imperial City enumerating palace eunuch Wei 
Zhongxian's "crimes" and listing by name seventy of his accomplices.41 
This prompted the Palace to issue a general edict ordering government 
offices everywhere to be alert for subversive writings concocted by sup-
porters of the "deviant Donglin clique." The edict reminded the realm 
that when Tianqi came to power in the early 1620s the "deviant clique" 
had dominated government, diminished the emperor's filiality and virtue, 
and discarded national territory. That clique has been destroyed, stated 
the edict. It went on to warn: "Those who have escaped the net have 
been told repeatedly to change their faces and reform their minds and 
start anew, and yet there are minds that still remain unmoved. There are 
still evil elements, 'mountain men,' and 'pure guests,' who make furtive 
connections and concoct rumors and write anonymously in behalf of the 
deviant clique!" Only the vigilant exposure of such activity will "rectify 
minds and leave the national right unsullied."42 
The organs of repression took heed. In early February 1627, police 
commander Wang Tingjian, on patrol in the Beijing streets, arrested two 
men for possession of dissident literature. Censor Men Kexin sent up a 
memorial stating the preliminary charges. One of the men arrested was a 
military degree holder by the name of Gu Tongyin. The other was an ex-
pelled Confucian student (shengyuan) named Sun Wenzhi.43 Both were 
natives of Taicang subprefecture, east of Suzhou; and both were one-time 
housemen of the executed commander Xiong Tingbi. The police found 
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on Gu a written critique of Manchurian affairs that favored Xiong Tingbi. 
On Sun they found two poetic laments for Xiong. A Palace rescript or-
dered the two men sent to the Eastern Depot for interrogation.44 
What came out of the interrogation was sensational. Here was no less 
than a plot to organize a political underground, right under the emper-
or's nose! And there was more. The husband of Gu Tingyin's mother's 
niece was none other than Hanlin compiler and imperial tutor Chen Ren-
xi. Chen Renxi's native place was in Suzhou prefecture, not far from Tai-
cang. He was a clandestine follower of the Donglin, who day and night 
thought about ways to overturn the regime (fanju). In this, Chen Renxi 
worked in close contact with his 1622 year-mate, the optimus Wen Zhen-
meng, who had been sent home in 1622 for his scathing description of 
Tianqi. Wen Zhenmeng in turn had ties to prisoner Sun Wenchi. They 
were all secredy plotting revenge and a return to power! 
This report was sent in Wei Zhongxian's name from the Eastern Depot 
to the Palace. The Palace rescript to the report praised Wei Zhongxian 
and directed that Gu, Sun, and several friends and servants of theirs be 
sent direcdy over to the Ministry of Justice. 
Minister of Justice Xue Zhen prepared a lengthy summary of the case 
along with recommendations for punishment. To this the Palace issued, 
on February 25, 1627, a rescript ordering the decapitation of Gu and Sun 
and the flogging and canguing of four of their servants and friends. A 
rescript of March 14 praised Wei Zhongxian and ordered the removals 
from civil service of Chen Renxi, Wen Zhenmeng, and former Hanlin 
bachelor Zheng Man.45 
Chen Renxi returned home from Beijing, and there he "closed his 
gate" and "awaited death." Wen Zhenmeng, already at home, did the 
same. It was the general expectation that the arrest and transportation 
of both to the Decree Prison was only a matter of time. In Wujin coun-
ty, south of Suzhou, Zheng Man (who was never able to find out how 
his name got placed in the imperial rescript) observed agents wearing 
"Beijing caps" posted day and night by the gate of his house. He 
decided to escape rather than "await death." He fled overland through 
Jiangxi, then south over the Meiling pass to Guangdong, beyond the 
effective reach of Beijing, where friends entertained him and showed 
him the famous sites. He came out of hiding after Tianqi's death in 
September.46 
< 
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The regime of Tianqi, Wei Zhongxian, and their coadjutors in bureau-
cracy was by no means devoid of significant achievements. The great po-
litical purge, still in progress in 1626-1627, was but one of them. A more 
lasting achievement was architectural. Several of the more spectacular 
buildings in the Forbidden City, visible expressions of the might and 
grandeur of the Ming empire, had been neglected for many years and had 
fallen into a state of disrepair. Their restoration was a pet project of 
Tianqi's, and, to please him, the multitalented Wei Zhongxian gladly 
took on the role of impresario of construction. The centerpieces of the 
rebuilding program were the so-called Three Palaces—that is, the 
Huangji, Zhongji, and Jianji palaces, colossal structures that line up one 
behind the other midway along the half-mile avenue leading from the 
Meridian gate at die south entrance to the Forbidden City north to the 
emperor's palace, the Qianqing. Of course the willing assistance of Cui 
Chengxiu as minister of works was essential in this. The construction 
work force was increased in size from 752 men to 5,288.47 
The official purge and the palace reconstruction were ingeniously in-
terlinked. Palace reconsttuction—which the regime routinely called the 
"great work" (da gong)—was funded not from taxes but from fines and 
confiscations imposed upon the families of the Donglin martyrs and their 
sympathizers, including especially military recruiters and suppliers who 
were believed to have embezzled huge sums and had sought protection 
from Donglin officials. 
Work began slowly, but from 1625 it was rushed. The Huangji palace 
was finished first, in November 1626, and its restoration was celebrated 
with elaborate ritual.48 The other two palaces were completed in Septem-
ber 1627. The Ministry of Works reported the total cost, from March 31, 
1625 to September 10, 1627, as 5,788,135.8 taels of silver.49 Some officials 
urged postponing the construction and diverting the funds to military 
defense in Manchuria, but the Palace insisted (1) that defense was being 
adequately funded already and (2) that, as of July 1626, the 1.5 million 
taels so far spent on construction were "not being taken from the peo-
ple."50 The Palace's assertion may have been technically correct. A fairly 
thorough combing of surviving records yields a by no means complete 
total of seventy-four men assessed 2,137,638 taels altogether (ranging from 
small amounts like the 300 taels Censor Wan Jing's family was forced to 
pay, to die 402,727 taels charged to die former military supply official Tao 
Langxian, to the 605,000 charged to die Huizhou entrepreneur Wu 
Yangchun—the attempted collection of which in April 1627 provoked a 
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local riot).51 The Palace's determination to accomplish the rebuilding in a 
hurry and in the face of all resistance, as though somehow it was in a race 
against time, helps explain the ferocity with which it forced the families 
of what it insisted were frauds and cheats and embezzlers to pay the 
amounts charged. 
And there was more: the military victory in Manchuria. After so many 
years of setback, news finally came of the repulse under cannon fire 
of Manchu leader Nurhaci and his forces at Ningyuan on February 19, 
1626. Nurhaci himself died on September 28 of the same year.52 There fol-
lowed in August 1627 a victory over the Manchus at Jinzhou, in the 
Liaodong peninsula. No wonder the mood of the regime turned self-
congratulatory. 
A Counter-Model to the Donglin 
The successes of one-time street rowdy, illiterate director of the Eastern 
Depot, and flamboyant palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian were almost be-
yond belief. He had destroyed all opposition inside the Forbidden City— 
with the exception of Empress Zhang, but he was continuing to work for 
her removal. Outside the Forbidden City, he had broken the "deviant 
clique," and he was continuing to purge its last remnants from govern-
ment. He had funded and rebuilt the Three Palaces. He was happy to 
accept full credit for the Ming military victory at Ningyuan. The haojie, 
the heroic strong man at the helm of national affairs that so many of the 
late Ming elite believed the situation required, had materialized—not in 
Yang Lian or Xiong Tingbi, but in palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian. 
Tianqi expressed his confidence in Wei on every possible public occa-
sion. He now regularly addressed the eunuch as his "depot minister" / 
(changchen). From around late in 1626, memorials from officials were ex-
pected to include praise for Wei Zhongxian in their opening remarks. Re-
scripts from the Palace came to be issued in the name of the emperor and 
the depot minister (zhen yu chungchen). Some fourteen male relatives, 
children of Wei's brother, sister, and daughter, were variously ennobled 
or given hereditary military offices.53 Wei Zhongxian himself received the 
unusual tide "superior duke" (shunggong). 
Some in the realm could not act fast enough to express their admira-
tion and gratitude, and this they did by building those notorious shrines 
dedicated to the living genius and beneficent merit of Wei Zhongxian. 
Palace authorization for constructing the first of these was issued late in 
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July 1626. The request came up from Zhejiang Provincial Coordinator 
Pan Ruzhen. The Palace was pleased to grant it. It gave the shrine the 
name "Pude" (Universal Virtue). The new shrine was built on the shore 
of scenic West Lake in Hangzhou, right between two existing temples 
dedicated to loyalist military heroes.54 
Pan Ruzhen scorned and detested the moral pretensions of the defeat-
ed Donglin clique.55 And it is clear from Pan's memorial that, although 
Donglin martyr Zhou Qiyuan had championed the underpaid rural pro-
ducers in the earlier dispute over Palace silk procurement, the effect of his 
stance was to make it impossible for the Hangzhou silk weavers to meet 
their quotas, with the result that many weavers suffered, and some even 
died in prison. It was Wei Zhongxian who then intervened to alleviate the 
weavers' plight. Accordingly, "several thousand people" now asked Pan 
Ruzhen to beg the Palace's permission to build this shrine in Wei's 
honor.56 
The Pude temple in Hangzhou was soon followed by some forty more 
Wei Zhongxian shrines, built by regional officials and local gentry in vari-
ous parts of China after receiving imperial authorization to do so. No ef-
fort or expense was spared, with glass bricks being used here and red 
gates erected there, and yellow tiles on the roofs. "For a while," noted 
contemporary commentator Zheng Zhongkui, "the whole realm ap-
peared to go mad."57 Inside some temples were installed lifelike statues of 
Wei Zhongxian, carved in aromatic wood, with a hole in the topknot 
where seasonal flowers might be inserted.58 Inside the temple built in Ji-
zhou, a gold statue of the eunuch sported a cap normally worn only by 
emperors.59 Matching couplets hung in each shrine were lavish with 
praise; "His sageliness and godliness establish the pivot between Heaven 
and Earth/ May his beneficence and long life shine as eternally brilliant 
as the sun and moon" is an example of the genre.60 The eunuchs in Nan-
jing built a grand temple with three sections. Worshippers entering the 
shrine saw in the central section a wooden statue and also a painting of 
Wei Zhongxian in court costume with eunuch servants at each side hold-
ing round fans and ivory tablets. In an alcove on the left was another 
painting of Wei Zhongxian, this one portraying him seated in gold hel-
met and armor with generals holding spears and swords standing along-
side; and on the right, one could contemplate Wei Zhongxian seated 
upright in traveling costume surrounded by littie eunuchs in poses of rev-
erence and adoration.61 
At the Beijing imperial college, located northeast of the Forbidden 
12 8 R E P R E S S I O N , T R I U M P H , J O Y , C O L L A P S E 
City, student Lu Wanling and several classmates petitioned the throne in 
June 1627 for permission to build a temple in Wei Zhongxian's honor on 
some vacant land they had bought nearby. The students' brief was that 
Wei had helped the young ruler Tianqi to become a "Yao and Shun"; that 
he had exterminated the "deviant clique"; and, most important for the 
students, he had restored the "study of the Sages" to its former glory. 
The students intended to worship at Wei's shrine whenever they offered 
seasonal sacrifices at the temple of Confucius.62 This petition the Palace 
approved. "I hated it deeply when the Donglin followers wrecked nation-
al affairs and encroached upon the inner court," stated the rescript. "I 
relied on the depot minister [Wei Zhongxian], who upheld correct opin-
ion, and turned away the evil wind, so that the villainy of the partisan 
camp was wiped clean as a mirror, and the filial piety and paternal com-
passion of myself and my father shone again as bright as the sun in the 
sky. His merit in the world is not small. His benevolent embrace has made 
possible pacification on the home front as well as the defeat of foreign 
enemies "63 
Officials improvised ceremonies imaginatively. Somewhere in the out-
skirts of Beijing, an official by the name of Huang Yuntai welcomed the 
installation of Wei Zhongxian's "benign visage" (xirong) into a newly 
built shrine, lined up his subordinates at the red-lacquered steps in front, 
where he had them perform five bows and three kowtows, then approach 
the image shouting "a thousand blessings" in unison, whereafter each of-
ficial in turn stated his name and office and kowtowed, and thanked him 
who should live "nine thousand years" and kowtowed again, then finally 
all repeated the five bows and three kowtows en masse.64 One official 
went too far, perhaps as a kind of protest. After performing elaborate 
obeisances at a Wei Zhongxian shrine, he crept on his knees to a nearby 
Buddhist temple, where he made only one bow. "How can I be greater 
than the Buddha?" asked a suspicious Wei when he was informed of the 
incident.65 
Official paperwork authorizing new Wei Zhongxian shrines was usual-
ly careful to indicate who the petitioners were, so one can see that besides 
regional civil officials, military officials, and eunuchs posted in Nanjing 
and elsewhere, they included Beijing merchants; gentry and common 
people in Tongzhou; local elders in Songjiang; the common residents 
of Beijing; more merchants in Beijing; and so on.66 Perhaps not all of 
this popular enthusiasm was genuine.67 Nonetheless, it appears that one 
should understand tiiis extraordinary episode—this nationwide building 
12 8 R E P R E S S I O N , T R I U M P H , J O Y , C O L L A P S E 
of great shrines in honor of a palace eunuch whom the Donglin had so 
recently vilified—as Wei Zhongxian's answer to the outpourings of love 
and grief on behalf of the Donglin heroes exhibited by crowds of people 
in such places as De'anfu, Tongcheng, Jiangyin, Zhangzhou, and of 
course Suzhou, scene of the famous riot of April 1626. The Donglin 
heroes had died for an ideal; they had stirred the emotions of the realm 
through their willing endurance of blood, pain, humiliation, and death. 
Wei Zhongxian's appeal to the people of China was founded on precise-
ly the opposite emotional grounds. Far from grief and death, the shrines 
symbolized radiance, abundance, and joy, and endorsed the acquisitive 
side of human nature—much in the same way that, perhaps, after 1989, 
the Communist regime replaced the self-sacrificing Tiananmen spirit with 
a new propaganda emphasizing materialistic values. 
< 
The tiny emperor, too, enjoyed what he could of the good life. His fond-
ness for building and crafts has become legendary Liu Ruoyu described 
how Tianqi and several eunuch companions would make lacquerware, 
and how Tianqi did not like being interrupted at tiiat activity, and if a 
high-ranking eunuch approached him with an important memorial at 
such times, Tianqi would wave him off, saying, " I understand; you just 
go take care of that."68 Wei Zhongxian also occasionally staged palace the-
atricals for Tianqi. The emperor enjoyed these, but report has it that his 
adored Empress Zhang walked out offended when one scene turned lewd 
and refused ever to attend again.69 
Along the western edge of the Forbidden City was a park and a lake, 
the Taiyichi, where the little emperor loved to go boating. Once Tianqi 
/ invited Empress Zhang aboard a boat and rowed her up and down the 
lake himself. It is said that the empress used the occasion to admonish 
- Tianqi that he should be reading memorials, that he should listen to the 
good scholars who attended his tutorials, and that he should not let the 
crowd of "small men" take advantage of him. "You are my teacher," said 
Tianqi. "I'll try hard to be diligent." But he soon forgot his promise, and 
in less than a month he was enjoying himself again.70 
Late in the afternoon of June 22,1625, Tianqi and two young eunuchs 
were playing on a small boat in a deep part of the lake when a sudden gust 
of wind tilted the boat and dumped the three of them into the water. Of 
course none of them could swim. People on shore blanched in fright. Wei 
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Zhongxian and Madame Ke were drinking on a big boat not far away. 
Wei tried but failed to reach Tianqi and got himself all wet in the effort. 
Finally several eunuchs on shore managed to row out to where the em-
peror was thrashing about and save him, but they did not reach his two 
young companions in time, and they drowned.71 
Despite his many consorts, Tianqi had an unbroken sequence of sad ex-
periences in producing offspring. Not one of his three sons and two 
daughters lived to see its first birthday.72 Some people thought Tianqi 
failed to give the babies adequate protection. Supervising Secretary Li 
Mou stated just that in a memorial of 1624, by which time four imperial 
infants had died; Li thought the deaths were due to the prenatal and 
postoatal shocks they had received from the earsplitting reverberations of 
the cannon the Palace army kept firing inside the Forbidden City.73 Palace 
eunuch Liu Ruoyu agreed that the imperial infants had not been well pro-
tected, and he noted the irony of the comparison between the emperor's 
sickly infants and the robust peasant children one might observe running 
about in the north China countryside.74 
The emperor's own medical history, what it was that caused his early 
death at the age of twenty-one, is difficult to construe, but all of his re-
ported symptoms were in some way respiratory. Occasionally he felt ill 
enough to call in the officials. On April 17, 1624, Tianqi called the grand 
secretaries to his bedside in the Qianqing palace. "The emperor was sit-
ting wearing imperial regalia," noted Ye Xianggao, "and we kowtowed 
and asked after his health. 'Yesterday I came down with cold and diar-
rhea,' replied Tianqi, 'and I feel weak, so I wanted to see all of you, that's 
all.' I urged the emperor to take care of himself. He nodded. We got up 
and stood on either side of him. The imperial physician knelt taking his 
pulse. When he finished, we knelt and said, 'Your face is calm and your 
speech clear, and you should recuperate all right, but you should rest.' 
The emperor said he understood. He ordered a eunuch to escort us back 
to the Grand Secretariat. He gave each of us gifts of silver and cloth "75 
On September 11, 1624, Tianqi was sick again, with a nosebleed. This 
time representatives of the supervising secretaries and the censors joined 
the grand secretaries at the emperor's bedside.76 Ye Xianggao had by then 
resigned. 
Liu Ruoyu noted in his memoirs that from mid-June 1627 the emper-
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or began feeling increasingly unwell, and from July he never left his bed. 
For a time they moved the invalid from the Qianqing palace to the Mou-
jindian, a smaller structure immediately to the southwest. Wei Zhongxian 
covered the walls of the ruler's sickroom with red silk doth and fetched 
a gold character reading shou (long life) from storage and hung it by his 
bedside. 
These arrangements failed to improve the emperor's health, and at 
some point it appears the patient was moved back to the Qianqing palace. 
It was not clear to his physicians what was wrong with him. Minister of 
War Huo Weihua sent a prescription for a medicine obtained from the 
condensation of steamed rice. The Imperial Dispensary and the Imperial 
Academy of Medicine prepared it. Tianqi liked it, as did the palace eu-
nuchs, who drank the leftovers; but after a while the emperor's condition 
worsened, and he refused any more of it. His body swelled up. Wei 
Zhongxian grew angry with Huo Weihua.77 
On September 19, the grand secretaries and other high officials were 
suddenly called to the emperor's sickbed in the Qianqing palace while the 
physicians examined him and gave him medicine. Tang Changshi, a mi-
nor official in the Ministry of Works, recalled that day in his memoirs. Eu-
nuchs came rushing to the ministry to fetch Cui Chengxiu. Everyone in 
the ministry was alarmed, not knowing what was going on. They await-
ed anxiously for Cui to return from the Forbidden City and tell them; and 
around noon, he did so. "We were called in to receive [the emperor's] 
final instructions (guming)" reported Cui. "He called in the grand sec-
retaries, the Nine Ministers, and representatives of the censors and super-
vising secretaries. We bowed and knelt, and he sat up and said to us: 'I've 
been troubled by eastern affairs [in Manchuria], and I've taken ill, and no 
remedy works, and it's all over. [My brother] the Prince of Xin is in the 
capital, and you capital officials must conscientiously guide him.' After he 
said that, he lay back down. We waited prostrate. Then he sat up again 
and said: 'Tell the Prince of Xin. You officials go away for a bit. The 
Prince of Xin will soon be here.' The emperor told us to visit the prince. 
Then he glanced left at Wei Zhongxian and he said to us: 'This depot 
minister has served me too.'"78 
Censor Ni Wenhuan reported back to the Palace his version of that 
meeting, which he too had attended. There was nothing in his report 
about the prince of Xin. According to Ni, the emperor had stated that he 
was troubled that he was too sick to attend to official business; that palace 
eunuchs Wang Tiqian and Wei Zhongxian were experienced and wholly 
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dedicated, and the grand secretaries should consult with diem on all im-
portant matters; and that without Wei Zhongxian it would have been im-
possible for the emperor to rebuild the Three Palaces and bring about 
victory in Manchuria.79 
The next day, the Palace issued an edict explaining that the emperor 
was ill because he had not been physically robust to begin with and had 
overtaxed himself worrying about national affairs. The edict directed the 
officials to confer with eunuchs Wang Tiqian and Wei Zhongxian. It also 
informed them that Tianqi had called in his younger half-brother and had 
spoken with him.80 It appeared as though death might be near. 
Late in the morning of September 28, eunuch Li Yongzhen left the em-
peror's bedside and entered one of the offices of the eunuch Directorate 
of Ceremonial nearby. He had with him a large, bloody clot of some sort 
wrapped in a piece of tissue, which he said had come from Tianqi's nose. 
The other eunuchs examined the clot and agreed that it was not good 
news. They rewrapped the clot, wrote the date on the tissue, and tacked 
it high on a wall. Later that day, the imperial physicians came by and ex-
amined it in order to determine whether the emperor needed a different 
medication.81 What conclusion they drew from it is not stated. 
Death came to Tianqi late in the afternoon of September 30. He was 
two months short of his twenty-second birthday.82 
There was speculation among the lettered classes of China that Wei 
Zhongxian was surely going to make an attempt to seize the Ming 
throne. But there was also doubt among some of them that such an at-
tempt, if made, would succeed. In Jiashan county, Zhejiang, Chen Long-
zheng explained why. If you contemplate the matter carefully, wrote 
Chen, you will observe that the eunuch has performed no great feat. His 
only merit is "commonplace service" to his ruler. Therefore there is no 
groundswell of public support for him to ride. His followers and adher-
ents are people of low quality. The empress does not favor him. His pal-
ace army is too small to control the entire country. And he seems to have 
no better plan than to compel everyone to praise him.83 
Chen Longzheng was right. Wei Zhongxian's political fate was tied to 
Tianqi's. He had tried to make his position more secure, of course. But 
his persistent efforts to maneuver Tianqi into deposing Empress Zhang 
had not succeeded. Rumor had it that at some point he tried to persuade 
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the empress to agree to adopt an infant son of his nephew, Wei Liang-
qing, as heir apparent to the Ming throne, and to let Wei Liangqing him-
self assume power as a "regent-emperor" (she hunngdi). To that propos-
al, the empress is said to have replied, "You'll kill me if I agree to that, 
and you'll kill me if I refuse; but if I die refusing you, I'll be able to hold 
up my head before the imperial ancestors." Wei had no reply to that, and 
he backed down.84 
On September 19, when Tianqi called the officials to his bedside to wit-
ness his final words (guming), Wei Zhongxian wanted his name placed at 
the head of the list as chief witness (guming shou). This the Grand Secre-
tariat, though lately a rubber stamp, refused to endorse.85 
At some point during Tianqi's last days, Empress Zhang visited with 
the emperor's younger half-brother (Zhu Youjian, the soon-to-be Chong-
zhen emperor) and urged him to agree to the dying ruler's wish that he 
succeed him. She also tried to arrange to have Chongzhen's exact where-
abouts hidden; and she warned him not to eat any food prepared in the 
palace, because of the chance it might be poisoned.86 
Official notification of Tianqi's death was issued on the next day, Octo-
ber 1. It came by way of an edict from Empress Zhang to the Ministry of 
Rites, which in turn released it to the public. It was short and to the 
point: 
The Ministry of Rites makes public this edict of the empress: The health of 
the emperor was never strong. On top of that, he got sick worrying over 
eastern [Manchurian] affairs. Medicines had no effect. He died at the shen 
[3-5 P.M.] hour of the 2id day of the 8th lunar month of the 7th year of 
Tianqi [September 30,1627]. 
As to the funeral rites to be carried out, I order the Ministry of Rites to 
meet as soon as possible with the Hanlin Academy and report here the ap-
propriate arrangements they propose.87 
Having received news of Tianqi's death, the officials rushed to gather 
at the Longdao pavilion, just outside the Qianqing palace compound, 
near the eunuch Directorate of Ceremonial. The eunuchs sent them all 
away to change into mourning costume. When they rushed back wearing 
proper costume, they were told to return later, as things were not yet 
ready. The officials pleaded, and finally they were let in to perform a cer-
emonial weeping at Tianqi's bier. Wei Zhongxian was observed standing 
by, saying nothing, his eyes swollen. As the officials filed out, Cui Cheng-
xiu (recently made minister of war) was called back to the palace for con-
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sultation. The officials looked at each other and someone spoke out in 
protest. "How can Cui monopolize the realm's affairs?" he wanted to 
know. If Cui heard the remark, he ignored it and went inside, where he 
reportedly told Wei Zhongxian that he was not able to help him with a 
last-minute usurpation of the throne.88 
It is not clear who wrote Tianqi's final edict, which appears to have 
been released to the public on October I. Apparentiy no complete copy 
of it survives, which is puzzling. It may have been tampered with. In the 
longest version, the dead ruler points up his successes (rebuilding the 
Three Palaces; victory in Manchuria—but nothing about the purge of the 
Donglin); praises the "imperial fifth younger brother" and transmits the 
throne to him; and gives instructions limiting expressions of national 
mourning.89 There is no mention whatever of Wei Zhongxian. His name 
may have been edited out. 
C H A P T E R 6 
A Reversal of Fortunes 
< 
O N O C T O B E R 2 , 1 6 2 7 , the Tianqi em-
peror's younger half-brother, Zhu Youjian, assumed the throne under the 
reign tide Chongzhen. (As things turned out, his was the last reign of an 
intact Ming China.) He was sixteen years old, but, unlike Tianqi, he 
played an assertive part in government from the very beginning of his 
reign. He also seems to have kept his own counsel. He certainly tolerat-
ed no decision-making surrogates, as Tianqi had done. During the first 
several months of his tenure as emperor, he adroitiy handled the disman-
tling of the "Cui-Wei" regime, a task made easier for him by the passivi-
ty of Cui Chengxiu and Wei Zhongxian, who, in the absence of Tianqi, 
failed to find a way to defend their positions. 
At its core, the Tianqi regime had been truly warm and familial, a 
guo jia in the emotionally literal sense of the word. Madame Ke and Wei 
Zhongxian daily attended Tianqi as his personal, parent-like guardians. 
Wei Zhongxian in the inner Palace and Cui Chengxiu atop the outer 
bureaucracy accepted each other as father and son. But Tianqi was 
the center of it all, and his premature death destroyed the tissue of pseu-
dofamilial affections out of which power at the highest level in Ming 
China had been constructed. With Tianqi dead, there was no way to re-
establish those same affectionate arrangements around Chongzhen, who 
did not love Madame Ke and Wei Zhongxian and, indeed, had no reason 
to do so. 
For several weeks, however, Chongzhen gave no hint that things might 
change. On October 8, he refused to act on Wei Zhongxian's offer to re-
sign. On November 5, he agreed to Wei Zhongxian's request that no new 
temples be built in his honor, but he allowed construction to proceed on 
those already authorized. On November 12, Chongzhen agreed to a me-
morial from the acting chief supervising secretary of the Office of Scru-
tiny for Personnel, Chen Eryi, that the Eastern Depot, Embroidered-uni-
form Guard, and censors on city patrol duty must together be made to 
exercise special vigilance because, according to rumor, "remnant villains 
of the Donglin" were lurking in Beijing hoping for "a change in the 
weather," and though the former emperor had already cleansed those ele-
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ments, there was a danger that, unless continually watched, "dead ashes" 
might well come to life again.1 
There were some faint signals of a new dispensation, but they were dif-
ficult to interpret. On October n , Tianqi's wet nurse, Madame Ke, vacat-
ed her quarters in the Forbidden City and moved to her private residence 
outside. Eunuch memoirist Liu Ruoyu reports that in the predawn hours 
of that day, Madame Ke went in mourning dress to the Renzhi palace 
where Tianqi's coffin still lay and wept as she burned the contents of a 
small box that contained her dead charge's baby hair, baby teeth, scabs, 
and nail cuttings.2 And on October 31 Chongzhen replied affirmatively to 
a request to have the legal authorities investigate student Lu Wanling and 
others for fraud and coercion in their role in arranging and funding the 
construction of a Wei Zhongxian temple at the Imperial University.3 
In October and November, certain Beijing officials began probing 
Chongzhen's intentions by repeatedly calling his attention to Cui Cheng-
xiu's overweening position in the Ming government. On October 22, 
it was requested that Cui and others be relieved of duty so that they 
might retire home to observe the prescribed mourning regulations.4 Cui's 
mother had died, but Tianqi (or, rather, Wei Zhongxian) had considered 
Cui so indispensable that his mourning obligation had been waived. Cui 
now asked to be relieved of duty, but Chongzhen denied his request. 
A month later, on November 21, Censor Yang Weiyuan impeached Cui 
Chengxiu for accruing excessive powers (Cui was concurrently minister 
of war and censor-in-chief, while his younger brother served as military 
commander in Zhejiang province), and for corruptiy dominating gov-
ernment. Yang charged that while Wei Zhongxian had repaid Tianqi's 
trust with his hard work and his willingness to accept the world's resent-
ments, Cui had not been faithful to Wei Zhongxian. Chongzhen angrily 
rejected the impeachment. But Yang Weiyuan thought he was on to 
something, because five days later he submitted a second impeachment of 
Cui Chengxiu, this time underscoring Cui's selfishness and greed and 
emphasizing Wei Zhongxian's impartiality and disdain for material 
things. Chongzhen now changed his mind; his rescript indicated that 
he was considering doing something about Cui, and indeed, on Novem-
ber 28, he relieved Cui of his two positions and authorized him to go 
home to observe mourning.5 
Some of the censors and supervising secretaries now smelled blood. On 
December 1, Censor Wu Shangmo memorialized his objections to the 
mildness of Chongzhen's rescript. On December 3, Censor Jia Jichun 
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(notorious for his defense of Lady Li in the 1620 palace crisis) sent up a 
harsh impeachment of Cui, listing his illegally gotten wealth, his collec-
tion of concubines, his unspeakably lewd behavior, and the excessive hon-
ors he acquired for his dead parents. On the same day, Supervising Sec-
retary Xu Kezheng impeached Cui's brother Ningxiu. On December 7, 
Chief Supervising Secretary Wu Hongye brought it to Chongzhen's at-
tention that Cui's son Cui Duo had been improperly awarded a juren de-
gree in the recent Shuntian prefectural exams (Chongzhen ordered that 
Cui Duo be retested, and he failed a retest given on December 20).6 
At home in Jizhou, Ming China's most powerful bureaucrat apparent-
ly sensed that sooner or later the new emperor would respond to these 
increasingly violent impeachments and order his arrest and execution. 
He was also very likely informed of Chongzhen's edict of December 11 
ordering the arrest of eunuch Wei Zhongxian. Report has it that on De-
cember 12, a party was held in the Cui household that concluded with a 
smashing of the expensive cups from which everyone had drunk. 
Shordy after this party, neighborhood security chief Gu Youde entered 
the Cui home and discovered the corpse of Cui Chengxiu hanging by a 
wet towel from the rafters of the library and, on the floor in the same 
room, the still-breathing body of his lover and favorite concubine, Xiao 
Lingxi, her throat cut with a knife. Gu Youde at once reported this shock-
ing news to Jizhou subprefectural magistrate Zhao Sanji. Magistrate 
Zhao informed Jizhou military intendant Sun Zhimian, who in turn noti-
fied Shan Mingyi, grand coordinator of Shuntian prefecture. Grand 
Coordinator Shan ordered Magistrate Zhao plus police, clerks, and coro-
ners to revisit the scene and double-check the original report. This they 
did, and the results were sent up to Chongzhen by Shan Mingyi on 
December 14. 
How long concubine Xiao survived with her throat cut is not record-
ed. However, on the same day, December 14, Censor Wang Huitu sent 
up an impeachment of concubine Xiao's younger brother Xiao Wei-
zhong, who had been improperly appointed to a military position under 
Cui Chengxiu's auspices. He also included a detailed report of his inves-
tigation into the social origins of concubine Xiao and her family. They 
were street entertainers! The beautiful Xiao Lingxi used to stand by the 
gate of the military encampment at Miyun (about fifty miles northwest of 
Beijing) and "present smiles" while her litde brother Xiao Weizhong 
played the pip a and performed acrobatics. Censor Wang went on to de-
scribe how in later years concubine Xiao would revisit Miyun and behave 
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imperiously. Facts like these, he concluded, showed why the "Cui-Wei" 
crimes needed to be fully exppsed.7 
Within days, Chongzhen endorsed a request that Cui's property be 
confiscated, the proceeds to be earmarked for military expenses. On De-
cember 26, a preliminary report noted that some 71,245 taels of silver plus 
other assets had so far been seized from Cui's estate. In March of the fol-
lowing year, Cui's corpse was publicly dismembered at Jizhou. He had 
not, by his suicide, cheated the executioner.8 
It was likewise by increments that disaster closed in on the archvillain 
himself, Wei Zhongxian. On November 30, two days after Cui Chengxiu 
left Beijing, Lu Chengyuan, a minor official in the Ministry of Works, 
complained in a long memorial that Wei Zhongxian had been rewarded 
to excess by Tianqi; that he had not declined to let Tianqi treat him as 
virtual co-emperor; that he had let himself be honored with the building 
of temples; that he had been put on a par with the duke of Zhou and 
Confucius; and that he had sent Palace eunuchs to control the frontiers 
and other vital points in the realm, supplanting the regular bureaucracy.9 
Chongzhen laid the memorial aside. 
On December 2, Qian Yuanke, a newly appointed minor official in the 
Ministry of War, followed with a long impeachment of Wei Zhongxian, 
reiterating many of Lu Chengyuan's complaints and demanding to know 
why Chongzhen continued to protect this offending eunuch who was, 
after all, no more than a low-born illiterate from the streets!10 Chongzhen 
"noted" receipt of this statement. On December 3, Shi Gongsheng, a 
vice-director in the Ministry of Justice, weighed in with another anti-Wei 
memorial, which Chongzhen also "noted." 
Then, on December 4, a "ten crimes" memorial arrived from one Qian 
Jiazheng, which was copied and recopied by people in Beijing and 
achieved some considerable fame. Qian Jiazheng was not an official. In 
1621 he had failed the Shuntian examination for the juren degree and by 
special imperial act had been appointed an Imperial University student. 
Donglin stalwarts Zou Yuanbiao and Gao Panlong had liked him. Having 
lain low in Beijing through the Tianqi years, student Qian decided the 
time had come to assert himself on the dynasty's behalf and resolutely de-
nounce Wei Zhongxian in a format echoing Yang Lian's failed "Twenty-
four Crimes" memorial of 1624. The story has it that Chongzhen, 
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impressed by Qian's memorial, called in Wei Zhongxian and had him lis-
ten and then reply as each of Qian's ten allegations was read aloud to him; 
but Wei had no replies and could only kowtow in silence through the 
ordeal. On December 6, Chongzhen "noted" this, but he indicated that 
although his mind was made up he wanted to hear more from official-
dom. As a university student, Qian Jiazheng of course had no right to 
memorialize the throne, but the emperor waived the penalty.11 
At this juncture, timidity lifted, the floodgates opened, and over the 
following weeks, "more than a hundred" officials sent up memorials de-
nouncing Wei Zhongxian.12 Meanwhile, on December 5, Chongzhen 
granted Wei Zhongxian's plea to retire to his private mansion on the 
ground of illness. The emperor put him at his ease, however, warmly not-
ing in his rescript how Wei had labored so long and hard for Tianqi, re-
building the Three Palaces and defending the national frontiers.13 
The emperor's reassurance was not sincere. Three days after giving it, 
on December 8, Chongzhen issued a long and thunderous edict listing 
Wei's monstrous crimes; but, because Tianqi's burial had not yet taken 
place, he ordered tiiat the eunuch be sent south to Fengyang in exile "for 
the time being."14 
And so, on or around December 8, Wei left Beijing accompanied by a 
large retinue and baggage train. Soon after Wei's departure, an official of 
the Ministry of Revenue memorialized in alarm that merchants arriving 
in Beijing from the south reported that they had passed Wei's convoy en 
route and had counted over a hundred carts and over a thousand horses 
and mules carrying bags! And what was in the bags> No doubt loot stolen 
from the Palace, or from the people.15 Commissioner Yang Shaozhen of 
the Office of Transmission warned the emperor that Fengyang was full of 
ruffians and fighters, and that Wei might well recruit them and join Cui 
Chengxiu's brother Ningxiu and his Zhejiang troops in a rebellion. 
Therefore, he felt he must urge Chongzhen to arrest Wei immediately.16 
On December 11, in response to these warnings, the emperor rescinded 
his earlier edict and ordered the Embroidered-uniform Guard to go fetch 
the eunuch back under arrest, and seize his entire retinue.17 
Informants rushed from Beijing and overtook Wei to warn him of what 
was coming. On December 13, Wei and his entourage stopped for the 
night at the You family inn in Foucheng county, about 150 miles south of 
Beijing and still a long way from Fengyang, their destination. 
In the early hours of December 14, a servant of Wei Zhongxian's sec-
retary, Li Chaoqin, discovered the body of his master hanging by the 
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neck from a rafter of the inn, and next to it, also hanging from a rafter, 
the body of Wei Zhongxian himself. The two had used their belts as 
nooses and had committed suicide togetiier. The servant immediately 
sent word to county magistrate Yang Baohe. Magistrate Yang placed the 
suicide scene under guard and arrested the servant and the inn owner as 
well as another eunuch and several muleteers. The rest of Wei's rednue 
fled before they could be caught. Later that day a commander of the Em-
broidered-uniform Guard sent to arrest Wei arrived in Foucheng, listened 
to Magistrate Yang's report, and informed the throne of it. Sometime 
later, Censor Zhuo Mai, on duty as Zhili regional inspector, examined the 
corpses and verified their identities. In a rescript responding to diese re-
ports, the emperor ordered the authorities to bury the two suicides tem-
porarily in Foucheng, and to haul all the accompanying luggage to Hejian 
prefecture for inventorying. The arrested eunuch was ordered returned 
to Beijing for questioning. The other figures arrested were interrogated 
in Foucheng and then released.18 
In obedience to an edict of March i, 1628, the corpse of Wei Zhongxian 
was exhumed and carted to Hejian prefecture for posthumous execution 
by slicing (lingchi); rumor had it that while Li Chaoqin's remains had al-
ready rotted to the bones, Wei's still oozed body fluids, "just as though 
he had been awaiting Heaven's punishment."19 (A wild rumor, which per-
sisted into the Qing, had it that Wei had forced a look-alike to hang him-
self, had escaped into hiding, and was never caught.)20 
The construction of the great mausoleum that Wei was having built for 
himself at the Biyunsi in Beijing's Western Hills was never finished, but it 
is said that eunuchs managed to bury some articles of his clothing there, 
and for many years they guarded the inscribed stelae prominendy on view 
at the site, carefully erasing hostile graffiti left by visitors. Not until 1701 
did the Kangxi emperor, responding to a memorial, order the complete 
demolition of all remains of the site.21 
Madame Ke, bearer of the title Fengsheng Furen (Lady Who Supports 
the Sage), was in the dying Tianqi emperor's thoughts in September 1627. 
In a public edict, he recalled how he was sickly and weak as a child, and 
would not have survived without Madame Ke; and how, after first his 
mother and then his father died, she protected him all the more, in ways 
that "the outer court cannot imagine." He rewarded her for "twenty-
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three years of total and unwavering loyalty" by promoting in honors her 
younger brother and her son.22 
As noted, Madame Ke vacated her Palace quarters on October n. 
Sometime in December, the Chongzhen emperor ordered that her and 
Wei Zhongxian's private residences be confiscated.23 Reportedly, Madame 
Ke, now homeless, proceeded on foot some miles to the Wanyiju (literal-
ly, Laundry Office), a secluded retirement facility for eunuchs located 
northwest of the Imperial City.24 On December 24, she there confessed 
under torture that the eight pregnant maidservants whom police had just 
found living in her private residence had earlier accompanied her on her 
visits to the Forbidden City. This was unspeakable! Who had fathered the 
babies they were carrying? In a few more months, one of those babies 
might have been made Tianqi's successor as emperor of China! Madame 
Ke's interrogator, a eunuch named Wang Wenzheng (or Zhao Ben-
zheng), beat her to death. Unknown to Chongzhen, her corpse was cre-
mated in a Buddhist hall nearby, and her ashes scattered. (In March 1628, 
Chongzhen ordered her corpse located so that it could be subjected to 
posthumous execution.25 Of course, it was never found.) 
< 
During the early months of 1628, the Ministry of Justice presented de-
tailed criminal charges against Wei Zhongxian, Cui Chengxiu, and Mad-
ame Ke, all now deceased. The emperor agreed to the further confisca-
tion and execution of Wei's nephew, Wei Liangqing, and Madame Ke's 
son, Hou Guoxing. He also ordered that all the rest of their many rela-
tives, with the exception of some very young children, be permanentiy 
exiled to malarial regions. Decree Prison officials Xu Xianchun and Zhang 
Tiqian, responsible for the deaths of the Donglin martyrs, were ordered 
to be executed.26 
The emperor's strategy, however, was not to conduct a complete purge 
of all officials tainted by contact with the "Cui-Wei" regime, but to limit 
prosecutions to those who, on the basis of clear written evidence, could 
be proved to have been its ardent partisans. Thus there was issued early 
in 1629 the so-called Ni an (Treason Case), which publicly listed 161 
names of Cui-Wei partisans and their punishments: 24 people sentenced 
to execution; 11 exiled to garrisons; 71 reduced to commoner status; 32 
demoted and forced to retire; 12 simply demoted; and 11 simply forced to 
retire.27 
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On December 8, 1627, the many temples recently built in Wei Zhong-
xian's honor, or still under construction, were ordered to be dismantled. 
Proceeds from the sale of the building materials were to be added to the 
military defense budget. (A year later, the Ministry of Revenue reported 
the collection of 25,538 taels of silver from those sales.)28 
In an edict of December 17,1627, the emperor declared an "era of ren-
ovation" (weixin zhi zhi) and announced his intention to rehabilitate the 
Donglin martyrs, end the persecutions of their families, and release all the 
other political prisoners who were still being held in the Decree Prison.29 
Chongzhen reviewed each case individually and in most instances grant-
ed releases and exonerations. 
Sons of the martyrs journeyed to Beijing to offer pleas and accusations 
in their dead fathers' behalf. Zhou Shunchang's young son Zhou Maolan 
pierced his tongue and wrote in blood a memorial accusing two officials 
(Ni Wenhuan and Mao Yilu) of having engineered his father's wrongful 
death.30 And there came a day early in 1628 when there was held in Beijing 
a formal judicial interrogation (huishen duibu) of eight or so eunuchs and 
Decree Prison personnel. Several of the martyrs' sons were in the crowd 
of onlookers. Among them were Zhou Zongjian's son Zhou Yanzuo and 
Huang Zunsu's son Huang Zongxi. Both brought sharp awls. Zhou 
Yanzuo got blood all over himself from jabbing the prison guards Yan Zi 
and Ye Wenzhong, who with their own hands had killed several of the 
martyrs. (He and Huang Zongxi were later on hand to watch as both 
guards were flogged to death.) At the same interrogation, Huang Zongxi 
stuck his awl into his father's tormentors, former Decree Prison director 
Xu Xianchun and the eunuch Li Shi, and he yanked hairs from the beard 
of Xu Xianchun's deputy, Cui Yingyuan. Several of the sons also conduct-
ed a sacrifice in their fathers' memory at the central gate of the Decree 
Prison itself.31 
There was a need to decide what to do about the Sanchao yaodian, the 
definitive official treatise on the Three Cases that the Cui-Wei regime 
had sponsored, of which a second printing had been made as late as Octo-
ber 10, 1627.32 On December 19, a minor official of the Ministry of Rev-
enue suggested revising it.33 Chongzhen ordered court officials to discuss 
the matter. On January 8,1628, Supervising Secretary Chen Weixin com-
plained that some officials, hoping to reverse the final verdict on th 
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Three Cases, failed to understand that the purpose of the Sanchao yaodi-
an was to celebrate the paternal compassion and filial piety of the Ming 
imperial family. They did not see that the "fixed verdict" (dinjjlun) in the 
Three Cases was reached before Wei Zhongxian ever came to power! 
Therefore, while the treatise must no longer be used as an enemies' list, 
neither must it be tampered with.34 Chongzhen "noted" receipt of this 
memorial. 
On May i, 1628, a minor official sent up a memorial from Nanjing de-
manding that the Sanchao yaodian be revised so as to remove from its text 
all the false indictments composed by former Decree Prison director Xu 
Xianchun, all the memorials written by Cui Chengxiu and other con-
demned eunuch-partisans, and all the charges of "villainy and hetero-
doxy" laid against the Donglin adherents.35 This demand the emperor 
rejected. 
Hanlin Expositor-in-waiting Ni Yuanlu was probably following the em-
peror's cryptic clues. In a memorial of June 1, soon to become famous, 
he laid before Chongzhen the argument that the Three Cases were unde-
cidable; that there were meritorious intentions on either side of the con-
troversy; and that the Sanchao yaodian itself was Wei Zhongxian's "per-
sonal compilation," which favored one side for purely political reasons. 
Therefore, concluded Ni, it was advisable neither to preserve the text nor 
to revise it in such a way as to overturn the verdict; the only acceptable 
alternative was to destroy it altogether.36 Chongzhen was impressed with 
this argument, and he ordered the Ministry of Rites to gather historians 
from the Hanlin to discuss Ni's proposal. 
A heated debate must have ensued. On or around June n, Hanlin 
Expositor-in-waiting Sun Zhixie, beside himself with disappointment and 
frustration, stormed weeping into the Grand Secretariat, where allegedly 
he howled to Heaven, jumped up and down, spluttered expletives, ripped 
up his cap, and vowed to die, all in protest over the threatened destruc-
tion of the Sanchao yaodian. 
The scene shocked everyone. Supervising Secretary Zhang Chengzhao 
impeached Sun for his behavior. Censor Wu Huan rebutted Sun's argu-
ment that Chongzhen would in effect be ignoring his own brother's im-
perial command if he should order the book destroyed. Sun Zhixie was 
dismissed from office.37 The imperial rescript went ahead and ordered all 
palace copies of the Sanchao yaodian destroyed, and it directed local and 
educational officials all over China to destroy all printing blocks and all 
stocks of printed copies on hand. 
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The emperor indicated by his action in the Sanchao yaodian dispute 
that he intended to strike a hard blow against partisanship of any kind 
whenever he had the opportunity. He was resolutely destroying the Wei 
Zhongxian gang. He had agreed to rehabilitate Wei Zhongxian's victims. 
His purpose in destroying the Sanchao yaodian was to bury the Three 
Cases altogether as a bone of partisan contention. On at least two occa-
sions he rejected requests to reopen the academies as centers of jiangxue 
(discussion and study).38 By edict he warned the bureaucracy not to en-
gage in further partisan polemics.39 But his hopes were in vain, because 
the Donglin wanted total vindication. 
On December 17, 1627, Chongzhen agreed to a palace eunuch's re-
quest to rehabilitate Wang An, the pro-Donglin eunuch who had been 
removed and killed in 1621. But on January 4, 1628, when a surviving 
brother of Wang An sent up another plea in Wang An's behalf, Chong-
zhen denied the plea and sent the petitioner away from Beijing for fear he 
might start some sort of "incident."40 
"What is the Donglin?" asked Ni Yuanlu in a plea of February 11. "It is 
the 'talent grove' of the realm. Though sometimes too harsh and aggres-
sive, it represents purity. Though sometimes too opinionated, it stands for 
lofty enlightenment." Remnants of the "deviant clique" of Cui and Wei 
were even now suppressing it, said Ni, using die "iron case" labeled by 
the slogans daoxue (dissenting Confucianism) and fengqiang (territorial 
losses in Manchuria) to beat it down.41 Chongzhen declined Ni's invita-
tion to issue a blanket endorsement of the Donglin faction. 
Censor Yang Weiyuan rebutted Ni in a memorial of February 24. How, 
he asked, can Ni deny the presence of greedy, arrogant, and philosophi-
cally deluded people in the Donglin? And why was he making "Cui-Wei" 
into a "case," namely, a partisan issue?42 
Ni responded with a long and emotional riposte of March 2. In it, he 
asserted that making a "case" (duian) of Cui-Wei was precisely the right 
thing for the "loyal and upright" men of the world to do, because the low 
moral character (pinjie) of Cui and Wei was perfectly evident; they had 
killed good men of talent and reputation because they feared diem, and 
so "using [the names] 'Cui-Wei' to discriminate the deviant from the up-
right is just like using a mirror to tell the difference between the ugly and 
the beautiful." Should the Donglin killers be immune from all criticism?4* 
Chongzhen replied that opinions should be united, and he chided the 
writer for arguing. 
Censor Yang replied on March 7 that the crux of the matter was not 
1 6 0 A R E V E R S A L OF F O R T U N E S 15 1 
"Cui-Wei" at all. The real case (duian) was "making contact with Palace 
eunuchs" (tongnei). Ruan Dacheng further argued in a memorial that it 
was Wang Wenyan who had started the turmoil with his link to Wang An, 
an arrangement that was simply copied by Cui Chengxiu and others when 
they made their links to Wei Zhongxian.44 The emperor "noted" these 
memorials, but it was clear he agreed with them, because on March 30 he 
issued an edict reminding the officials of what had happened in the Tianqi 
era and warning them never again to make contacts with palace eu-
nuchs.45 (Because Yang Lian and many of the other Donglin heroes had 
in fact made such contacts, it was impossible for the avengers of the 
Donglin to achieve a complete partisan victory over those whom they la-
beled the "Cui-Wei" forces.) 
Was Political Partisanship Legitimate? 
Late Ming political discourse suggests that, on balance, the answer to that 
question is no. Partisan mobilization seems only to have been justifiable, 
not as a good thing in its own right, but as a response to the refusal of 
the emperor, beginning specifically with the Wanli emperor, to supply 
moral leadership to the realm. And the Donglin partisans, who stepped 
into the breach, foundered when, as an association of morally superior 
"gentiemen," they had for practical reasons to enlist the help of certain 
"small men" in the struggle for political supremacy in Beijing. Although 
they tried, it proved impossible for the Donglin spokesmen to gloss over 
this contradiction. 
The Donglin academy in Wuxi, founded in 1604 by Gu Xiancheng and 
Gao Panlong, for twenty years made a deep impression upon a significant 
fraction of scholar-officials and students from all over China. Through its 
study by discussion (jiangxue) method, Gu and Gao and other invited 
lecturers taught how the discovery of one's essential moral self must be 
achieved by way of outwardly directed moral effort.46 They warned their 
listeners that "small men" everywhere were trying to build a world with-
out gentiemen and without fathers and were "drowned in self-seeking 
freedom, while pretending to be concerned with tao [dao] and other vir-
tues."47 Gu and Gao also sought, through patronage and personal in-
fluence, and through hard infighting, placement for their degree-holding 
friends and proteges in available bureaucratic positions in Beijing. It was 
in political struggle of that sort that the outwardly directed dictum of 
"loving good and hating evil" proved useful as an energizing imperative. 
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(However, Gao Panlong was careful to explain in a lecture that loving 
good and hating evil was a dictum that was intended only for men of the 
"first caliber" [yideng] to act upon; men of the "second or third caliber," 
he cautioned, lack the moral development requisite to making their own 
judgments in such matters.)48 
In a 1613 memorial, Donglin sympathizer Liu Zongzhou conceded that 
Donglin partisan mobilization was not inherently a good thing but a side 
effect of the Wanli emperor's refusal to lead and govern the realm. Lack-
ing the hand of a morally right-guided autocrat, the Donglin, he argued, 
were left to rally behind the doctrine of loving good and hating evil to 
defend or attack other officials on the basis of their perceived moral 
worth (liupin)—that is, as gentiemen (junzi) or as small men (xiaoren). 
Liu admitted that at times this activity led to an excess of "cruelty and un-
feeling" (cctnke er buying). He also insisted that it was not appropriate 
that gentiemen should form factions among themselves that were based 
upon different "views" (yijian) in controversial political issues. They 
should just agree to differ.49 
In practice, Liu's approach did not work. The Donglin did take 
"views," arguing in the Three Cases that persons of high moral character 
might rally behind a single view, leaving only persons of low moral char-
acter to champion the contrary positions. Liu's friend Gao Panlong 
helped press for this radicalization. In a memorial of 1622, and again in 
1623, Gao gave a ringing endorsement of the rectitude of the paranoid 
reading of the evidence in the Palace Case of 1620.50 In effect, he associ-
ated high moral character with the holding of a certain "view" in an issue 
of political controversy. 
Gao Panlong further argued that partisan groups or factions or cliques 
(dang) form inevitably, but they comprise all gentiemen on one side and 
all small men on the other. In the case of small men, the factions they 
form are inherently "biased" (they are a piandang). Gendemen, by con-
trast, naturally group together as members of a single species (lei): they 
constitute a danglei zhi dang, that is, a clique or fellowship that forms on 
the basis of common characteristics that each member recognizes or sens-
es in the other—and that nonmembers also recognize, and condemn. In 
a long October 1622 message addressed to his Beijing colleagues, Gao 
argued that strictiy speaking there was no "Donglin dang," as Supervis-
ing Secretary Zhu Tongmeng had charged when he attacked the Shou-
shan academy as a center for partisan organization. Gao stated that any-
time anyone says or does anything that is correct, anytime any excellent 
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person is appointed to a vacant position, the small men raise a clamor and 
accuse such people of being Donglin men. "No matter that they are men 
from every different part of China, who have no connection with each 
other—if they act with uprightness, they are regarded as members of this 
single dang!"51 
In his controversial essay on factions, however, Gao argued that it was 
a mistake for gentiemen in the heat of battle to deny that they constitute 
a dang. But no dang was capable of achieving anything all by itself. Auto-
cratic support was absolutely essential. According to Gao, there was only 
one way to bring an end to the disastrous partisan strife of the 1620s: the 
emperor had to identify and appoint to the highest positions the handful 
of outstanding personalities among the dang of gentiemen and reject the 
handful of outstanding leaders among the small men. The rest of offi-
cialdom, being of middling quality, would follow as a matter of course the 
lead of the outstanding gentiemen.52 
Early in the Tianqi reign, Liu Zongzhou had made an argument of just 
this kind in a personal letter he wrote to Grand Secretary Zhu Guozhen, 
urging him neither to sit by and "observe from a distance" (guanwang) 
nor to follow chief Grand Secretary Ye Xianggao and "work out compro-
mises" (tiaoting). He implored Zhu to strive to make the young ruler a 
moral autocrat—a Yao or Shun. Liu accurately foresaw that Tianqi would 
try to withdraw from government as his grandfather Wanli had done, 
placing actual rule in the hands of some effective practitioner of harsh 
methods, as early in his reign Wanli had done with Grand Secretary 
Zhang Juzheng.53 Of course Tianqi's surrogate was not a grand secretary 
but palace eunuch Wei Zhongxian. 
After the deaths of Tianqi and Wei Zhongxian, arguments over the le-
gitimacy of factions were resumed at court. In 1628-1629, as the time for 
the sexennial evaluations of Beijing officials approached, some speaking 
officials at court tried to eliminate all talk of factions. Officials, they said, 
were either upright or deviant; history had shown that to assume or to 
charge that those making such judgments did so on partisan grounds was 
to invite dynastic collapse.54 
Censor Ren Zanhua patiendy explained that when one talked about 
"gentiemen" and "small men" one was talking about species or categories 
(lei), not factions. It was like the colors red, white, blue, and so on, which 
are easily distinguishable from each other. It was like dogs and horses, 
which from birth (from the time they receive qi) are of a different species 
from human beings. How puzzled we would be if dogs or horses should 
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point at us and call us all members of a human faction! Unless we avoid-
ed the word "faction," we could not even say that the categories of hu-
man being, dog, or horse even exist! So the emperor just needed to sep-
arate officials by moral quality (liupin), and on that basis determine the 
right or wrong of what they said.55 
Supervising Secretary Liu Mou said there was no need to consider par-
ties or cliques as real entities. Government was a matter of partiality or 
impartiality in individuals. It was not eloquence or talent that character-
ized upright gentlemen, but impartial thinking. Gentiemen kept not their 
own interests but the interests of the ruler, the dynasty, and the people in 
mind. In the Tianqi era, it was the self-concerned thinking of people like 
Grand Secretary Wei Guangwei that led them to identify their critics as 
members of a Donglin camp (menhu)3 which in turn occasioned the fate-
ful transfer of power to Wei Zhongxian in the inner Palace and the near 
collapse of die Ming.56 
The Chongzhen emperor emphatically agreed with these arguments. 
He insisted that all talk of factions and camps destroyed government and 
therefore must cease. On February 18, 1629, he met with a large gather-
ing of officials in the Wenhua palace in conjunction with a fierce dispute 
in which each side was accusing the other of partisanship—of old links to 
the Donglin and Cui-Wei factions. "Well, just consider this," said Chong-
zhen after a long day of listening to both sides. "When have [the speak-
ing officials] ever had the dynasty (guojia) in mind? I can tell when 
they're really focusing on the guo, the jia, the national territory, the well-
being of the people. But they don't send up anything unless it suits their 
selfish purposes. What kind of time is this? We have alarms east and west, 
we have war north and south, yet they have no anxiety for the dynasty, all 
they do is divide into camps, all they talk about is some clique (dang), 
some Donglin, and of what benefit is that to national affairs?"57 
The case for or against factions could, in the end, never be definitively 
resolved, couched as it was in Confucian moral theory, and vividly col-
ored as it was by recent memory of the events of the disastrous Tianqi 
reign. Even if not asserted by members, faction could always be inferred 
and imputed by others. 
If one followed Gao Panlong's argument, "factions" were natural soci-
omoral formations, and in order for China to be ruled well, the emperor 
needed only to coopt into his administration the leaders among that self-
selected faction which was made up of individuals of recognizably supe-
rior moral type. 
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If, further, one followed the argument made later by Hou Fangyu 
(1618-1655), then only gendemen formed factions. And it was right that 
they should do so. The argument that factionlessness should prevail 
(which Chongzhen preferred) was nothing but a clever ploy advanced by 
small men. Small men clung to the specious slogan "stand independent 
and minimize collegial ties" (duliguayu), which in fact just licensed op-
portunism, allowing them to feint and shift, straight today and crooked 
tomorrow.58 Even from youth a good gendeman must have his close 
friends! If he is friendless, it means worthies have rejected him and he 
must be evil, or else humble to excess. "How," asked Hou, "can a gen-
deman with a will to serve the world stand independent and minimize 
collegial ties?" Partisan circles (dang, menhu), he pointed out, were to be 
found everywhere in China. Sometimes an entire province was made up 
of small men. Sometimes there were gentleman and small-man cliques in 
the various prefectures and counties. And it happened that even inside 
families, fathers, sons, and brothers divided into gendeman and small-
man cliques!59 
Liu Zongzhou (back in office, as prefect of Beijing's Shuntian prefec-
ture) protested in a long memorial of November 1629 that while the label 
"menhu" was the reason for the killing of "countless upright men [em-
bodying] primal qi" in recent years, the emperor was keeping the menhu 
struggle alive by the very balancing act (between the upright Yang-Zuo 
and the deviant Cui-Wei factions) that he hoped would suppress it.60 The 
emperor was not pleased by this argument. 
The Donglin in Retrospect 
Later on, as time passed and the Tianqi era could be viewed in longer per-
spective, most commentators took the position that the Donglin's politi-
cization of virtue had been a grave mistake. According to Feng Ban 
(1602-1671), gendemen should associate with each other not on the basis 
of party but on the basis of impartiality and righteousness. The Donglin 
experience showed that when gentlemen form a party, harm results. The 
Donglin men were upright gentlemen, but it was unfortunately self-inter-
est (siyi) that led them to create a camp (menhu).61 
Lin Shidui (1615-1705) thought that some in the Donglin suffered from 
an excess of heat and ardor. The Donglin founders were gentiemen, but 
they created a camp, and they attracted evil opportunists into that camp. 
A R E V E R S A L O F F O R T U N E S 15 1 
Real men (hanzi), he said, stand without fear above the storm, and do 
not seek shelter in the camps of other people.62 
A dynasty afflicted with dang, concluded Zhu Haoling (1606-1683), was 
like a tree riddled with termites. All dang were bad. The Donglin dung 
was organized around opinion; in the struggle over the Three Cases, the 
Donglin leaders' heroics "eclipsed the sun and moon and drove the wind 
and storm," but they had to accept help from small men, and the whole 
"partisan disaster" (danghuo) that ensued was responsible for the fall of 
the Ming. It was always a mistake to identify small men and engage them 
in battle, as the Donglin had. Gentlemen should remember that they can-
not vanquish small men through partisanship. They vanquish small men 
when they act with impartiality and perfect calm; they must never yield to 
emotionalism and rancor.63 
Back in the Tianqi era, noted Chen Tingjing (1639-1712), the scholar-
officials prided themselves on being Donglin stalwarts. They so eagerly 
sought respect and fame that they frivolously provoked the anger of small 
men. It did not matter to them that their pursuit of personal reputation 
came at the dynasty's expense, and, indeed, had those gentlemen not per-
ished, the Ming dynasty might not have collapsed as soon as it did.64 
The distinction between gentiemen and small men was and had to re-
main total and absolute, according to Huang Zongxi (1610-1695; son of 
Donglin martyr Huang Zunsu). Even so, he agreed that the Donglin 
("our party") had been too radical. Huang Zongxi's father had, after 
all, tried to stop Wei Dazhong from impeaching Grand Secretary Wei 
Guangwei, but Wei Dazhong cared more for his own reputation (ming-
jie) than he did for the fate of the dynasty. "If the small men were driven 
to the extremity of using the eunuch [Wei Zhongxian] to wreak venge-
ance, the fault for that lay with the gentlemen of the Tianqi era," he 
concluded.65 
There was wide agreement in the Qing that the fate of the Ming was 
sealed by what had happened in the Tianqi era. There were differences, 
however, about who or what bore the main responsibility. Was it the 
Tianqi emperor? Anthologist Chen Ding (b. 1651) thought so. So child-
ish and stupid (tonghun) a ruler was Tianqi that, wrote Chen, not even 
the duke of Zhou could have controlled the crowd of "tigers and wolves" 
that came to dominate his court. Tianqi was scarcely aware that Wei 
Zhongxian was stealing his power. "Heaven sent disaster to the dynasty 
by giving birth to that characterless (bucai) ruler," he concluded. After 
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the damage Tianqi had done, there was nothing his successor, the Chong-
zhen emperor, could do to save the realm.66 
However, historian Tan Qian (1594-1658) did not think that Tianqi per-
sonally was all that much to blame. He noted that in the fifteenth centu-
ry the Yongle emperor had trained his grandson, the Xuande emperor, so 
that upon his succession Xuande would be able to cope with the demands 
of the job. The Wanli emperor, by contrast, did not attend court, and the 
child Tianqi grew up in the Cining palace where he knew nothing of out-
side affairs and had no one but eunuchs and palace women to educate 
him. For all the evils of his reign, noted Tan Qian, Tianqi must be given 
credit for having refused to revive Wanli's policy of having eunuchs run 
the nation's mines, and especially for his vouchsafing the succession of the 
throne to his younger brother, the Chongzhen emperor.67 
Or was no one specifically to blame? The Ming dynastic history, pub-
lished in 1739, comments (after its biographies of the Donglin martyrs): 
"When a dynasty is about to perish, it first destroys its own good species 
(shanlei). After that, there come flood, drought, and banditry. So at the 
beginning point of [a time of] disaster and chaos, it is the gendemen 
among the scholar-officials who, remarkably, suffer the poison first. In the 
case of the Ming, all the court officials argued endlessly the so-called 
Three Cases, and the great villains used that as a means to extirpate the 
good species, which is how Yang [Lian] and Zuo [Guangdou] and the 
others ended up as corpses in the [Decree] prison. It was like the late 
years of the Eastern Han all over again. Nothing could have saved the 
Ming."68 
There never was a final, single verdict in the Donglin matter. What the 
Donglin had stood for and what it had suffered called for everlasting 
commemoration. And yet, at the very same time, what hindsight sug-
gested the Donglin had done was to set in motion the collapse of the very 
dynasty they had thought they were rescuing, and for this it appeared 
they deserved resolute condemnation. 
In his preface to his biographical anthology of leading Donglin person-
alities (the Donglin liezhunn, published in 1711), Chen Ding reflected up-
on the unhappy terminal years of the Ming and considered what the 
Donglin had done to shape them. The great legacy of the Donglin, he as-
serted, was its creation through the technique of jiangxue (discussion and 
study) of a historically unprecedented spiritual revolution; the Donglin 
had raised the moral level of China's long civilization to such a degree 
that nothing in the past could compare with it. The Donglin changed the 
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whole moral atmosphere (fengqi) of China. They taught the "study of the 
sages"; they elucidated "righteous principles"; they encouraged "honesty 
and sense of shame"; they made people look on the dynasty (guo) as a 
family (jia), on the ruler as a father; they encouraged people to pursue 
right like water flowing downhill, and to look on death as a return home. 
And just observe how many people of all classes—from the Chongzhen 
emperor and high officials, the gentry, even down to commoners and 
their wives and daughters—"willingly committed suicide as proof of their 
moral resolve, or suffered slaughter to bring to a completion their benev-
olence." Chen Ding said that he was able to uncover the stories of some 
forty-six hundred martyrs, not counting women. Martyrs came forth in 
solid ranks, heel to heel and shoulder to shoulder, and all thanks to 
Donglin teaching. " N o dynasty," he said in a ringing phrase, "ever fell in 
more brilliant glory than did the Ming."69 
It was probably hard for the editors of the Qianlong emperor's "Four 
Treasuries" project to decide what to do with Chen Ding's work. In the 
end they decided to accept and recopy it for the imperial library.70 But the 
Manchu emperor attached a preface of his own, dated 1778, to Chen's 
preface; in it, he heavily berated Chen Ding for his false notions. "The 
Donglin discussion and study began in uprightness," he thundered, "but 
it ended in chaos, and it brought the Ming down with it The gende-
men should have carried on the [Ming] founders' legacy and brought 
peace to the people. Given that they failed to keep that legacy, it is hardly 
reasonable to consider their martyrdom in a lost cause as glorious 
When the Donglin let small men into their ranks, that was just like open-
ing the door to invite in the thieves, and that is where the partisan impris-
onments began. The Donglin brought this on themselves, and they kept 
it up until the Ming fell. Chen Ding wrongs the ruler, the bureaucracy, 
and [the ideal of the] upright man and the gendeman. [Above all], 
any gendeman should want his dynasty to survive, and the people to 
prosper!"71 
There was, and is, no certain way to reconcile these conflicting views 
of the Donglin legacy. However, though the Qianlong emperor con-
demned the Donglin men for their political shortsightedness, he did not 
go so far as to impugn the martyrs' sincerity, or, indeed, to order the 
destruction of Chen Ding's work, as he could have done. In effect, the 
emperor left open the possibility that the self-sacrifices of the Donglin 
heroes might look altogether better if they were not judged in the light 
of practical questions of governance at all. There was another way to 
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commemorate those who gave their lives for moral principles and in pro-
test of evil. This way transcended practical issues. It was cosmic. 
In 1848, publisher Pan Xi'en wrote a preface to a collectaneum he put 
together consisting of the prose writings of 101 moral heroes and martyrs, 
ranging in date from the fourth century B.C. to the end of the Ming and 
including the Donglin heroes. (Seventy-two of his 101 heroes lived in the 
Ming.) He called the collectaneum Qiankun zhengqi ji, or "rectified qi 
(moral climate, ethical energy) between Heaven and Earth." He noted 
that qi is a cosmic substance that should be "upright" (zheng), but in the 
course of time and events it turns "deviant" (xie). In times of crisis, when 
yin and yang struggle with each other, deviant qi overspreads the world, 
and "if no one steps forth then, and uses all his strength to support and 
revive [upright qi\ then surely Heaven and Earth come to destruction. 
By 'upright q? is meant commonality without partiality; making plans for 
the entire state, not single families; acting for the whole realm, not the 
single individual. And there is no greater instance of qi in a rectified con-
dition than when men go so far as to sacrifice themselves and their fami-
lies for the sake of the state and the realm."72 
This sort of cosmic thinking is by no means dead in China today.73 It is 
thus on a cosmic battlefield, in the partly pure, partly contaminated fields 
of qi that fill the space between Heaven and Earth, that human beings 
must from time to time take this side or that in an all-out war. To fight 
to restore upright qi is to love good and hate evil, to uphold the whole 
and not the part, and to sacrifice absolutely everything to the cause. 
Student leader Chai Ling's startiing statements of 1989, linking the unity 
of China to love and hate and blood and sacrificial slaughter, seem to 
have had, not so much "science" and "democracy," as these deeper philo-
sophical and historical resonances implicitly behind them. Likewise, in 
1624, Yang Lian and Wei Dazhong and Li Yingsheng were not thinking 
about practical matters of governance at all when they flung their missiles 
at personified evil, knowingly placing their lives at risk when they did so. 
It is at this rarefied cosmic level that blood and history in China achieve 
their full and indeed intended effect. 
When the pseudonymous "Beijing Guest" described in awful detail 
what happened inside the Decree Prison in 1625, he called his account 
"Proof of the Conjunction of Heaven and Man: A True Record" (Tian-
ren hezheng jishij, thus evoking the cosmic context for the gruesome facts 
he reported. He noted in the spring of 1625 an unusual juncture of the 
moon with a certain constellation, which to him meant that "innocent 
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high officials were about to come to grief." Specifically, the heavenly bod-
ies foretold poisonous disaster for officials of the Censorate—which 
would be Yang Lian and Zuo Guangdou; and, sure enough, their arrests 
were ordered a month later. Next the Beijing Guest sighted a noctilucent 
cloud positioned in a certain way, which prefigured the torture and 
deaths of Yang, Zuo, and Wei Dazhong on eunuch orders; and, after that, 
the sun and the planet Venus were visible in the same sky together, nor-
mally indicating an inferior competing with the ruler for power (quart), 
but the eunuch's power was already complete, so the Beijing Guest inter-
preted the phenomenon to mean the imminent deaths of the remaining 
Donglin prisoners. 
And so it turned out. But the Beijing Guest was not primarily interest-
ed in showing the world the accuracy of his astrological predictions. He 
kept a daily log of what happened in the Decree Prison at the risk of his 
own life for a different purpose: so diat "a hundred generations from 
now, the air (feng) of the [Six Gendemen] will still be current, and peo-
ple will continue to mourn them."74 The narrative itself leaves no doubt 
of the writer's emotional involvement in the fate of the men who came to 
know him as a youxin rcn—"a man with a heart." 
Someday, perhaps, the legacy of the demonstrations of 1989 will be re-
interpreted by whatever government is then ruling in Beijing in a way 
somewhat resembling the Qing interpretation of the Donglin legacy of 
1620-1627: as a grievous mistake in practical politics but a glorious exer-
cise in collective sincerity, which demonstrated the moral capacity of the 
people of China, led by the best and brightest among them, to rise to a 
level high above their mundane and selfish concerns and to write with 
their blood yet another chapter of a very special history that has a place 
all its own in defining what China is all about. 
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